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Abstract
This dissertation examines the impact of the 1988 reform of the Structural
Funds' Regulations on the administrative arrangements regarding regional policy
process in Greece, focusing on changes and shifts of power in the sub-national tiers of
government. The analysis looks into the application of the guiding principles in the
context of the two Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) for Greece, covering the
period 1989-1999, and focusing on the regional section of the CSFs.
Against this background research involves:
• the compatibility between the existing domestic arrangements on the one
hand and those required in the context of the Community Support
Frameworks on the other,
• the new institutions introduced in response of the above requirements,
• the response of the domestic system to the new institutions,
• the loci of resistance and the role of the Commission in ensuring application
of Community legislation.
The study includes a theoretical and an empirical part.
The first three theoretical chapters offer an overview of the Community Regional
Policy and the requirements it sets on domestic systems, an understanding of the
Greek political culture and administrative system and more specifically the
decentralised and deconcentrated tiers of government, the significance of the
European argument in the domestic debate on State and societal reform, and a
theoretical framework for the study of the Greek case.
The three empirical chapters examine the application of the two Community Support
Frameworks, the introduction of new institutions, and the degree to which these
altered traditional policy process, and power structures especially with regard
empowerment of sub-national tiers.























CAD: Collective Decision of Action (a decision, usually
ministerial, allocating financial resources to a public body
to be used for developmental purposes)
CRP: Community Regional Policy
CSF: Community Support Framework
EAPTA: Special Local Self-government Development Programme
EATOP: A party committee of PASOK created specifically to
promote decentralisation
EDIK: National Democratic Union (political party of the Centre,
post dictatorial period)
EETAA: Greek Enterprise for Local Government and Local
Development
EIB: European Investment Bank
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund
IMP: Integrated Mediterranean Programmes
JSC: Joint Steering Committee
KEDKE: Central Union of Municipalities and Communes
LD: Local Development
LP: Large Project
LPIP: Local Public Investment Programme
LSG: Local Self-government
LSGA: Local Self-government Authorities
LSGO: Local Self-government Organisation
MLG: Multi-level Governance.
MOU: Management Organisation Unit
iv
21. ND: New Democracy (Right-wing political party)
22. OPEK: Association for the Modernisation of the Society
23. PASOK: Panellenic Socialist Movement
24. PDE: Public Investment Programme
25. PM Programme Manager
26. PSG: Prefectoral Self-government.
27. PSG: Prefectoral Self-government
28. PW: Public Works
29. RCAD: Regional Collective Decision of Action (issued by a
Ministry and concerning a Region)
30. RDP: Regional Development Plan (the first phase of
programming)
31. ROP: Regional Operational Programme
32. SEA: Single European Act
33. SNA: Sub-national Authorities
34. YPEHODE: Ministry for the Environment, City Planning and Public
Works.
35. YPESDDA: Ministry for the Interior, Public Administration and
Decentralisation
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the response of the Greek administrative
system to the requirements of the 1988 revision of the Structural Funds, in order
to find out whether and to what extent it induced changes in domestic regional
policy process. In this context, emphasis is placed on empowerment of
subnational tiers of government and in particular the Regions which were first
introduced in light of European integration.
Analysis is looking into the application of the two Community Support
Frameworks (CSF) for Greece, in the period 1988-1999, focusing on the
institutional and organisational incapacity of the sub-national tiers, as revealed in
production of public works and in particular basic infrastructure projects, and
discussing the reforms introduced in response to European policy requirements.
The Greek political and administrative system has always been clientelist
and centralised. The principles introduced with the 1988 reform of the Structural
Funds as well as Community directives applying in the context of the
Community Support Frameworks contrasted sharply domestic regional policy
process. Such has been the persistence of existing institutions that at the end of
the first programming period, traditional policy patterns were left almost
untouched, while reforms introduced with considerable delay in the second
programming period met with strong resistance. According to the main
argument of the thesis, and in line with new institutionalist theory, the degree of
domestic adaptation to Community legislation depends on the issues regulated
by the latter. There are two dimensions in this approach:
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a) The centrality of the elements challenged by Community policy process
in national political and administrative culture. This implies that
resistance of the domestic system to the reforms introduced depends
largely on the degree that these reforms challenge the existing opportunity
structures, i.e. existing patterns of power and resource distribution.
b) Directly linked to and dependent on the above is the self-reforming and
in a more narrow sense the self-regulatory capacity of the society. This is
again as shown in the analysis closely related to cultural factors. More
specifically, if culture is perceived as a set of institutions and self-
understandings developed with view to securing survival, then it becomes
obvious why a political and administrative system would tend to
reproduce itself. Structures and modes of resource and power distribution
are consolidated over time and through repetition. Reforms that seek to
change these well-consolidated patterns threaten in reality vested interests
of groups and social strata. The more vital the challenged elements to the
survival of these groups the stronger the resistance displayed.
Although a number of studies, most of them articles and short
contributions have examined the issue of adaptation of the Greek administrative
system to the demands of European integration, some of them stressing the
importance of social capital and political and administrative culture in general,
none of them has attempted an in depth analysis of the reasons behind the low
degree of domestic adaptation. In short, the reforming capacity of the Greek
society as a whole and the administrative system in particular have not been so
far adequately analysed.
In doing so, this dissertation examines moreover, developments in
domestic politics during the past decade that have not been studied before at an
academic level. More specifically, the creation of modernising-reformist
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movements within the political parties in an attempt to address the issue of their
obsolescence, their linkage to the European argument and the resistance of
domestic opportunity structures are brought together for the first time in the
development of the core argument of this thesis, revealing and interpreting the
low self-reforming capacity of the Greek society.
Without an understanding of the above issues it would be difficult to
comprehend in a satisfactory way the low degree of adaptability of the Greek
administrative system to Community regional policy requirements.
The reason why this dissertation focuses on public works production is
linked to the fact that basic infrastructure projects have always been
predominant in domestic regional policy process. As such, this sector displays in
a most illustrative manner all the features of the clientelist, centralised State,
highlighting the institutional and organisational weaknesses of sub-national tiers
of government, and the networks of various actors organised around traditional
opportunity structures. It is characteristic that basic infrastructure small scale
works and projects retained their predominance in the context of the CSFs. It is
also significant that the official document of the 2nd CSF contained specific
provisions regarding improvement of this particular sector, following the chaotic
situation observed during the 1st programming period. There have been no
similar provisions regarding other policy sectors.
The study focuses on the regional section of the CSFs and includes both
theoretical and empirical elements. Information is drawn on Greek and foreign
bibliography and official Greek and Community documents. Moreover, there
was initially an attempt to collect information with questionnaires. However, this
did not yield satisfactory results as there was no sufficient response.
Subsequently, information regarding theoretical issues on which literature is
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inadequate or non existent, but mainly information concerning empirical matters
has been accessed through a very large number of interviews.
More specifically, as regards the genesis and evolution of the reforming
movements that crystallised in think-tanks attached to political parties and in
particular the Association for the Modernisation of the Society, (Chapter Three),
a field not adequately studied, information was provided to a large extent
through interviews with personalities of the political and academic worlds
involved in the creation and development of this movement. Moreover, and
especially regarding Chapters Four, Five and Six, interviews with actors at sub-
national, national and Community levels have provided invaluable information
based on their personal experience from involvement in the application of the
CSFs. With one or two exceptions, interviewees have been involved in the above
process for many years, most of them during both programming periods, and
were still serving in the same or relevant positions at the time they were
interviewed, which allowed them a very accurate knowledge and deep insight of
the developments.
These semi-structured interviews have proven an extremely useful
method, as they allowed arguments to develop freely thus revealing parameters
that had not been considered in advance, which, however, shed additional light
into the issues discussed. In addition, it seems that personal contact and the
establishment of mutual trust has offered an advantage as opposed to
impersonal questionnaires. The whole process has been facilitated by the fact that
the author is a civil servant, with acquaintances at all levels of the public sector.
This has moreover allowed her to attend a number of official meetings of great
interest to the research project. Furthermore, it made possible access to
documents, although the latter has not been particularly easy (especially with
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regards the more delicate issues), and this is one of the reasons why empirical
research relies so heavily on interviews.
Nonetheless, a satisfactory number of official documents were finally
obtained, enough to complement information provided through interviews and
support the arguments deployed in the course of the analysis. More specifically,
the official Ex-post Evaluation Report of the 1st CSF, evaluation reports of
individual Regional Operational Programmes of the two programming periods,
and Minutes of the Community Support Framework Monitoring Committee
have been used extensively for documentation in the last three empirical
chapters. In addition, and to a far lesser degree, a limited number of official
documents from personal archives have been accessed.
Finally, the author's educational background, (a graduate of the National
School for Public Administration, Department for Local Self-government), her
experience acquired during her work of nearly two years in the Prefecture of
Eastern Attica, five years as a Head of the Department for 2nd Degree Self-
government in the Region of Attica, and nearly two years as an Inspector for
Public Administration, have contributed greatly to a deep understanding of the
developments at all levels of public administration, especially the sub-national
tiers.
The analysis is divided in three theoretical and three empirical chapters.
Chapter One offers an overview of the developments in Community
Regional Policy, focusing on the 1988 revision of the Structural Funds
Regulations. The principles introduced with the above reform are discussed in a
way that illustrates their dynamics in domestic policy process. The chapter is also
looking into the Commission's role in promoting application of the rules and
empowerment of the Regions. A short overview of the literature concerning
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domestic adaptation to the requirements of European integration concludes
Chapter One.
Chapter Two discusses the Greek political culture analysing the nature of
the centralised clientelist State, and offers a description of the Greek
administrative system and the abortive attempts to reform it. In particular, the
status of sub-national tiers of government is studied, with emphasis on their
institutional, organisational and financial incapacity. Discussion includes
regional development policy process in a manner that highlights the vicious
circle that retained clientelism and centralisation of power.
Chapter Three offers in the beginning an overview of the relations
between the Community and Greece. Moreover, it examines the appearance and
development of reformist movements within political parties, and their relation
to the European argument. The analysis seeks among others to reveal the self-
reforming capacity of the Greek society. Finally, a theoretical framework is
developed, for the interpretation of the response of the Greek administrative
system and society to the demands of the application of the two Community
Support Frameworks.
Chapter Four looks into the application of the CSF 1989-1993, showing
persistence of the existing domestic patterns in policy process. Moreover, the
reforms introduced during this period are presented. The study covers the
regional section of the CSF, i.e. developments in the Regional Operational
Programmes (ROP).
Chapter Five describes the reforms introduced during the application of
the CSF 1994-1999. It was during this period that the reforming process was
accelerated after the poor results of the 1st programming period. Some of the
innovations were directly induced by European policy requirements and were
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even agreed upon in the CSF 1994-1999 for Greece. Others, especially those
related to decentralisation and deconcentration had been announced long before
among the intentions of the ruling party and were accelerated in the light of
European policy process. The process demonstrates once more domestic
patterns' persistence, while at the same time highlights the role of the
Commission as an overseer of the application of the Community legislation and a
dynamic agent of domestic reform.
Chapter Six, the case study, examines the application of the two Regional
Operational Programmes of Thessaly, offering an account of the response of the
administrative system and social partners to the application of Community
policies, as well as to the new institutions induced in the above context.
Finally the theoretical and empirical elements of the research are brought
together in a conclusive manner.
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Chapter One: CommunityRegionae Policy: froma Resource Re-
AllocationMechanism to a Tool ofEconomicand Social Cohesionand
anEngine of Institutional Reform. TheRole of the Commission: 'A
Regional DevelopmentEngineer'? 1.
Introductory notes
This chapter is looking into the 1988 reform of the Community
Structural Funds as an engine of domestic administrative reform. This
dissertation focuses on infrastructure projects funded by the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), however the 1988 reform encompasses
all the Structural Funds, providing for their co-ordinated function with view to
achieving 'social and economic cohesion' therefore the guiding principles apply
equally to the other Funds too.
Similarly, discussion of the period before 1988 is important, inasmuch as
it illustrates the argument - key hypothesis of this thesis- according to which,
resistance of national administrative patterns to reforms is due principally to
disturbance of existing patterns of resource and power distribution, by the new
principles introduced with 1988 reform.
Indeed, the study of the period before 1988 reveals the preoccupation of
the Member-States with the prospect of losing powers to supranational
institutions, especially the Commission, but also with the possibility of a re¬
configuration of power distribution within the national settings. A detailed
discussion of this period is beyond the scope of this thesis, although a brief
1 Delors, J. (1987), Introduction of the Commission's programme for 1987. Address to the
European Parliament. Commission of the European Communities (1987), "The Single European
Act: A New Frontier for Europe". Communication from the Commission (COM(87) 100) to the
Council. Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 1/87, p. 31.
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reference to the respective developments is made below before the examination
of the 1988 reform.
Discussion seeks to portray the engines of domestic reform. Apart from
the principles enshrined with the 1988 Structural Funds' revision, clauses
included in the CSFs directly providing for administrative changes, as well as
Community secondary legislation concerning public works production, are the
principal mechanisms of reform. The Commission's role has been particularly
important in ensuring application of the operating rules of the Funds and
promoting change.
Community Regional Policy (CRP) before 1988
During the first decades of European integration, CRP was not a
challenge to domestic administrative arrangements, as it functioned merely as
a mechanism for resource re-allocation among Member-States. The funds were
allotted to the individual Member-States on a quota basis, which allowed them
to use the resources at their discretion retaining the existing administrative
patterns. The main reason for the belated advancement of a Regional Policy of
a truly Community character has been attributed to fears shared by Member-
States, -and in particular those with a strongly statist tradition like France-, that
a CRP enhancing the role of the regional level was in fact " ...a declaration ofwar
on the State... It was - rightly or wrongly - thought that Community construction was
to be achieved at the expense of the national states, stressing the intermediate regional
level". 2 Another dimension of the issue was related to the changing dynamics
between the Member-States and the Community3
2 Meny, Y. (1982), "Should the Community Regional Policy Be Scrapped" ? CMLR, Vol. 19, No 3, pp.
373-388, p. 374.
3 "The development of the structural funds must he considered in the context of ... the changing
dynamics of the relationship between the European institutions and the member states". Michie, R. and
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The creation of the ERDF in 1975 did not alter seriously this state of
affairs, in which the Commission's role was minimal.4 It is since the mid-1980s
and in particular after the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) that,
successive reforms transformed the ERDF into the tool of economic and social
cohesion. The period up to 1986 was marked by the Commission's efforts to
promote a new type of CRP, of really Community nature, which involved
reducing the Member-States' influence on CRP making. The first real
breakthrough came with the adoption of the Integrated Mediterranean
Programmes (IMPs), (Reg. 2088/1985 of 23 July 1985, concerning the integrated
Fitzgerald, R.(1997), "The Evolution of the Structural Funds", in Bachtler, J. and Turock, I. (Eds),
"The Coherence ofEU Regional Policy". London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, p.14.
4 After a lot of hesitancy, the creation of the ERDF was announced in the Paris Summit in 1972.
It was established in 1975 (EEC Reg. No 724/75, OJ 1975 L 73/1). The re-distributional nature
of the new CRP was reflected in the final text of the regulation, which fell short of the initial
proposals as these had appeared in the Thomson Report. As pointed out by the deputy
raporteur of the European Parliament Committee on Regional Policy and Transport after the
establishment of the ERDF, "...what we have here is not a real Community regional policy, but a
policy of assistance and support for the regional policies ofMember-States". Debates of the European
Parliament 1975, Wednesday, 12 March, p. 42. More specifically, and significantly for the issue
of administrative reforms, with regards to the reproach of poor participation of regional, social
and economic partners provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the Regional Policy
Committee, Thomson pointed out that had the Commission insisted on mandatory
consultation, the Council would have ruled out altogether the relevant clause. The Regional
Policy Committee, consisting mainly of representatives of the Member-States had the final say
regarding the decisions taken in the context of the ERDF. "The committee may, at the request of a
member, consult representatives of trade Community and business or professional organisations either
orally or in writing on specific subjects directly connected with the tasks of the committee. When items
on the agenda are of concern to particular regions, the committee, if members appointed by the Member
State concerned think it usefid to do so, may take evidence either orally or in writing, from institutional
representatives or from other mterested parties from the regions concerned." Emphasis added. (Article
5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Regional Policy Committee, OJ No L 320, 11.12.1975). These
statements unveil the anxiety of the national governments with regards not only loss of power
vis-a-vis the Community institutions but also sub-national levels of government. Additional
and more concrete evidence of this is provided in the statements of Fitzerald, President-in-
Office of the Council, in his address to the EP. Defending the provisions on the Rules of
Procedure of the Regional Policy Committee, he argued that one of the reasons why the
consultation of the regional and social and economic partners was not binding, was that the
opposite would have clashed with the existing domestic administrative arrangements implying
that the likelihood of domestic administrative reforms, with view to responding to legal
provisions was at that time beyond consideration. In Fitzerald's own words,"If one were to lay
dmun a legal obligation to consult, there would need to be clearly and specifically established with whom
that considtation must take place. Given the different administrative arrangements, and the different
social and structural arrangements in the different regions, there would be insufficient provisio?i to be
able to make this a legal requirement". Debates of the European Parliament (1975), Wednesday, 12
March 1975, p. 71.
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Mediterranean Programmes).5 Their introduction has been attributed to the
threatened Greek veto in view of the Iberian enlargement. Nonetheless, as
shown by programmes prior to the IMPs, this was not the first time that
measures were introduced to tackle the particular problems of the
Mediterranean area of the Community. Indicatively, EEC Regulation
2615/19806 adopted a special programme to address the issue of French
problematic regions, Aquitaine, Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrenees, and
Italy - Mezzogiorno. It is worth noting that this was before the Greek
Memorandum of 1981 and the demands expressed therein. On the other hand
the principles endorsed in the IMPs Regulations were not novel either, as
indicated by their elaboration and gradual evolution by the Commission also
long before submission of the Greek Memorandum.
Therefore, it has been argued rather correctly that the Greek
Memorandum came simply as a response to the schemes of the Commission
itself to reform CRP, and it is precisely because of this that it met with a
positive response.7 A detailed discussion of the IMPs is not within the scope of
this study,8 however, it is important to examine certain points of this major
development in CRP, which shows the Commission's involvement in the
changing role of Subnational Authorities (SNA) in European regional policy¬
making.
Three major changes were introduced with the IMPs: a) the extended
powers of the Commission which had now the ultimate power to select the
5 OJ1985 L197/1.
6 EEC Regulation 2615/1980, of 7 October 1980, instituting specific Community regional
development measure contributing to the development of certain French and Italian regions in
the context of the Community enlargement (OJ L 271,15.10.1980)
7 Smyrl, M. E. (1998), "When (and How) do the Commission's Preferences Matter?" JCMS, Vol. 36,
No 1, pp. 79-99.
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projects,9 b) the introduction of the multi-annual integrated approach in
programming, and c) the participation of subnational authorities in policy¬
making process, which, although designated by the Member-States as provided
by the respective clause, still acquired the status of interlocutor in policy
making process which was the first serious step towards their further
empowerment.10 Although the reform was not so extensive as the one
introduced in the 1988, it begs the question how the Member-States accepted
the introduction of principles, which they had been resisting so far. It has been
argued that, the consequences of the innovations were not perceived in
advance by the national governments, which once aware of the unintentional
impact of the new measures, tried to limit the powers conferred to the
Commission.11
The interest of this interpretation lies in the fact that it is precisely the
unintentional consequences of the bargains struck between the supranational
institutions on the one hand, and the national governments on the other, that
have earned special value in the multi-level governance approach, which
transcended both state centric and supranational explanations of European
integration.12 Accordingly, the most important element of the 1985 innovations
is connected to Delors's belief that not only the economic weakness of the
Regions, but their lack of institutional capacity as well was compromising
8 See the analysis by DeWitte, B. (1990), "The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in the Context
of Community Regional Policy". Florence, European University Institute Working Paper, Law
90/8.
9 The ultimate decisional power was conferred to the Commission with the transformation of
the management committee (composed mainly of national representatives) into a merely
advisory body.
10 Smyrl, M. E., (1998), supra p. 85.
11 Ibid pp. 85, 94. According to the author, the Council, in the light of the Greek veto regarding
Iberic accession accepted the reforms proposed by the Commission: Member-States were so
eager to lift the veto, that they paid little attention to the details of the Commission's proposal.
12 See Chapter Three, Section, A theoretical framework
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'economic and social cohesion'.13 The latter is of interest in the present study for
two reasons:
a) both the 1985 and the 1988 reforms brought into relief the institutional
incapacity of the Greek Regions vis-a-vis the exigencies of the reforms. In the
first place there were no Regions in Greece when the IMPs were launched and
were introduced precisely in the light of the IMPs, by Law 1612/1986!4
Perhaps it is precisely because of lack of the regional tier in Greece, that it has
been argued -rather correctly- that in fact empowerment of the Regions as
introduced with the IMPs was not aimed at the Greek regions so much, but the
latter were rather the pretext used by the Commission to bring about a reform
of a much greater scale, on the whole of the Community territory.15
b) The second point of interest also related to Delors's idea of
empowering the Regions is connected to the role of the Commission in this
process. Accordingly, the Commission's strong interference in Greece
regarding institutional reforms in CSFs application as discussed in the relevant
chapters, can be seen and interpreted precisely in the above context.
The 1988 Reform.
• The notions ofconvergence and cohesion
The reforms introduced with the IMPs announced the more extended
changes introduced in 1988, which arose from the need for economic and social
cohesion in the light of the single market. Cohesion in the European context
initially conceived as convergence is not easily defined. It can be said though
13 Smyrl, M. E., (1998), supra p. 85. Regarding the increased powers of the Commission in
particular and the role of J. Delors, see pp.90-96.
14 Further discussed in Chapter Two.
15 See Smyrl, M. E., (1998), supra p. 85. p. 93.
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that it portrays "the degree to which disparities in social and economic welfare
between different regions or groups within the Community are politically and socially
tolerable".16
This two-facet approach, i.e. the economic and social aspects evolved over
the years. More specifically, convergence was initially understood in nominal
terms, i.e. it referred to prices level, public deficit etc. However, the difficulty to
achieve convergence in nominal terms when conditions of offer diverge due to
different living standards, led to the redefinition of the objective with view to
comprising real prices i.e. productive structures. It is at that point that the
notion of convergence expanded to include that of social and economic
cohesion. The evolution of the notion was similar regarding the regions:
regional restructuring came to be seen as an instrument of real convergence
between regional and national economies.17
Accordingly, the necessity of a regional policy of a clearly Community
nature arose as a response to the goal of cohesion. In particular, the need for an
effective and efficient application of the new CRP led to the introduction or rather
confirmation and further reinforcement of operational tools18 which, in turn,
necessitated domestic administrative reforms. The economic justification for the
development of a CRP was directly connected to the need to avoid the negative
effects of market integration on the problematic regions of the Community,19
16 European Parliament, Directorate General for Research (1991), "A New Strategy for Social and
Economic Cohesion After 1992". Research and Documentation Papers, Regional Policy and
Transport Series, No 19, Luxembourg, p.13. On the meaning and rationale of Cohesion and
Regional Policy, see also, Gabriel, G. and Junius, L. (1998), "Regional Policy and Cohesion", in
Duff, A. et al (Eds), (1998), "Maastricht and Beyond". London and New York, Routledge.
17 Buzzelay A. and Hannequart, A. (1994), "Problematique regionale et cohesion dans la
Communaute Europeenne". Paris, TEPSA, Economica, p. 20-21.
18 The guiding principles endorsed in the 1988 reform had been elaborated by the Commission
and partly introduced before 1988.
19 Hooghe, L. and Keating, M. (1994), "The Politics of European Union Regional Policy".
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 1:3, p. 368.
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which in their turn would compromise the effort towards the completion of the
single market itself.
Apart from the potentially negative economic effects, though to a lesser
degree, concerns of social nature were added, circumscribed by the idea of a
"social market economy", which attempts to associate the concepts of freedom of
opportunity and enterprise to "the values of solidarity and mutual support".20 An
additional aspect of the social dimension relevant to the theme discussed here
is connected to the concept of endogenous development and mobilisation of local and
regional potential21. More specifically, the social case of the CRP was backed by
the argument that local-regional development would allow people to remain in
their communities preserving their cultural identity, instead of migrating "to
follow capital".22
However, this ideological arsenal was merely a set of "underlying values"
in the debate about the CRP. In reality their significance laid mainly in their
allowing "arguments couched in the language ofsocial integration to be counterpoised
to market values".23
20 European Commission (1996), "First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion-1996". p. 13.
21 Hence, indirectly, also with the themes of regionalisation and decentralisation.
22 Hooghe, L. and Keating, M. (1994), supra, p. 369.
23 Ibid, p. 370. It is significant that in the light of the 1988 reform it was even argued that
"inequality must be reduced through redistribution of resources, even if it has some negative effects on
growth, because for social and political reasons an increase of inequality in the Community is
unacceptable". European Parliament (1988), "The Economic and Social Cohesion of the Community".
Research and Documentation Paper, Economic Series No 1. p. 15. This statement referring to
social and the political ramifications of the potential negative effects indicates the significance
of the political factor behind the evolution of the notion of convergence into that of social and
economic cohesion. Solidarity established as a principle with the SEA served as a political
imperative for the 1988 reform of the Funds. See Commission of the European Communities
(1989), "Guide to the Reform of the Community's Structural Funds", p. 10. However, as
characteristically noted, these reforms were "presented as a contribution to solidarity, but best
understood as a traditional package deal" Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (1999), "Decision-Making in
the European Union", London, MacMillan, p.151.
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To reiterate, it was primarily economic concerns about compromise of
the completion of the Single Market, and the political cost for national
governments ensuing from a deterioration of social inequalities as a result of
market integration, that led to the development of the CRP in general and the
1988 reform in particular.
• The Single European Act and the Regulations
The decisive moment for the 1988 reform came with the signing of the
Single European Act. The crucial decision regarding the doubling of the budget
commitments was taken by the Brussels European Council of 11-12 February
1988. Six days later the Commission's Communication to the Council
describing the international and Community economic outlook for 1988, left no
doubt about the economic foundations of the measures proposed in the same
document with view to achieving cohesion.24
The second decision of the European Council made in June and
December of the same year concerned the review of the principles governing
the operation of the Structural Funds.25 As noted before, the political imperative
arose from the need to establish solidarity among the Regions of the
Community, an idea that was elevated into a constitutional principle in SEA
with Art. 130a establishing cohesion as an objective. The economic imperative, i.e.
reduction of regional disparities and the resulting need for better
administration of the Funds26, was met in Art. 130b, which provided for co¬
ordination of national policies, for common policies and the internal market as
24 Commission of the European Communities (1988), "The Economic Situation and Outlook for
1988. Overcoming the Uncertainties"., COM (88) 54 Final.
25 Commission of the European Communities (1992), Reform of the Structural Funds: A tool to
Promote Economic and Social Cohesion".
26 Commission of the European Communities (1989), "Guide to the Reform of the Community's
Structural Funds", p.11.
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well as the structural instruments to be used as the means to achieve cohesion.
Art. 130c incorporated the ERDF in the EEC Treaty, specifying at the same time
its mission; i.e. redressing of the regional disparities, through helping the
development of the regions whose development is lagging behind, as well as
conversion of declining industrial regions.
It is Art. 130d that provided explicitly for the reform of the Structural
Funds through a Framework Regulation, with view to addressing the issue of
efficiency, the co-ordination between the Funds' activities and those of the
other financial instruments, while Art. 130e provided for the adoption of
further legislation in response to the Framework Regulation.27 Accordingly, the
following Regulations were adopted:28
• Framework Regulation EEC Reg. 2052/198829 defining the tasks of
the three Structural Funds, their objectives, as well as general rules to ensure
efficiency of, and effective co-ordination between their activities and between
them and the activities of the EIB and the Community's other financial
instruments, as amended by EEC Reg. 2080/199330
• Co-ordination Regulation EEC Reg. No. 4253/188831 setting out
implementing provisions for co-ordination of the Funds together with specific
planning and financial rules which are common to all three Funds, as amended
by EEC Reg. 2082/1993.32
27 Ibid.
28 The 1993 reform is discussed later in this chapter.
29 OJ No L 185/9,15.7.1988.
30 OJ No L 193/1, 31.7.1993.
31 OJ No L 374/1, 31.12.1988.
32 OJ No L 193/20, 31.7.1993.
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• In addition to the above Regulations, specific regulations for the
ERDF, ESF, and EAGGF respectively Council Regulations No. 4254/198833 as
amended by EEC Reg. 2083/199334, 4255/198835 as amended by EEC Reg.
2084/199336,4256/198837 as amended by EEC Reg. 2085/1993.38
• The Operational Principles.
As noted before, the reform and its underlying principles had their
origins in the Commission's plans elaborated several years before its adoption,
with view to using CRP for the promotion of a harmonious development
throughout the Community. This is clearly stated in the Commission's
Communication to the Council in 1986 after the signing of the SEA. The need to
assist problematic regions with view to achieving a harmonious development
is acknowledged as the impetus of the reform,39 while there is specific reference
to the new operational tools that would make up the fundamental elements of
the 1988 reform: the notion of partnership as implied in the explicitly
mentioned "shared responsibility", as well as departure from the re¬
distributional nature of regional policy. Equally, concentration of resources on
five objectives,40 the programme approach as opposed to individual projects,
33 OJ No L 374/15, 31.12.1988.
34 OJ No L 193/34,31.7.1993.
35 OJ No L 374/21,31.12.1988.
36 OJ No L193/39, 31.7.1993.
37 OJ No L 374/25, 31.12.1988.
38 OJ No L 193/44,31.7.1993.
39Commission of the European Communities, (1987), supra p. 7. Also, Commission of the
European Communities, (1992), "Reform of the Structural Funds: A Tool to Promote Economic and
//
40 Commission of the European Communities, (1987) supra pp. 13-14.
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and the principles of partnership appear to have acquired a concrete form:
"Programmes will involve contracts between the Community, the member-States and
the regions. They will involve joint preparation, monitoring and assessment, and they
will thus lead to a fully-fledged partnership".42
These rules were incorporated in the Framework and Co-ordination
Regulations to apply in common to all Member-States. Their interest here lies
in that they often necessitated institutional reforms. The extent of the reforms
depended on the degree of compatibility between the principles on the one
hand and the existing domestic administrative arrangements on the other.
Similarly, the degree of adaptability of the national systems to the reforms
depended on what elements of the existing domestic arrangements were
challenged by the new institutions. In other words, each time, the degree of
administrative resistance has been directly analogous to the centrality of these
elements in the political and administrative structures and practices of the
Member-State in question.
1. Concentration
Directly connected to the efficiency and effectiveness of structural
interventions, the principle of concentration has a geographical and a financial
aspect. Art. 1 of EEC Reg. 2052/88, (Framework Regulation), establishes five
priority objectives and the criteria of eligibility for each of them, on the basis of
the nomenclature of the territorial units (NUTS). Funds can be obtained for
projects, as long as the region in question qualifies for one of the five objectives.
Art. 2 of the same Regulation provides for the financial aspect of the
principle of concentration, stipulating that "the Structural Funds.... shall
contribute, each according to the specific provisions governing its operations, to the
41 Ibid p. 14.
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attainment of Objectives 1 to 5 while it also provides for the European
Investment Bank (EIB) and the other financial instruments of the Community
to contribute to the attainment of the objectives set in Art. I.42
Concentration signalled departure from the quota system, under which
assistance was not focused on the regions in need, but was also going to
Member-States with no particular developmental problems. Apart from
involving channelling of the aid to the less prosperous regions, concentration
suggested that the Member States could no longer dispose of Community
funding at their discretion, because the eligibility criteria for the regions were
set in advance.
Adoption of the principle also suggested that the more well off Member-
States surrendered their financial claims in view of the objectives set by the
SEA for the realisation of cohesion. It is not deemed essential at this point to
enter the discussion as to why Member-States renounced at least at the formal -
legislative- level-their centrality in determining resource allocation in the
context of the CRP. The focus at the moment should be precisely on the
resulting loss of power of the Member-States, as funds would be allocated to
regions not any longer at the discretion of the national governments, but
according to the criteria of eligibility set by the Regulations. The importance of
this reform here is related to the ensuing changes in domestic policy-making
procedures, reflecting the disturbed patterns of power and resource
distribution.
More specifically, one of the far reaching consequences of this
innovation, concerns the limitations placed upon national governments in
using Community Funds for electoral purposes, by allotting sums to
constituencies irrespective of whether they met eligibility criteria or not. In the
42 On the principle of concentration see Commission of the European Communities, (1992),
Communication from the Commission. "Community Structural Policies. Assessment and Outlook",
COM(92) 84 Final, pp. 15-20 and on the allocation of assistance the Annex, p. 18.
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case of Greece in particular, where clientelist practices have been the rule, and
where resources for regional development have traditionally been used for the
preservation of the centralised state along complex clientelist networks, the
principle of concentration would have impaired seriously the central
government's ability to impose its preferences. Nonetheless, the fact that the
whole of Greece was eligible under Objective 1 for assistance cancelled this
particular potential impact of the principle of concentration.
2. Partnership
Art. 4 of the Framework Regulation provides that "Community operations
shall... be established through close consultations between the Commission, the
Member State concerned and the competent authorities and bodies - including, within
the framework of each Member State's national rules and current practices, the
economic and social partner, designated by the Member State at national, regional,
local or other level, with all partners acting in pursuit ofa common goal".
The so-called "institutionalisation of considtation practices", i.e. the
introduction of the principle of partnership is considered probably as the most
valuable innovation in the application of the Funds.43 The notion appeared in
the Community documents concerning regional policy in the early 1980s44 and
was introduced with the EEC Reg. No. 1787/84 reforming ERDF. Along with
subsidiarity it was articulated in the Regulation 2088/1985, as were clauses
43 European Commission (1995), "The Implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds in 1993.
Fifth Annual Report", p. 111.
44 See among others the proposal of the Commission to the European Council of Ministers, on
29 October 1981 in OJ, No C336, 23.12.81. p. 60. Also: Commission of the European
Communities 1984, "The Regions of Europe": Second Periodic Report Also: OJ, No L 169,
28.6.1984. In addition, the joint declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the
Commission: OJ, No C72/59, 18.3.85. Moreover: Commission proposal to the Council on 29
Oct. 1981, OJ, No C336, 23.12.81. p. 61.
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elevating sub-national authorities to quasi-equal partners in the management
of the Programmes.
The reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 further reinforced the
principle and widened its content. Following the reports on the
implementation of the principles underlying the Funds which indicated a
rather poor participation of the socio-professional organisations,45 the 1993
reform further strengthened the principle of partnership by providing
inclusion of the social and economic partners, leaving however their
designation at the discretion of the Member - States.46
The reason why partnership has been gradually strengthened to the
point of penetrating almost every stage of the management of the Funds
should be sought in the dilemma of how to better utilise the increasingly
limited resources available for economic growth. Effectiveness has become thus
an imperative and a principle in its own right, although not mentioned among
the governing principles of the Structural Funds Regulations. Against this
background, broad partnerships are expected to bring together information
and expertise from different levels and bodies, both governmental and non
governmental, public and private, with view to combining and joining their
efforts towards better results in the operation of the Structural Funds.
45 See among others, European Commission (1991), "Annual Report on the Implementation of the
Reform of the Structural Funds 1990". p. 11.
46 The Commission deeming the contribution of management and labour important in
achieving the objectives of the reform of the Funds encouraged and established a dialogue
through a series of meetings with social and economic partners and national and regional
administrations, in which the principles of the reform were discussed as well as their
application. This has had as a result the establishment in some Member - States of a channel of
information with the social and economic partners. See, European Commission (1991), supra,
pp. 12-13. The Commission's efforts to further involve the social partners in the application of
the Funds, have found expression in a series of initiatives of consultative nature meant to
broaden partnership. This has taken place despite the fact that there were not formally
established structures and procedures to support these initiatives. It is characteristic that as
part of the effort to enhance the role of the social partners, trade unions were involved in
carrying out studies regarding the role of the social partners in the application of Community
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Therefore, it is not accidental that the growing importance of
partnership and its gradual development coincides with the launching of the
Single Market and the Single European Act in 1987, and the following big step
which is the signing of the Treaty on the European Union in 1991.47
Partnership and its corollary principle, subsidiarity, are directly linked
to the issue of decentralisation of powers in the CRP context, as the most
obvious rule involving participation of regional, local and social and economic
partners. Nonetheless, its quality depends on domestic administrative
traditions. A typical instance of this are the Monitoring Committees48 thought
of as the par excellence expression of partnership. Their tasks include
programme management, ensuring transparency, information diffusion and
the development of debate. However, and again as the case of Greece indicates,
decisions are usually reached outside the Monitoring Committees, which tend
to meet in order to endorse officially what has already been decided upon.
Moreover, the margins left for institutional change induced by the
application of the principle of partnership are limited by the wording of the
relative clause, according to which, partnerships are to be conducted "within
the framework ofeach Member State's national rules and current practices," while the
partners are more over "designated by the Member State", which means that at
least officially, the Community is not interfering with the Member States'
internal structures and practices.
Regional Policies. See, European Commission (1994), "The Implementation of the Reform of the
Structural Funds 1992. Fourth Annual Report"". pp. 79-80
47 An example of the importance attributed to the function of partnership in achieving social
and economic cohesion, is the emphasis placed by the Commission in its White Paper on
European Social Policy, on broader partnerships including NGOs, trade unions and other
social and economic partners(Place in footnote) Commission of the European Communities
(1994), "European Social Policy: A Way Forward for the Union. A White Paper". COM (94) 333.
48 Art. 25, par. 3, Co-ordination Regulation.
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Furthermore, it is stipulated that the "partnership will be conducted in fidl
compliance with the respective institutional, legal and financial powers of each of the
partners". This has proven a powerful factor in the application of the Funds. It
is directly related to the issue of command of resources, which determines the
negotiating power of each partner, and is to be seen against the background of
potentially changing dynamics between the Community institutions and
national authorities, but also and principally between the national authorities
and sub-national entities and other partners.
As indicated in the case of Greece, the "respective powers" of the partners
have influenced greatly the application of the principle. Research has revealed
that lack of resources of local and regional as well as social partners impinged
upon both the letter and the substance of the principle. Consequently, the
weakness of local government entities in Greece has been a reason why the
latter have been unable to successfully assume successfully the role assigned to
them by the new operational tools, in the context of partnerships.
Nonetheless, and despite the modest results that vary from Member -
State to Member - State depending on the existing national institutional
arrangements, there has been a clear move towards wider participation of the
social partners in the operational tasks of structural policies already at the end
of the first programming period.49
Partnership is embodied in evaluation conceived as "a shared
responsibility",50 the usefulness of which was brought into relief because of the
need for efficient use of the resources. Although it was practised in the USA
49 It has been a "gradual learning process through practical experience". See European Commission
(1995), "The Implemetation of the Reform of the Structural Funds in 1993. Fifth Annual Report", p.
112. '
50 Art. 4 and 6 of the Framework Regulation and Art. 26 of the Co-ordination Regulation refer
to evaluation, which is to be conducted in the context of partnerships. See also, European
Commission (1999), "Better management through evaluation", Luxembourg, Office of Official
Publications.
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and Canada since the 1970s, for most Member-States evaluation started to
develop in the early 1990s, in the context of the Community Structural Policy.51
In use already in the context of the IMPs, evaluation was made
obligatory for all Structural Funds interventions, and was linked to monitoring
and re-programming with the 1988 reform, while it was strengthened with the
1993 revision of the Structural Funds.52 What is of particular interest here, is the
gradual impact that the practice of evaluation is having on domestic
administrative practices. Three different groups emerged as a result of a survey
conducted in the Member-States on the application of evaluation. The first
group comprises those countries in which while evaluation is seen and
practised as a statutory obligation arising from the Structural Funds
Regulations, it is however beginning to be considered as a management tool.
The example of Spain is illustrative: the practice of evaluation apart from
contributing to better management of Community structural interventions is
moreover growing into an evaluation culture.53
The second group includes those States in which national adaptation
went soon beyond a simple response to the statutory obligation, and evaluation
is fully incorporated into the administrative culture as a management tool.54
Finally, a third group includes those countries, in which evaluation was
developed and practised before the enforcement of the EEC Regulations,
basically the Scandinavian countries, but also the UK and Ireland. In these
51 Centre for European Evaluation Expertise (1998), "Development of evaluation of structural
interventions in the Member-States". Draft Synthesis of a report on a study carried out in
Member-States.
52 While Articles 4 and 6 of the 1988 Framework Regulation refer to "assessment", and "ex
ante" and "ex post evaluation" respectively, the 1994 revised Articles 4 and 6 introduce the first
"ex ante appraisal", "monitoring" and "ex post evaluation", and the second "prior appraisal",
"monitoring", and "ex post evaluation".
53 Centre for European Evaluation Expertise (1998), supra.
54 Ibid.
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countries, evaluation is seen as a political act, i.e. it provides information for
the public in the context of transparency and public scrutiny regarding
effective and efficient administration of the funds. As pointed out, in that sense
"evaluation becomes a tool in the democratic game".55
The findings of the above report offer support for the argument
according to which, a certain practice when repeated crystallises and becomes a
new logic.56 It is though significant that this occurred to different degrees in the
Member-States. Greece for example still belongs to the first group,57 which
should be attributed to resistance of domestic opportunity structures as shown
in Chapter Four.
3. Programming
Constituting one of the major aspects of the 1988 reform, programming
was stipulated in Art. 6 of EEC Reg. 2052/1988 (Co-ordination Regulation). A
period of five years was indicated in the relevant clause.58 The essence of the
principle consists in departure from piece meal approach and dispersion of
resources on a large number of small projects, towards incorporation of actions
into large multi-annual programmes.
Initially the development plans, submitted by the Member-States to the
Commission for approval are expected to offer an assessment of the situation at
55 Ibid
56 As discussed in Chapter III, this approach is adopted by a certain group of intellectuals and
politicians, aspiring to reform of the Greek State and society in the European context.
57 Centre for European Evaluation Expertise (1998), supra.
58 An exception was made for the Objective 2 Regions, which allowed for a three-year
programming period.
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national or regional level, as well as the government strategy envisaged.59 The
next stage concerns the Community Support Framework, which corresponds to a
document, approved by the Commission after assessment of the development
plans submitted by the Member-States. It comprises description of the
situation, sets the priorities and objectives, and specifies the strategy to be
followed.60 It may involve implementation of one or more operational
programmes, funded by one or more financial instruments. In the case of
Greece e.g. it consists of several operational programmes of national scope, and
thirteen Regional Operational Programmes, (ROPs). Community Support
Frameworks and Single Documents constitute the outcome of negotiations
involving the Commission, the Member States, and the Regions. The main
difference between the two types of documents lies in the procedure of
approval of the respective programme: whereas in order for the CSFs to be
applied the relevant programmes need to be approved in advance, the Single
Documents are immediately operational.61 CSFs are used for Objective 1
Regions, while SDs for Regions of the other Objectives as well as in ten
Objective 1 Regions.62
An important aspect of the programme approach is related to the status
of CSFs. Art. 10 of Reg. 2082/1993 stipulates that a Commission decision issued
on a CSF should be sent to the Member-State concerned and published in the
Official Journal. Subsequently, it is the decision that has a legal status and not
the CSF, which is a form of soft-law. There is great confusion regarding the
notion of soft law, which was introduced in public international law in the
59 European Commission (1993), "Communitry Structural Funds 1994-1999", p. 22.
60 Art. 8 of the Co-ordination Regulation specifies the information to be comprised in the CSF.
61 Commision of the European Communities (1995), "Greece - Regional Development Programmes
1994".
62 Ibid
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1970s.63. According to one of the most prevailing definitions, it is "an umbrella
concept for normative phenomena that display the characteristics of law because they
are influencing and restricting the will andfreedom of their addressees, but on the other
hand do not establish a genuine international obligation, but do leave room for a 'soft
obligation'".64 This quality of the CSFs, allows for the re-negotiation of the terms
included in them, while at the same time serves as a legal basis for reforms.
Indeed, in the case of Greece, during the 2nd programming period reforms were
introduced in application of clauses included in the CSF 1994-1999.
Therefore, regarding the issue of administrative reform in CRP-making
context, two distinctive stages can be discerned: a) the adoption of the
operational tools discussed and decided upon during the initial phase and b)
the stage during which these new principles need to materialise into specific
legal and structural measures at the domestic level, during the implementation
of the CSF. It is during this latter phase that the dynamics of domestic
administrative arrangements of power and resource distribution are released. It
is this phase that this study is focusing on.
The 'soft-law' attribute of the CSFs is important in one more sense: apart
from allowing for a flexible approach and adjustment, at the same time and
probably because of this, it promotes the role of the Commission as an overseer
of the implementation of the Treaties. More specifically, the Member-States
which would be inclined to avoid compliance with Community law, are
allowed additional discretion in the context of the CSFs due to the flexibility
offered by the soft law quality of these documents. It is at this point that the
Commission interferes to guarantee that the programmes are implemented
with no significant divergence from the aims set in the CSFs.65
63Wellens, K. and Borchardt, G.M. (1989), "Soft Law in European Community". European Law
Review, Vol. 14, pp. 267-321.
64 Ibid, p. 272.
65 On the need for flexibility see the Treaty on the European Union, the Protocol on Economic
and Social Cohesion.
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Another important element of the programme approach is connected to
the elaboration of the Regional Development Plans, which following
negotiation between national authorities and the Commission become the
CSFs. Their nature and content involve the existence of resources at all levels of
the administrative system in terms of staff and technical infrastructure, and a
certain degree of prior experience in drawing development plans, and in that
sense, it may challenge directly domestic administrative arrangements. Again,
the case of Greece has been illustrative in that sense.
Moreover, as shown in later chapters, a major challenge for the Greek
administrative system and practices has been departure from the piece meal
approach and dispersion of resources on a large number of small projects.
Traditionally, over-fragmentation of projects into tiny works has been a major
feature of regional policy in Greece, connected to local electoral considerations,
in combination of Local Self-government Organisations (LSGOs) incapacity to
carry out large-scale projects. Again, the domestic system displayed a low
capacity to adaptation because central elements of the domestic administrative
culture were challenged by the new principle.
4. Additionality
Additionally66 was introduced and applied for the first time with the
1988 reform, and meant that the increase in resource allocation through the
Structural Funds would lead to an equivalent increase of national resources
allocated for regional development.
Compliance with the principle can be measured against two criteria: a)
the macroeconomic aspect, according to which Community resources released
through the funds must be added to national expenditures. Member-States are
66 Art. 9 EEC Reg. 4253/88 (Co-ordination Regulation).
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not supposed to reduce their structural expenditure during the whole period of
the application of the Community assistance, b) The microeconomic aspect,
according to which sums should reach the intended recipients of the assistance.
This aspect involves transparency in financial transaction.67
Verification of the principle was expected to be completed at the end of
the programming period, however, it is the Commission's responsibility to
carry out the task at regular intervals, and the first effort was made already at
the end of the first year of the reform, i.e. 1989. Various serious problems were
manifest from the beginning, especially regarding the difficulty to collect the
necessary information from the Member-States. An additional problem was
connected to the fact that the Commission could not be sure about the
correctness of the data provided. Throughout the first programming period,
several technical problems were invoked by the member-States in relation with
the requirement of providing statistical and budgetary data. It seems that the
countries covered by Objective 1 had less difficulty in carrying out the task. The
situation was particularly unsatisfactory during the first years of the
implementation of the reform, to the point that the Commission could not
draw conclusions in most cases.68 Italy has been a particularly difficult case,
while during the first years the problems were more acute in Objective 3 and 4
Regions.69
The Commission pointed out that full co-operation of the Member-States
was required in order to fulfil the task of verification successfully. By 1991, the
problems continued with Italy and the United Kingdom and to some extend
with the French overseas departments. The conclusion was reached that the
67 European Commission (1994), "The Implementation of the reform of the Structural Funds. Fourth
annual report 1992".
68 Commission of the European Communities, (1992), "Second Annual Report on the
Implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds. 1990".
69 Ibid
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wording of the Article 9 of the co-ordinating regulation 4253/1988 was not
appropriate. In response to these problems the Commission took the following
initiatives. First it sought to improve the co-operation with the Member-States
through bilateral contacts, which had some satisfactory results in 1992.
Regarding legal provisions, the Commission proposed and succeeded the
review of Article 9 of the co-ordinating regulation in March 1993 when the
second reform of the Structural Funds occurred. The review of the legal
provision was expected to provide a more explicit definition of additionality,
while it would at the same time allow some flexibilty as to the particular
administrative and technical realities of the Member-States.70
Acknowledgement on the part of the Commission that reform was needed to
ensure flexibility vis-a-vis the particular conditions of the Member-States is
indicative of the awareness of the significance of domestic administrative
arrangements, and the serious obstacles they can pose to reform.
To reiterate, the application of the principles endorsed with the 1988
reform have challenged domestic administrative systems to various degrees,
depending on their compatibility with the latter.
The 1993 reform
The 1993 reform followed the Edinburgh Summit of 1992. It was due to
the financial provisions adopted there that the review of the Funds became
necessary and the Commission was asked to " table as soon as possible proposals
to revise the Structural Fund regidations",n In proposing the reform 1993 of the
Structural Funds the Commission noted that its aim was not to initiate a broad
change like the one introduced in 1988, but to build and improve on the
70 European Commission (1994), supra.
71 Commission of the European Communities, COM(93) 67 final, "The Community's Structural
Fund Operations 1994-1999".
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existing situation. A fundamental change would among others create
uncertainty and delays.72
Although of a limited scope, the 1993 reform suggests that the
Commission is not enjoying unlimited discretion in institutional design
regarding administration of the Funds. The intention of French, British,
German and Spanish governments in light of Delors II was to re-nationalise
regional policy limiting the Commission's powers. One of the arguments put
forward in support of this position was that national executives were more
capable of efficient administration of regional policy funding.73
The attitude of the Member-States towards the Commission, and their
effort to regain control over CRP diminishing its power is enunciated in the
Commission's official documents on the 1993 reform. Noting that there was "a
great deal of decentralisation" during the first programming period, the
Commission stressed in its proposal the need for more careful division of
responsibilities, and the need to respect the principle of subsidiarity as "the
gidding principle". There is repeated reference to subsidiarity and emphasis on
the need to increase the responsibility of the Member-States and the
Monitoring Committees. It is characteristic that, the Commission feels obliged
to reassure the Member-States' that their "prerogative of implementing
programmes is not encroached on by the increase in the attribution of the Monitoring
Committees which are designed rather to reduce the number ofdecisions to be taken at
Community level".74 This somehow apologetic attitude was dictated by the
72 Ibid.
73 Marks, G. (1996), "Exploring and Explaining Variation in EU Cohesion Policy", in Hooghe, L.
"Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Midti-Level Governance", Oxford, New York,
Oxford University Press, pp. 393-394.
74 Commission of the European Communities, COM(93) 67 final, "The Community's Structural
...", supra.
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strong criticism on the part of the Member-States regarding the Commission's
power.75
However, despite the strong coalition in favour of re-nationalisation of
CRP, the changes finally effectuated were rather modest. The most significant
one occurred in the process of programming. Whereas in the 1988 reform, there
were three stages, as described above, the whole process was now simplified
into two stages. During the first one, state executives drew a regional
development plan, which was negotiated bilaterally with the Commission in
the second stage into a Community Support Framework.76 The new
arrangement limited the degree to which the Commission could determine the
final form of the plans during the negotiation stage, as the plans submitted by
the Member-States were more detailed than during Delors I. It furthermore
limited the role of sub-national actors, because they are involved at a stage
prior to the negotiation of the general priorities with the Commission.77
The effort of the Member-States to gain control over designation of the
Regions eligible for funding resulted in the 1988 economic criteria for funding
becoming more flexible to accommodate Member-States demands, and include
Regions that under the 1988 regime were not eligible. However, it seems that
finally, the Commission's discretion in funds allocation was rather increased,
as the Member-States applied for funding for more regions than they thought
to fulfil the criteria, which resulted in the Commission playing the role of the
arbitrator, and thus being able to influence the outcome to a greater extent. The
other innovations were not substantial and influenced respectively to a minor
75 On the attitude of the Member-States regarding the Commission's powers see also, Endo, K.
(1999), "The Presidency of the European Commission under Jacques Delors. The Politics of Shared
Leadership". London, Macmillan Press, p. 192.
76 Marks, G. (1996), supra.
77 Ibid.
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degree the balance of power between the Commission and the Member-
States.78
The Reforms, the Commission, and the Regions
The significance of the innovations introduced in 1988 lies among
others, in that they promote decentralisation of Community action. The
quintessence of this approach is to be found in the Commission's expectations
that activation of the regions through partnership would secure it allies in its
effort to bypass national governments' unwillingness to proceed to the
implementation of the SEA which, nevertheless, they had signed. Indeed it has
been argued that the " the very nature of the reform was to foreclose the freedom of
action of national governments by way of instituting administrative procedures,
regulations and multi-annual programming".79
The need to secure allies in this process arose especially during J.
Delors's tour in the capitals of the Member-States after the signing of the SEA.
Reactions of the national governments caused him anxiety regarding the
political will of the national governments to adopt the measures necessary for
the implementation of the SEA, which nonetheless they had signed. Delors
realised that it was precisely the political will or lack of it, that would lead to
either "a truly common economic area", or, on the contrary, "a hazy free trade
area"80. Owing to these fears, in his speech in the EP during which he
introduced the Commission's programme for 1987, Delors appealed repeatedly
78 Ibid.
79 Christiansen, Th. (1997), "Tensions of European governance: politicized bureaucracy and multiple
accountability/ in the European Commission" JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY. 4:1,
pp. 73-90.
80 Delors, J. (1987), supra p. 26.
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to the Parliament's support whose alliance he considered vital for the adoption
of the measures required by the SEA.81
Along the same line of thinking, when Delors announced the new CRP
in 1986, apart from the new policy of cohesion which acquired institutional
status in the SEA, he also declared the Commission's intention to establish a
new enhanced role for the sub-national authorities in the decision-making
process of the Community.82 This is how the idea of a Europe of the Regions
arose. It implied that economic convergence can and should be parallel to
administrative convergence. In fact, this is what the Commission sought by
giving the exact specifications of the way that the Regions were to acquire
power and assume their new role: "The objective was to empower sub-national
authorities in the European arena, including those from the member states where they
are extremely weak, and by specifying how this empowerment should be organised, to
achieve a uniform pattern of sub-national involvement. It was an ambitious attempt to
transform, in this policy area, the Europe without the regions into a Europe with all
regions".83
However, the degree to which the aim of the Commission was achieved
depended largely on existing domestic arrangements. More specifically, it is
argued that the degree to which the Regions have been able to exploit the new
tools depended on the resources available to them, which is a question of the
existing arrangements regarding domestic patterns of powers and resources
distribution. This explains why certain regions were empowered whereas
others were less or not at all. Therefore, the vision of a Europe of the Regions is
subject to the conditions set by national politico-administrative arrangements.
81 Ibid.
82 See, Hooghe, L. (1996), "Building a Europe with the Regions: The Changing Role of the European
Commission", in Hooghe, L. (ed) (1996), "Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Midti-
Level Governance", Oxford New York, Oxford University Press, p.89.
83 Ibid, p. 90.
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The Commission has acknowledged the variation of power and resource
distribution within the Community, and the difficulty to deal with it: "There is
no regionalisation without suitably empowered regional institutions. However, the
jurisdictions and financial resources of the regions vary widely. ... This lack of
uniformity means that the Commission will have to deal with regional representatives
with poxoers differing from State to State"84.
The European mechanisms ofdomestic reform
In order to examine the impact of the two CSFs on administrative
arrangements in Greece, it is necessary to identify the mechanisms of reform.
These can be demarcated at three levels:
1. The Regulations issued in the context of 1988 reform and the operational
tools and principles introduced thereby.
The Regulations, the principles they introduced, their potential impact
on policy process, and the reforms ensued at the national level have been
analysed above.
2. The Community Support Frameworks, as provided for in the Co-ordination
Regulation, and the terms specific to Greece included therein.
The nature of CSFs and their role in administrative changes is discussed
earlier in this chapter.
3. Community legislation applying in public xvorks production.
Since empirical work in this dissertation focuses on this sector, the
relevant Community legislation is discussed here. Public works production in
the Community context is regulated:
84 Commission of the European Communities (1992), supra p. 20.
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a) By the general principles of the EEC Treaty i.e.:
• Art. 14 on free of movement of goods, persons, services and capital
• Art. 28 and Art. 29 prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports and
exports
• Art. 43 on freedom of establishment of nationals of Member-States in the
territory of another Member-State
• Art. 49 on freedom to provide services within the Community.
b) Furthermore, secondary Community legislation i.e. Council Directive
93/37/EEC of 14 June 199385, as amended by Council Directive 97/52/EEC
provide for the co-ordination of the procedures of award of public works
contracts.
Briefly, the above legislation provides for open procedures in the award
of public contracts. It sets limits to the cases in which a public work contract
can be awarded directly bypassing the procedure of open competition, by
prohibiting fragmentation of works: "No work or contract may be split up with the
intention of avoiding the application of the Directive."86 Responsibility for the
application of Community law lies mainly with the Member-Sates, although all
parties concerned are responsible, often including private actors,87 which is
85 This directive constitutes the codification of the following directives: Council Directive
71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public
works contracts, as amended by Council Directive 78/669/EEC of 2 August 1978, Council
Directive 89/440/EEC amending Directive 78/669/EEC, Council Directive 90/531/EEC of 17
September 1990 on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy,
transport and telecommunications sectors.
86 Art. 6, Council Directive 93/37/EECof 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of
procedures for the award of public works contracts as amended by Council Directive
97/52/EEC.
87 Curtin, D. and Mortelmans, K. (1994), "Application and Enforcement of Community Law by the
Member States: Actors in Search of a Third Generation Script" in Curtin, D. and Heukels, T. (Eds),
"Institutional Dynamics of European Integration". Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, p. 431.
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related to the issue of the self regulatory capacity of the society. More
specifically, with regards directives, it has been pointed out that a state's choice
to comply with them "is a decision with distributional consequences... a matter of
choice by the state to discipline civil society".88 Against this background, the
political will to comply with directives is analogous to domestic resistance by
groups and individuals whose behaviour is influenced by the directive in
question. As a result, the degree of compliance is directly linked to the issue
regulated by the directive and the actors involved in it. In other words,
compliance "may be a matter ofself-regulation" 89
Characteristically, public works production in Greece involves both
public and private actors, and compliance with EU directives regulating this
sector has been affected by the resistance displayed by the respective network.
Consequently, compliance with the relevant directives brought into relief the
issue of a weak civil society a factor directly connected to the low self reforming
capacity90 of the Greek society in general, and subsequently affecting self
regulation in the European context more particularly. Moreover, as shown in
later chapters, there is a direct link between the reasons of the low self-
reforming and self-regulatory capacity of the Greek society on the one hand
and traditional opportunity structures on the other.
The Commission, the enforcement of Community Law, and domestic
reforms.
As noted before, developments in CRP have been influenced by the fear
of the Member-States that a CRP of supranational character would involve
88 Haas, P. (1998), "Compliance with EU directives: insights from international relations and
comparative politics". Journal of European Public Policy, 5:1, pp.17-37.
89 Ibid.
90 Discussed in Chapter Three.
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shrinkage of the role of national governments. These fears were related mainly
with the Commission's role as a supranational agent and 'guardian of the
Treaties' and they are not ungrounded. Although policy formation is one field
in which the importance of the Commission's role is evident, policy
implementation has greatly promoted its role in the process of integration.91
Under Art. 226 (ex Art. 169) of the EEC Treaty, the Commission is assigned the
role of the guardian of the Treaty, which involves ensuring that Community
Law is observed by the Member-States.
Community Law is only partly implemented and enforced by
Community institutions and mainly by national legal systems and
administrations,92 and this is the reason why implementation becomes
problematic. Non-compliance takes a variety of forms.93 It may come as a result
of positive action or omission on the part of a Member-State. In that case, the
Commission may have recourse to the provisions of Art. 226, and bring the
Member-State concerned before the Court of Justice.94
However, so far the Commission has shown preference to other
informal, milder procedures, even when it is established beyond doubt that
there has been a breach of law. The reasons for this preference are connected to
expediency. It is argued for example that the procedures provided for in Art.
226 require considerable human resources that the Commission does not
91 Mendrinou, M. (1996), "Non-compliance and the European Commission's role in integration".
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 3:1, pp. 1-22.
92 Snyder, F. (1993), " The Effectiveness of European Commimity Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools
and Techniques". THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 56, pp. 19-54.
93 Ihid, pp. 22-23.
94 The procedure consists in an administrative and a legal stage. For more details see, Ellis, E.
and Tridimas, T. (1995), "Public Law of the European Community: Text, Materials and
Commentam". London, Sweet and Maxwell, pp. 340-373. Also, Dashwood, A. (1989),
"Enforcement Actions under Articles 169 and 170 EEC". EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 14, pp.
388-412. Moreover, see Snyder, F. (1993), "The effectiveness ofEuropean supra, pp. 19-54.
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possess. On the other hand, milder forms of action help the development of an
amicable ambience in the Community, contributing to smoother integration.95
It is on account of these factors that the soft-law aspect of the CSFs (as an
element of programming) in combination with the principle of partnership
becomes important in the discussion of administrative reform. More
specifically, amiable measures consist in "soft law" and structural reform of
national administrations.96 Significantly, the latter is defined as "a type of social,
usually institutional adjustment, involving the reallocation of power. In the
Community setting, such reforms are likely to affect the distribution of power between
the Community and the member-States, among Community Institutions and among
various parts of the national governmental systems".97
Moreover, the reforms are expected to occur in the context of
partnerships, i.e. "...relations between bureaucratic organisations", understood as
"bureaucratic interpenetration... or interorganisational exchange...often called
partenariat (partnership)". 98 On the one hand, the CSFs as one stage in the
process of programming and at the same time a document containing the goals
and the means to be achieved sets the framework for, in a certain way
announces and often contains specific clauses for administrative reforms
required for its implementation. On the other hand, because the reforms are
"likely to affect the distribution of power...", partnerships are deemed the right
setting in which to work out and decide upon such sensitive matters as changes
in the existing balance of power. In that sense, partnerships would be expected
to ensure wider consensus, and therefore effectiveness of both the reforms and
subsequently the CSF itself.
95 See Ellis, E. and Tridimas, T. (1995), supra, pp. 343-344.
96 All measures are based in Articles 4 and 155 EEC. On the powers of the Commission. Snyder,
F. (1993), supra, p. 27.
97 Emphasis added. Ibid, p. 36.
98 Ibid, p. 36.
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Nonetheless, empirical research in Greece has shown that in most cases,
institutional reform was decided in absentia of most parties concerned
e.g.bureaucrats and Subnational Authorities (SNA), and was rather imposed by
the Commission. As a result, some of the most important innovations
introduced after negotiations between the Greek government and the
Commission have been strongly resisted by the bureaucracy. Consequently,
their introduction was delayed and made possible only after the Commission
threatened to discontinue funding. Even then, the new institutions were not
successful and the expected positive impact on the CSF application was rather
mediocre. As discussed in a later chapter, Greek civil servants have interpreted
this intervention as an effort on the part of the Commission to further its
influence."
The role of institutions and administrative cultures in regional
development.
An important aspect of the 1993 reform is worth discussing here, as
directly related to the core hypothesis of the thesis. More specifically, the
Commission's observations as regards the application of the regulations in the
period 1988-1993 highlight the importance of administrative cultures in
adaptation of national administrations to structural policy's requirements.
In 1992 and on the eve of the introduction of the second programming
period, assessing the application of the 1988 reforms the Commission found it
rather mediocre. The programme approach for instance proved too challenging
for some Member-States, which were not used to the techniques required by
this approach. Furthermore, technical assistance and partnership did not work
99 This is illustrative of the argument according to which, "as a civil service, the Commission
would naturally give way to its political masters. As an independeyit political animal, the Commission is
keen to extend its power and play a politically strategic role in setting the goals of the community itself.
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as well as expected. The problem was located in the different administrative
traditions and cultures, and the Commission admitted that it was rather
unrealistic to expect a homogeneous response from countries with great
differences: "Indeed, the reform's regulations imposed identical obligations on
Member-States with cultures and administrative traditions as different as, for example,
Germany and Greece".100 This is a clear indication of the cultural determinant
arising as an important factor in the success of the reforms. As a result, the
Commission estimated that a review of the reform was required in order to
achieve simplicity and flexibility after 1993 101
Indicative of the Commission's growing interest in institutions and
administrative culture is the fact that six years later, on the eve of the third
programming period, having assessed the application of Delors II, it stresses
their importance in the Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic
Situation and Development of the Regions of the European Union. Institutional
elements such as social capital in the form of business culture and shared
norms and values, as well as principles governing public administration are
considered as decisive elements in competitiveness and regional
development.102
Drawing among others on new-institutionalist theory, the Report adopts
D. North's definition of institutions, comprising structures but also culture,
norms and values as well as legal and fiscal systems. It is pointed out that
although in the past such factors were neglected in economic analysis, they are
Usher, J. (1994), "The Commission and the Law". In Edwards, G. and Spence, D. (eds), "The
European Commission", London, Longman, pp. 146-168. Quoted in Cram, L. (1999), supra, p. 47.
100 Commission of the European Communities (1992), Reform of the Structural Funds: A tool to
Promote Economic and Social Cohesion".
101 Ibid.
102 European Commission: (1999) "Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and
Development of the Regions of the European Community". Introduction.
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increasingly thought to be "fundamental to the behaviour ofeconomies",'103 and that
"the efficiency of the institutional structure of a region is, therefore, increasingly
considered to be a significant factor in regional development".104 Furthermore, the
Report emphasises the role of the Structural Funds procedure in introducing
new cultural elements in national administrative systems, through application
of the guiding principles enshrined in the relevant Regulations, revealing
precisely the aim to bring about permanent changes in the performing logic of
national administrations.105
Recapitulating, it is evident that the cultural-institutional element arose
and was gradually acknowledged as a dynamic factor in regional development,
as the difference in domestic administrative cultures unveiled the difficulty to
establish a homogeneous system in the Funds' management.
National Adaptation to European Integration: the Literature
Academic concern with the issue of national public policies and policy
styles in the process of integration has given rise to an extensive literature. A
number of studies are pre-occupied with the process of adaptation of national
policies and administrative systems in general, in what came to be known as
the Europeanisation or Europeification of national policy making, often in the
context of comparative approaches.106
103 Ibid, _p. 63..
104 Ibid p. 64.
105 Ibid., pp. 66-71.
106 See among others, Ladrech, R. (1994), "Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and Institutions:
The Case of France". JCMS, Vol. 32, No 1, pp. 69-88. Carter, C. and Scott, A. (1997), "The
Europeanisation of the European Union". 8eme Colloque International de la Revue "Politiques et
Management Public" Hanf, K. and Soetendorp, B. (Eds) (1998), Ladrech, R. "Adapting to
European Integration: small states and the European Union". London - New York, Longman.
Andersen, S. S. and Eliassen, K. A. (Eds) (1993), "Making policy in Europe : the Europeification of
national policy-making" London, Sage. Thatcher, M. (1999), "The Europeanisation ofRegulation. The
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In particular, the issue of empowerment of the Regions in the European
context has spurred the interest of students of European integration, and has
given rise to a considerable volume of literature under the theme of 'Europe of
the Regions', and the theoretical approach of multi-level governance (MLG). Most
of these studies focus on the mobilisation of SNA as a result of CRP
application. According to a central argument of this approach, the interaction
between the supranational institutions on the one hand and the national
institutions on the other result often unintentionally in changes in policy¬
making process, introducing a third level of governance in European Policy
making, that of subnational tiers. Usually these studies focus on the
consequences of one policy sector only, i.e. the European Regional Policy,
omitting the impact of other policy sectors, and arguing that SNA mobilisation
is taking place beyond the Nation-State.107
Certain MLG studies however, examine additional aspects and
dimensions of the issue, acknowledging factors other that European integration
Case of Teleconmiunications." EUI Working Paper. Radaelli, C. (1997), "How does Europeanisation
Produce Domestic Policy Change?" COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 30 No. 5, pp.
553-575. Wright, V. (1996), "The national co-ordination of European policy-making", in Richardson,
J. (Ed.), "European Union: Power and Policy-Making" London, Routledge. Meny, Y. et al (Eds)
(1996), Adjusting to Europe The impact of the European Union on tiational institutions and policies",
London and New York, Routledge. Toonen, A. J. (1992), "Europe of the Administrations: The
Challenges of'92 (and Beyond). PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 52, No 2. Kassim, H.
et al (Eds) (2000), The National Co-ordinatioji of EU Policy". Oxford and New York, Oxford
University Press. Rometsch, D. and Wessels, R. (Eds) (1996), "The European Union and the
Member-States. Towards Institutional Fusion?". Manchester, New York, Manchester University
Press.
W7 On the theme of regionalism as connected to European integration see, Keating, M. and
Jones, B. (Eds) (1995), "The European Union and the Regions" Oxford, Clarendon Press. See
Hooghe, L. (1996), "Cohesion policy and European integration : building multi-level governance"
Oxford, Oxford University Press. Hooghe, L. and Keating, M. (1994), "The Politics of European
Union Regional Policy". JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 1:3. Marks, G. "Structural
Policy in the European Union", in Sbragia, A. M. (Ed.) (1992), "Europolitics. Institutions and
Policymaking in the "New" European Community". Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution.
Marks G., Hooghe, L. and Blank, K. (1996), European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v.
Multi-level Governance". JCMS, Vol. 34, 3. pp. 341-378. Marks, G. "Structural Policy and Multilevel
Governance in the EC", in Cafruny, A. W. and Rosenthal, G. G. (Eds) "The State of the European
Community. Vol.2, The Maastricht debates and beyond": Boulder, Colo. Lynne Rienner Harlow,
Longman. Marks, G. et al. (1996), "Competencies, Cracks and Conflicts: Regional Mobilisation in the
European Union", in Marks, G. et al. (Eds), "Governance in the European Union" London, SAGE.
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in the process of SNA mobilisation, such as trends in decentralisation, which
are more or less independent of European integration process. In these studies,
the nature and degree of SNA mobilisation, and the extent to which the latter
manage to exert influence in European policy process are understood as a
result of the domestic conditions and political-administrative arrangements. In
other words, SNA access to European policy-making is seen as occurring
"through... the Nation-State", not beyond it, in the context of changing relations
in the internal structure of the Nation-State. According to the main argument of
this approach, SNA are likely to further their involvement in European policy¬
making in those areas of European domestic policy in which they already have
competencies.108
The argument for the significance of domestic factors is carried further
in a number of short studies in which the role of political actors in changing the
existing sets of rules at the domestic level is emphasised,109 while the
importance of the control of resources prior to European integration also in
terms of know-how by the SNA is taken into account.110
A number of articles examine the hypothesis according to which reforms
at domestic level become necessary only in case of a misfit between European
108 See Jeffery, Ch. (1997), "Conclusions: Sub-National Authorities and 'European Domestic Policy',
in Jeffery, Ch. (Ed.), "The regional dimension of the European Union: towards a third level in
Europe?" London, Frank Cass. Jeffery, Ch. (1997), "The Emergence ofMulti-level Governance in the
European Union: A Domestic Politics Approach". 8eme Colloque International de la Revue
"Politiques et Management Public". Jeffery, Ch. (2000),"Sub-national Mobilisation and European
Integration: Does it make any difference?" JCMS, Vol. 38, pp. 1-23. Jeffery, Ch. (2000), "Sub-
National Mobilisation and European Integration: Does it make Any Difference?", JCMS Vol. 38, No 1,
pp. 1-23.
109 See among others, Marks, G. (1997), "An Actor-Centred Approach to Munlti-Level Governance",
in Jeffery, Ch. (Ed.), "The regional dimension of the European Union: towards a third level in
Europe?" London, Frank Cass.
110 Smyrl, M. E. (1997), "Does European Community Regional Policy Empower the Regions?",
GOVERNANCE, Vol. 10, No 3, pp. 287-309.
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policy requirements on the one hand and national administrative arrangements
on the other.111
However, it is principally in the context of new institutionalist
approaches that the role of domestic institutions acquires additional value.
New institutionalist literature is focusing on formerly rather neglected themes
i.e. formal and informal devices that shape the behaviour of domestic actors
involved in the application of European policy implementation, and how these
are affected by or inversely affect this process. Since the 1980s, proponents of
the institutionalist approach have increasingly argued that the role of
institutions as embedded in culture influences directly the way national
administrative systems respond to the implementation of Community
legislation, determining the degree of effectiveness and efficiency. In particular,
certain studies in line with the new institutionalist theory have contributed
significantly in the understanding of domestic systems' resistance to reforms
ensued in the European context, by showing that when reforms challenge core
elements of power and resource distribution, they are likely to meet with
strong resistance on the part of the actors involved.112
The literature on the impact of European integration on the Greek
administrative arrangements, rather limited during the first decade of Greek
111. See, Toonen, Th. A. J. (1992), "Europe of the Administrations: The Challenges of '92 (and
Beyond)". PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 52, No 2. More recent contributions by
Goetz, K. H. and Elix, S. (2000), "Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political
Systems". WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, Vol.. 23, No 4, pp. 211-231. Goetz, K. H. "National
Governance and European Integration: Intergovernmental Relations in Germany". JCMS, Vol. 33, No
1 March 1995.
112 Knill, Ch. And Lenschow, A. (1998), "Change as 'Appropriate Adaptation: Administrative
Adjustment to European Environmental Policy in Britain And Germany". European Integration on
line Papers (EIOP), Vol. 2 No 1, http://eiop.or.at/texte/1998-001a.htm. Knill, Ch. (1997),
"Implementing European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions", EUI Working
Paper RSC No 97/56. Knill, Ch. and Lehmkuhl, D. (1999), "Plow Europe Matters. Different
Mechanisms of Europeanisation". European Integration on line Papers (EIOP), Vol. 3 No 7,
http:/ /eiop.or.at/texte/1999-007a.htm. Christensen, }. G. (1997), "Interpreting Administrative
Change: Bureaucratic Self-interest and bistitutional Inheritance in Government". GOVERNANCE,
Vol. 10, No 2, pp. 143-174). Borzel, T. A. "Towards Convergence in Europe? bistitutional Adaptation
to Europeanisation in Germany and Spain".
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membership has increased since the 1990s. A number of books and articles
examine Greece's integration to Europe in general,113 while others focus on
more specific subjects among them decentralisation.114 There has been no
extensive study of the impact of CRP implementation on the Greek
administrative arrangements regarding regional policy process in particular.
Cultural embeddedness of institutions and the ensuing difficulties in
administrative convergence in the Community as indicated in the Greek case
has been discussed in a short albeit insightful contribution by N. Wenturis.115
In addition, in a very interesting article, Ch. Paraskevopoulos examines the role
of social capital in domestic adaptation to European Regional Policy demands.
The author points to the importance of cultural factors in Greece's adaptation to
European Regional Policy requirements, as revealed in the nature of civil
society and public - private sectors interaction, clientelism and state
centralisation. The discussion focuses on the application of European Regional
Policy in the Aegean Islands.116
113 See Kazakos, P. (1994) "Greece in a Changing Europe", (in Greek) Athens, Papazissis.
Kazakos, P. (1991), "Greece between Integration and Marginalisation". (In Greek), Athens, Diatton.
Psomiades et al (Eds) (1992), "Greece and the New Europe". Pella. Peatherstone, K. (1996), "Greece
in a Changing Europe", Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press. Spanou, C.
(2000), "Greece", in Kassim, H. et al (Eds) "The National Co-ordination of EU Policy". Oxford,
Oxford University Press. Tsinisizelis, M. (1996), "Greece", in Rometsch, D. and Wessels, W.
(Eds) "The European Union and member states. Towards institutional fusion?, Mancester and New
York, Manchester University Press. Christakis, M. (1998), "Greece: Competing with Regional
Priorities", in Hanf, K. and Soetendorp, B. (Eds), "Adapting To European integration: small states
and the European Union". London; New York, Longman
114 See, Andrikopoulou, E.: (1992)_"Whither Regional Policy?" In Dunford, M., Kafkalas, G.(Eds):
"Cities and Regions in the New Europe". London, Belhaven, Verney, S., Papageorgiou, F. (1992),
"Prefectural Councils in Greece: Decentralisation in the Community ContextIn Leonardi. R. (Ed.):
"The Regions mid the European Communiht". Cass, London. Ioakimidis, P. C. (1996), "EU Cohesioji
Policy in Greece: The tension Between Bureaucratic Centralism and Regionalism", in Hooghe, L. (Ed.)
"Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance". Oxford, Oxford
University Press. Kazakos, P. (1999), "The 'Europeanisation' of Public Policy: The Impact of
European Integration on Greek Environmental Policy".
115 Wenturis, (1994), "Political Culture", in N. Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P. C. (Eds) "Greece
and EC membership evaluated". London, Pinter. New York, St. Martin's Press, pp. 225-237.
116 Paraskevopoulos, Ch. J. (1998), "Social Capital and the Public-Private Divide in Greek Regions".
In WEST EUROPEN POLITICS, VOL. 21, No 2, pp. 154-177.
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Apart from the above-mentioned article, the theme of institutional
adaptation has been treated mainly in short contributions in collections of
studies of similar content. Some of them touch upon the issue of challenged
patterns of resource and power distribution, offering support for the main
hypothesis of the current project.117
Summary
Developments in the process of European integration in the 1980s have
promoted the evolution of an increasingly dynamic Community Regional
Policy, a development that reached its peak with the 1988 reform of the
Structural Funds. The guiding principles endorsed in the new Regulations
triggered institutional reforms in the Member-States, with view to achieving
efficiency in CRP implementation. The magnitude of the reforms depends on
the degree to which existing domestic arrangements clash with the new
operational tools. Subsequently, the degree of adaptability of the domestic
administrative systems to the reforms introduced in the above context has been
analogous to the centrality of those elements in the domestic systems, most
challenged by the reforms. The more central those elements in the national
administrative patterns, the greater the resistance displayed by domestic
actors.
The European Commission has played a dynamic role in promoting the
European character of the CRP, which during the first decades was
nationalised. Moreover, the Commission as guardian of the Treaties has
117 See in particular Christopholopoulou, P. (1996), "Prefectural Administration and Self
Government in the Greek Political System". (In Greek), In GREEK REVIEW OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, VOL. 7, pp. 124-152, and Economou, D. (1995), "Developmental programmes and social
interests" in Spanou, K. "Collective claims and governmental policies", Athens-Komotini, A.N.
Sakkoulas, pp. 209-222.
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interfered in the process of domestic reforms, in order to ensure compliance
with Community law, a process that often raised its profile as a dynamic
supranational actor.
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Chapter Two: Greece: Political Culture, State Organisationand
Regional Policies.
Introductory notes
It is argued here that application of the 1988 reform guiding principles
in the context of the first two CSFs in Greece met with considerable resistance
from traditional policy patterns. Despite the fact that several mechanisms of
Europeanisation1 have been at work, the degree of adaptation to European
requirements has been rather low. The core argument deployed here is that
administrative resistance is mainly due to the fact that the principles
introduced through the mechanisms described in Chapter One, have been
challenging "domestic opportunity structures, and hence the distribution of power
and resources between domestic actors".2 Therefore, in order to discuss the
Europeanisation of the Greek regional policy process and interpret
administrative resistance, it is necessary to describe "domestic opportunity
structures" prior to the 1988 reform. As these are deeply embedded in culture,
an understanding of the Greek political culture will shed light into the loci of
resistance.
Accordingly, this chapter seeks to offer an understanding of the cardinal
features of the Greek political culture, followed by a description of the formal
i.e. legal arrangements regarding State organisation, as well as regional policy
process. The analysis will try to reveal the centrality of the elements of
1 In order to avoid confusion the term Europeanisation in this thesis is used to denote the
process of adaptation to the requirements of European integration.
2 Knill, Ch. and Lehmkuhl, D. (1999), "How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of
Europeanisation". EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON LINE PAPERS, Vol. 3, No 7. URL:
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007a.htm
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domestic patterns of power and resource distribution, that were challenged by
the reforms induced by the application of the two CSFs in Greece.
Greek Political Culture
For the purposes of the analysis here, political culture will be defined as
conceptions regarding the relations of the individual to society as a whole, the
ideas of power structures and State organisation, and the expectations of the
citizens vis-a-vis the State.
The most prevalent characteristic in the history of the Modern Greek
State has been "cultural dualism" i.e. the existence of two rival cultures, which
have marked with their antagonistic relationship the development of the State
and society. On the one hand, the older culture, deeply influenced by the
Orthodox Church which has cultivated and maintained an anti western
attitude, a culture which is also against change, has an attachment to pre¬
capitalist practices and shows "intolerance of the alien".3
Moreover, this culture is characterised by a "levelling egalitarianism",
unpredictability and insecurity, hence the assignment of a preponderant role to
the State as the "dispenser of rights", and as a protector of the weak against the
strong. Inherent in this perception of the State, is the accordance of "limited value
to the role of institutions as structures that shape relations between rulers and ruled", a
feeling of insecurity towards an autonomous, active civil society in preference
of structures which favour clientelist practices.4
3 The information on cultural dualism in Greece is drawn entirely on Diamandouros, N. (1994),
"Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece", Working Paper, Madrid,
Institute) Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.
4 Ibid.
Chapter Two p. 51
On the other hand, the younger twin of underdog culture, had always a
tendency to look to the advanced Western states for inspiration and support in
accomplishing economic, social or political reforms. Characterised by
extrovertedness, it tends to favour international links with view to promoting
Greece's integration in the international system, and assigns great importance
to the modern political institutions, which are expected to diminish the
influence of clientelism. This is a reformist culture shaped by the perceptions of
the Greek diaspora bourgeoisie and its domestic allies, which are rooted in the
western, liberal model of transition to modernity, with the establishment of
market economy.5 At times, one or the other culture has temporarily dominated
over the other, with the underdog culture remaining the stronger and with the
larger number of proponents, hence the failure of most reformist attempts.
• Patronage-clientelism: a definition
As argued above, the older of the twin cultures in Greece, is
characterised by hostility to formal institutions, in favour of informal ones
delineated by patronage-clientelism. Patronage-clientelism is generally defined
as a relationship between two parties of which one controls scarce resources to
which the other party is allowed access in exchange for loyalty, votes and other
services.6 In other words, the whole concept is built on the crucial element of
control of resources. This is an important element essential to the current study,
as according to the main argument deployed here, resistance to reform
originating in Community Regulations is due the fact that traditional resource
5 Ibid.
6 A discussion of the nature of resources is beyond the scope of this thesis, On the topic see,
Legg, K. R. (1969), "Patrons, Clients, and Politicians". Working paper, Institute of International
Studies, University of California, Berkeley. The paper offers a lucid analysis of the concept of
patronage - clientelism, discussing among others, the origins, nature and impact of clientelism
as a system. Also, Clapham, Ch. (1982): Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelisni in
the Modem State". London, Frances Pinter.
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and power distribution patterns are being challenged. It is worth noting that, as
a relational concept circumscribing a dyadic link, i.e. a link between two parties
only, in the context of which both enjoy benefits, patronage-clientelism exists in
a wide variety of political systems, and need not necessarily constitute the focal
point of social and political life. It acquires special significance for the political
scientists when it determines extensively if not exclusively socio-political
configurations in a polity, or otherwise when it becomes a system in its self as in
the case in Greece.
Patronage as a system then, defines largely if not exclusively the
patterns of power and resource distribution and their reproduction within a
polity. Therefore, once analysis moves to the system level, the focus is not on
the nature of exchange between two parties involved within a limited time
space, but on "the existence and operation of a complex network of vertical and cross-
cutting ties which have wider integrative and social control functions than those
identified through the discrete reciprocations of single patrons and clients".7 In that
case, as characteristically noted by Wallace-Hadrill, "the secret of the game is the
manipulation ofscarce resources".8
Similarly, Clapham identifies as essential for clientelism the following
conditions a) that "critical resources must be controlled by one particular group
within the society", b) that "the client group taken as a whole, should be inhibited or
prevented from gaining access to the resources controlled by the patron group through
co-operative strategies which unite the client group as a whole to confront, by force or
bargaining, the patron group as a whole.9 Accordingly, resources for local-regional
development in Greece have been kept under the control of patrons mainly at
7Johnson, T. and Dandaker, Ch.: (1989), "Patronage: Relation and System", inWallace-Hadrill, A.:
"Patronage in Ancient Society". Routledge, London, p. 225. See also, Juckerman, A.S. (1979), "The
politics ofFaction". New Haven-London, Yale University Press, p. 18.
8Wallace-Hadrill, A. (1989), "Patronage in Roman society: from republic to empire" in Wallace-
Hadrill, A. (ed.): "Patronage in Ancient Society". London, Routledge, p. 70.
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the central level, or at the deconcentrated branches of the State, and distributed
in exchange for votes.
• Patronage and civil society
A main feature of the modern concept of civil society has been the
separation of the public from the private sphere.10 This implies the presence of
autonomous intermediate bodies, free of the State's command mediating
between the latter and society.11 However, the concept of civil society as
defined above does not fit well in a clientelist state because the latter alludes to
extensive use of the state apparatus by the governing party with view to
creating clientelist ties along personal-individualistic lines. Against this
background, associations, trade unions and in general interest groups, instead
of aggregating and articulating their demands independently, they do so in the
context of clientelist exchange. Such is the grip of the state on the intermediary
associations that as in the case of Greece, the leaders of labour unions are each
time officials of the governing party, promoting party -and personal- interests
rather than those of the interest groups they represent.12
9Clapham, Ch. (1982), supra, p. 8.
10 Krader, L. (1976), "Dialectic of Civil Society". Amsterdam, Van Gorcum, p.33.
^Roniger, L. (1994) "The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society
in the Cotitemporary World", in Roniger, L. and Gunes-Ayata, A. (Eds): "Democracy, Clientelism
and Civil Society". London, Boulder, pp. 1, 6.
12 See for example, Collins, N. and Louloudis, L. (1995), "Protecting the Protected: the Greek
Agricultural Policy_Netxoork". JOURNAL OL EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 2, pp. 95-114.
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• Patronage and bureaucracy
As argued by Dandeker, in his analysis of Weber's thesis, the degree to
which bureaucracy acts autonomously from the state, its employer, varies.13 In
a clientelist state, in which the state apparatus is used to promote mainly party
interests in the context of a wide clientelist network, the intrusion of the party
in the state apparatus and of the latter in the bureaucratic machine is such, that
the interests of the bureaucrats and those of the party are enmeshed in complex
patterns of exchange often hindering efforts at reforms.14 The over-
politicisation of the bureaucracy and its increased power at the expense of
representative institutions has also been noticed by L. Sigelman who
underlines its negative effect on the reforms and the process of political
development.15
Greece is an illustrative case of the arguments advanced above.
Recruitment of the public sector has always been one of the main tools in the
hands of the ruling party each time, with view to creating and maintaining a
large clientele. This has resulted in a complex pattern of interdependence,
which, as shown below, has repeatedly hindered administrative reform.
13 See among others, Dandeker, C: (1978), "Patronage and bureaucratic control - The case of the
naval officer in English society 1780- 1850". BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 29, No 3,
p. 301.
14The involvement of bureaucrats in politics and the effect that this has on political
development has been analysed by F. W. Riggs, in his study of the political development in
"transitional societies". The term is applied with view to societies in transition from tradition to
modernity, otherwise known as "developing". Riggs examines the direct and indirect effect that
the pursue of the interests of bureaucratic institutions has on the development of political
institutions. As he argues, in developing countries the degree of bureaucratic involvement is
such that the form of political development achieved in this case, is "in the sense ofpoliticisation
but not democratisation". See Riggs, F.W.: "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A paradoxical
View". In La Palombara, J.(Ed.) (1963), "Bureaucracy and Political Development". New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, p.141.
15Sigelman L. (1972), "Do Modern Bureaucracies Dominate Underdeveloped Polities? A Test of the
Imbalance Thesis". THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. Vol. 66, p. 525.
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• Patronage as an ethos, and a form ofpower
Because of the primacy attributed in this study to values as playing an
important role in the process of institutional and societal reform, it is important
to establish whether patronage possesses ethical properties. In other words, it
is deemed important to clarify whether the clientelist system is simply a course
of action in the Greek society or a mentality and an ethos at the same time. In
the latter case it could prove far more difficult for a change to occur, i.e. a
change in perceptions and values, which is considered necessary for economic
and political development.16
Scholars are rather divided on this issue. Some argue that patronage is
only a course of action, which becomes rational to adopt under specific
circumstances. Clapham e.g. maintains that clientelism is "a form of behaviour
ivhich becomes rational for people to pursue, given specific external factors"17,
recognising at the same time a "lack of ideology or value consensus"18 On the other
hand, it is maintained that clientelism is not devoid of ethical nuances. Gellner,
who has contributed largely to the understanding of Mediterranean societies
and their cultures, is convinced that, "'real' patronage ... seems to be a system, a
style, a moral climate".19 It is in patronage as a system he refers to, arguing that,
"in larger societies, patronage proper is an ethos: people know that it is a way of doing
things amongst others".20 There is however a third assumption, according to
16 On change in values as a condition for political and economic development see the work of
K. Deutsch who has written expensively on integration issues. For example, Deutsch, K. (1961),
"Social Mobilisation and Political Development", THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE
REVIEW, Vol. No 3, pp. 493-514.
17 Clapham, C. (1982), supra, p. 3.
18 Ibid, p. 8.
19Gellner, E. (1977): "Patrons and Clients", in Gellner, E. and Waterbury, J. (Eds): "Patrons and
Clients in Mediterannean Societies". London, Centre for Mediterranean Studies of the American
Universities Field Staff, pp. 3. 7. Emphasis added.
20 Ibid, p.3.
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which patronage is an amalgam, a co-habitation of ideology and structure, of a
form of action deemed as rational and a code of ethical behaviour.21 This means
that it may well exist in a society as a structure necessary for the function of
this society, but at the same time it can be a credo, a code of ethics defining
social and political relations.
As shown in the discussion of patronage so far, those in control of
resources are in a position to impose their course of action on the clients, who
cannot afford to have freedom of choice, since they depend on the patrons for
access to scarce resources critical for their survival. Moreover, apart from the
threat of tangible sanctions as connected to deprivations of material resources,
there is a whole internal mechanism, i.e. a value system based on such notions
as honour, loyalty, friendship etc, which functions as a very efficient
mechanism of control in patron client relations. In other words, patronage is a
form of power. As Lasswell and Kaplan argue in their analysis of power, it
"may rest on faiths and loyalties as well as interests, to say nothing of habit and
apathy... we speak ofpozoer as a control over value practices and patterns. "22
Accordingly, when patronage is perceived as an ethos, individuals grow
up to believe that this is the way societal relations should be and resource
allocation and state organisation should occur along these lines. In this case,
patronage is a form of power perhaps equally if not more efficient than power
exercised with the threat of material and/or corporeal sanctions.
21 It is close to what Wallace-Hadrill observed about the Romans' perception of patronage:
"patronage... represented a vital part ofconscious Roman ideology, of their own image ofhow their world
both was and ought to be." Wallace-Hadrill, A. (Ed.) (1989), supra pp. 66-67.
22 Lasswell, H.D. and Kaplan, A. (1950), "Power and Society". New Haven and London, Yale
University Press, p. 76. Emphasis added.
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• Patronage and the modern Greek State: the repercussions on State
organisation.
This section will look into the evolution of patronage and the
development of the over-centralised clientelist State. The discussion will show
how power and resource distribution through complex clientelist networks has
maintained and consolidated a pattern of political and State organisation. At
the heart of this pattern lies the utilisation of local-regional development
policies in a manner that kept local self-government weak, while retaining and
enhancing the central State's strength and domination over the latter. Similarly,
the interaction between the intermediate organisations and the State and their
firm control by the State have largely contributed to the maintenance of this
pattern which is being challenged by the Structural Funds Regulations. The
discussion covers also the introduction of the IMPs, which was the first big
challenge for the Greek administrative system. In particular in seeks to
highlight the resistance of patronage and persistence of traditional practices in
public policy process in reforming attempts up to 1988.
Clientelism existed in Ottoman Greece in a decentralising form. More
specifically, although, the Ottoman Empire when compared to its Western
feudal counterparts was far more centralised, still it allowed the development
of local potentates who acquired a considerable degree of power. This was true
especially from the end of the 16th century onwards, with the gradual
weakening of the power of the Sultan and the subsequent loosening of the
administrative ties between the centre and the periphery. It was during this
period that large pieces of land passed not only to the pashas (local Ottoman
representatives), but also to Greeks. This process gave rise to the Greek land
owning elite, entailing at the same time their involvement in local
government.23 In this vast empire where the conquered were far more
23Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P. (1990), "Decentralisation in Post-Dictatorial Greece". Unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, pp. 10-12.
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numerous than the conquerors, the latter offered the Christian landowners legal
and political guarantees in exchange for their loyalty on the one hand, and
mediation between the Porte (Ottoman administration in Constantinople) and
the local population on the other.
The economic power incorporated in the large estate ownership,
followed by the privileges bestowed upon the landowners by the Ottomans,
entailed the monopoly of power by the former in the Greek rural communities.
This had detrimental effects on the socio-political structure of the village. The
people of the village directly elected the local leaders, the so-called procriti,
however, the results of the elections were always decided in advance in the
context of clientelist exchange between the procriti and the electoral body.
Thus, although the democratic institutional context existed (unwritten),
the political consensus occurred outside this context. Therefore, this is a case in
which notwithstanding the role of clientelism in decentralisation of power from
the Porte downwards to the local elites, this is as far as decentralisation
reached; the individual was literally deprived of freedom of choice and
personal responsibility. Thus, the pattern of cohabitation of formal with
informal institutions was established already at a very early period of the
Modern Greek State and has persisted ever since.
Against this background, the clash between Kapodistrias, the first
Governor of the independent Greek State on the one hand, who established the
centralised bureaucratic state apparatus and the procriti on the other was
inevitable. The new centralised system introduced by Kapodistrias was meant
to deprive the procriti to a large degree of the resources they used for clientelist
exchange, and thus destroy the basis of the power system on which they
thrived during the Turkish occupation. Kapodistrias lost his life in the cause of
a strong central state, murdered by one of the local potentates, yet his death did
not hinder the introduction of a strong centralised bureaucratic machine and
later, the introduction of a parliamentary system. The developments that came
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as a result of the reaction of the powerful families that saw their local
strongholds falling are illustrative of the flexibility and adaptability of
traditional value systems and political practices to modern settings.
Patronage displayed a high degree of adaptability to the new conditions.
The establishment of the centralised state bureaucratic machine meant that
resources previously in the hands of the local leaders now devolved upon the
bureaucrats and politicians at the centre. In view of lack of other resources of
economic nature, such as large estates24, the procriti were subsequently left
without the basis of clientelist exchange which secured and perpetuated their
grip of power over the local population. The only resource left to them was
personal and family prestige at the local level acquired in the course of
centuries precisely due to their status as patrons. They used it wisely to cement
their position in the new circumstances.
More specifically, the families that had amassed power during the
Ottoman period, after the establishment of the central state in 1830s and later
after the introduction of the parliamentary system, infiltrated the state machine
at the central level. Most politicians up to the 1870s, when the first big socio¬
economic and political change occurred, were members of the powerful local
families, the so called "tzakia". In order to be elected they used their prestige
among the population of their constituency. However, once they accessed
political power at the centre, they next moved to secure a very firm grip of the
bureaucratic machine. Therefore, they acquired new resources at the central
level, which they used to attract their clients at the local level and secure their
re election. They monopolised favours to their clienteles to such an extent, that
it was impossible for the latter to have access to jobs, hospitals, or any kind of
24The majority of the powerful families were not big landowners, as the land policy of the
Greek State favoured the creation of small plots instead of large estates. See Dertilis, G. (1985),
"Social Transformation and Militant Intervention". (In Greek), Athens, Exantas.
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services provided by the State, without the help of the patrons. In return they
offered their vote and that of the members of their family.
As a consequence, the establishment of the centralised state and
bureaucracy did not eliminate patronage, which, having functioned at the local
level during the Ottoman period in the context of clusters of dyadic relations,
was transformed into a proper system of power and resource distribution, as
well as reproduction of power structures. In this context, the political parties
were loose organisations operating at the centre through mobilisation of the
clienteles by the brokers at the local level.
This development made unnecessary further resistance of the local elites
to the expansion of the central state. Moreover, since it was precisely due to
their control of resources at the central level that they were able to maintain
their power, they had an interest not only in sustaining but also in reinforcing
accumulation of power at the centre. The "malfunctioning parliamentary regime"
that emerged, had as main characteristics the strongly particularistic and
personalistic character of dialectics between society and the State in its narrow
sense, as opposed to the more collective nature of the respective relation in
Western modern societies. It proved an effective mechanism of control of the
central state apparatus, and through this a means for the enhancement and
consolidation of centralisation of power. It is significant that the dominant class
initially consisting in the local powerful families (tzakia) were not only
interested in the upper levels of the State apparatus. Posts in Prefectures and
Municipalities were swarmed by members and clients of the leading political
families. This is an additional reason why it has always been so important that
power and real control of the sub-national institutions, (both prefectures, i.e.
deconcentrated branches of the central state, and municipalities and
communes, i.e. directly elected local authorities), remain in the hands of those
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at the central level of government: they used them to sell favours and retain
their clienteles to the advancement of their interests.25
Internal economic developments as informed by the international
environment in late 19th century, had serious effects on the social and political
developments in Greece. The two world economic crises in 1873 and 1929
triggered a series of changes that influenced immediately the structures of
power and the nature of patronage in Greece: a) the rise of a new industrial
middle class who demanded a share in political power. Their entrance in the
political arena caused a considerable weakening of the old tzakia and as a result
affected also the clientelist networks which were built along the lines of friends,
relatives and in general followers of the old families, b) The capitalist mode of
production enhanced the idea of a civil society perceived in its liberal notion,
although in Greece it never reached Western standards due to the omnipresent
clientelist system, c) Due to the predominant role of the state in the economic
developments, the centralisation of the state apparatus was dramatically
reinforced both in terms of power and as an unprecedented growth of the
bureaucracy.26
With the coming of the new bourgeoisie in Greek politics, the
augmentation of the civil servants body, the spreading of education and
consequently the rise in the numbers of educated people, the brokerage of
power passed from the old local mediators to civil servants, lawyers and
doctors. It was them from now on that could best - because they were
professionals - solve the problems of the clients by rendering the always
25 Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P. (1990), supra.
26On the developments of the times see Mouzelis, N. (1980), "Capitalism and Development of the
Greek State". In Scase, R.: "The State in Western Europe". London, Croom Helm.
Chapter Tivo p. 62
remote, incomprehensible and hence hostile central state more friendly, and
securing access to resources always by means of patronage. 27
At the same time, political parties underwent also a transformation:
from loose political formations dependent on the local brokers for mediation
with the clienteles, they became strong organisations accumulating control of
resources in the capital of the country. From now on party machinery was in
control of lawyers, doctors and bureaucrats at the centre. One of the most
important phases in the evolution of patronage in Greece has been the Inter
War era, which favoured its further consolidation. It is during this period that
the two big bourgeois parties managed to draw the peasantry into the conflict
between these two parties, a conflict known as "dihasmos" i.e schisme. It
focused on the debate of monarchy versus republic and caused a great deal of
turmoil in the country. The fact that the peasantry was divided along these two
different lines of approach to the regime issue meant that in reality they were
diverged from real problems connected to their economic condition. Instead
they were firmly tied to the two parties in client - patron relations, thus
extending and consolidating the clientelist system. 28
Therefore, the economic and political developments and the subsequent
change in clientelism reinforced the centralisation of the state, by transferring
the power from the local brokers to those controlling the parties at the national
level. This development inaugurated the era of party and state clientelism.
Since then the ruling party's grip over the state took unprecedented
dimensions to such a degree, that the latter was able to use the former for the
perpetuation of its power by means of extensive practice of patronage.
27 Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P. (1990), supra.
28 Comninos, M. (1984), "Clientelist Politics in two Greek Districts". Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
London School of Economics.
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After the end of the civil war at the end of the 1940s, there was a
strengthening of the repressive state apparatus, and a re organisation of the
bureaucracy, conditions, which fostered the re emergence, extension and
consolidation of the clientelist system. As argued by M. Comninos, the purges
in the public sector that followed the victory of the bourgeois class in the civil
war, offered the bourgeois politicians the opportunity to re built their clienteles
by recruiting clients in the bureaucratic machine through employment in the
civil service and distribution of government patronage. The result of these
practices was a shift towards gigantism and centralisation that hindered effective
functioning of the bureaucracy.29
The discussion so far described the salient characteristics of the Greek
political system: a repeated, intricate pattern of interaction between politicians
on the one hand, and the bureaucrats recruited in the context of clientelist
relations on the other, resulted in a gigantic, over centralised, ineffective state
apparatus, depriving citizens of free access to resources, accessible only
through clientelism. This extra institutional consensus, i.e. the fact that the
interaction state - society did not occur within the existing institutional
framework, but outside it along patronage networks, the falsification of the
popular mandate and the increasingly arbitrary and repressive nature of this
system in the post war period, led to a huge wave of passionate
demonstrations against these practices in the 1960s. The dominant class
responded with the 1967 military coup and the establishment of the seven-year
junta.30
The period after the restoration of democracy in Greece, was marked by
the re-construction of the old clientelist networks, and an effort to distribute
29Only in one year, in 1962, at least 8.000 employees were recruited and placed in the upper
echelons of the bureaucracy. See ibid pp. 69-72.
(1989), "Clientelist Relations and Populism.
System". (In Greek), Athens, Exantas.
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favours and employment from the public sector which grew once more in an
impressive way. During this period, all efforts at administrative reforms failed.
However, the most important phase in the development of state patronage in
post dictatorial Greece, coincides with the Socialist party's (PASOK) term in
government. PASOK was founded by Andreas Papandreou in 1974, who
during PASOK's term in opposition until 1981 when it won the elections, was
constantly stigmatising the right wing New Democracy and its clientelist
politics, as well as state centralisation, and in general all the traditional
practices of which the people had become weary. 31 PASOK was aware of the
popular expectations for a change in political practices and the word 'allagi' i.e.
change, became the principal slogan of the party's election campaign in 1981,
although as characteristically noted, it "...urns not simply a political slogan; it was
'a profound vision in the consciousness of the Greek people'.32
The promise for change crystallised among other things in the
introduction and prevalence of meritocratic and rational criteria over
personalistic - clientelist practices, and decentralisation with view to enhancing
popular participation in decision making at grassroots level, and the
subsequent empowerment of the citizen.33 However, once PASOK came to
power after winning the elections in 1981, the chasm between the promises and
practice soon became apparent. In an attempt to consolidate the basis of its
power, and in an unprecedented explosion of populism, it granted favours and
posts using extensively the state apparatus and its resources.34 Strong loyalty to
31 On PASOK's genesis and development, see Spourdalakis, M. (1988), "PASOK: Structure,
Internal Crises and Centralisation ofPower". (In Greek), Athens, Exantas.
32 Clogg, R. (1987), Parties and elections in Greece. The Quest for Legitimacy", London C. Hurst and
Company, p. 75.
33Spourdalakis, M. (1988), supra p. 261.
34 It has been argued that clientelism worked as a safety valve, integrating those social strata
that due to lack of resources had not acquired the necessary qualifications. Interview with K.
Theos, Special Consultant to the Under-secretary of the Ministry for National Economy, and
since 1999 Secretary General of the above ministry.
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the party was the necessary pre-condition for most of the appointments
especially in the upper echelons of the hierarchy. Moreover, regarding
decentralisation, PASOK adopted a policy, which contrasted its declarations
while in opposition. There was in the first place further centralisation of power
in the Executive at the expense of the other powers.35 Furthermore, the party
gained a tight grip of the elected local authorities, to an unprecedented
degree.36
• The intermediary bodies
As noted earlier, civil society has been very weak in Greece, due to the
firm grip of the State. Subsequently, collective decision making has given way
to particularistic procedures and practices. In affecting national regional policy
process the European Regional Policy inevitably impacts on public-private
relations as well. Therefore, although a detailed analysis of the issue of interest
aggregation and articulation is beyond the scope of the present study, it is
nonetheless appropriate to discuss in short the nature of public-private
relations in the Greek political system.
The freedom to form associations was first guaranteed by the Constitution
of 1864 (Art. 11) and was subsequently refined by the successive
Constitutions.37 The Constitution of 1975 as amended in 1986, currently in
force, guarantees this freedom in Articles 12, 22 and 23. Trade unionism
generally seen as the main barrier against the development of a centralised and
35 This allowed further discretion to the bureaucrats of the Ministry of the Interior to hamper
the introduction of reforms.
36 Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P. (1990), supra pp. 170 and 244-245 PASOK's decentralisation
policies are discussed in more detail later.
37 Galanou, E. (1986) "Judicial Attitudes towards the Freedom of Association". In Association of
Greek Constitutional Lawyers (Ed.): "The Constitutional Freedoms in Action". Athens, Sakkoulas
p. 213.
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interventionist State, has followed in Greece an evolutionary pattern which has
on the contrary, contributed to excessive state interference and over-
centralisation.38 This becomes evident in: a) the particularistic way in which
each interest group is pursuing its interests in the context of clientelist
relationships with the State, and in defiance of the 'general good1. This mode of
dialectics promotes and perpetuates a firm grip of trade unions and
associations by the State, b) The fact that trade union leaders are persons with
very strong party affiliations, their loyalty lying firstly with the party and only
secondly with the group the interests they represent. It is characteristic that
some of them, manage to hold important governmental offices as a reward for
their services to the party, during their office as trade union leaders. 39
Pressure groups on the one hand seek state interference in the form of
special privileges against the principles of competition, while on the other, they
become proponents of the free market when this involves abolition of
privileged arrangements regarding antagonistic groups.40 Subsequently, the
issue in Greek politics is not connected to ideology, but to the maintenance of
the existing social relations, or "rather the fact that no one is seeking to alter
them".41 Every body claims state aid and protection at the individual or/and
the sectoral level, but since claims of this nature do not presuppose necessarily
the existence of mass political formations on ideological basis and democratic
structure and processes, social groups address their claims through
38 Koukiadis, Y. (1986), "Trade Union Freedoms and the Legislator". In Association of Greek
Constitutional Lawyers(ed.) (1986) suprav pp. 204-205. In a neo-marxist approach N. Mouzelis
has offered a satisfactory explanation of the deviant capitalist development -
underdevelopment- in Greece, resulting from Western models being transplanted in a pre¬
capitalist context, as well as of the effects of this underdevelopment on political and social
development of the country. Mouzelis, N. (1978), "Greece - Facets of Underdevelopment". London,
MacMillan Press.
39 See among others, Collins, N. and Louloudis, L. (1995) "Protecting the Protected: the Greek
Agricultural Policy Network". JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 2, pp. 95-114.
40 Simitis, K. (1989), Introduction, in Mouzelis, N. et al: "Populism and Politcs". Athens, Gnosi,
pp. 10-11. '
41 Ibid, p. 13.
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particularist mechanisms, or even individual politicians.42 This asphyxiating
embrace of trade unions and associations by the State has been described as
"fragmented syntechniasmos", in distinction from "state corporatism". 43
This situation raises severe issues of legitimacy every time the
government introduces new measures that affect the interests of various
groups. The so-called "social dialogue," consists merely in "rituals", in which
the union leaders meet with government representatives while policy
guidelines have already been decided by the latter and are simply accepted by
the former. Consequently, trade union leaders are in great difficulty to
persuade the members of their unions to accept the deals made with the
government. This lack of credibility on the part of the represented vis-a-vis the
representatives has deprived the government of a useful instrument in
achieving social consensus on policies. Subsequently, "the political legitimation of
its choices becomes impossible".44
The issue of legitimacy is therefore very acute in national politics. It
becomes even more crucial in the light of European integration, and the
induced extensive reforms that require social consensus and support.45
Developments during the past few years, as the government introduces new
policies which meet with fierce popular reaction illustrate these arguments.
With regards to the public sector in particular, all serious efforts at
modernisation aiming at rendering it more efficient in view of the European
42 Ibid, pp.11-15.
43 The word syntechniasmos is retained as having no exact equivalent in English, the closest one
being corporatism. As argued by Kazakos, in "state corporatism", interest organisations tend to
be more or less "extensions" of the State itself and not simply the State's target. State
corporatism has also been connected to the abolition of antagonistic political parties and of
freedom of speach, which is not the case in Greece, apart from Metaxa's dictatorship in the
inter-war period. Kazakos, P. (1991) "Greece between Adjustment and Marainalisation". Athens,
Diatton, pp. 59-60.
44 Ibid, p. 62.
45 Ibid.
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challenges have failed due to fierce reactions of the civil servants whose
interests were touched.46
As a consequence Greek politics is characterised by the fragmentary
approach to requests, the main criteria for their satisfaction being political
considerations, as opposed to the long term "perspective of modernisation and
adjustment of the social structures to the continuously and rapidly changing needs of
the economic and international developments"47. The political parties respond by
using the traditional populist methods, which exacerbates the situation
perpetuating the vicious circle. As K. Simitis argued the only way to break this
vicious circle, is not the clash between political parties, which have lost their
credibility, but the clash between the populists on the one hand and the modernisers
on the other, within the political parties themselves.48
In sum, interest aggregation and articulation is characterised by
particularistic and fragmented relations between public and private spheres
and as such is being directly challenged by the application of the principles
introduced with the European Regulations, which require a collective approach
to policy making process.
46 Ibid, pp. 63. Regarding re-organisation of State and in particular decentralisation, it also
failed as it involves among others, the transfer of personnel from the centre to the periphery, a
measure strongly opposed by civil servants associations. Ibid, p. 65.
47 Simitis, K. (1989), supra, p. 16
48 Ibid, p. 17. It should be noted that this statement was made at a time well before Simitis
became Prime Minister, and even before he launched the modernising movement within
PASOK. Emphasis added.
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The Organisation of the State - Constitutional and Legal Arrangements
• Definitions
There is usually confusion regarding the terms used to describe the
organisation of the State. A clarification is attempted here before further
examination of the Greek administrative structures is discussed.
There are basically two systems of state organisation, namely the system
of centralisation, according to which powers are reserved to the State in its
narrow sense, and decentralisation. As regards the system of centralisation it is
distinguished in concentration, i.e. exertion of competencies by central
governmental bodies wielding power over the entire national territory, and
deconcentration which involves exertion of power by governmental bodies over a
part only of the national territory. Obviously, deconcentration is classified under
centralisation because is suggests that powers and competencies rest with the
State in its narrow sense, as opposed to powers devolved to bodies possessing
own legal personality, and enjoying a certain degree of administrative and
financial autonomy.
Decentralisation as an organisational pattern finds its purest expression
in self-government and involves mainly a) existence of an entity with own legal
personality, i.e. separate from that of the State, b) participation of its members
in the execution of administrative competencies, suggesting that in a self
government organisation the people is the ultimate carrier of the powers
devolved to the organisation, c) independence of the self-government
organisation vis-a-vis the State and the other public agents, i.e. decision making
powers and independence in performing acts in the context of the devolved
competencies, d) State control, without which a self government organisation
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would be a State on its own, and e) the management of public affairs regarding
executive powers only.49
Regional government in Greece before the introduction of the Regions by
Law 1622/1986, referred to the level of the Prefectures, discussed below. The
Greek word peripheria used as the equivalent of the word Region is also used to
denote those areas of the national territory other than the Capital of the country
and/or the big agglomerations.
Local Self-government Organisations (LSGO), the lowest administrative
tier, enjoying a certain degree of administrative and financial autonomy, was
subject to legality and expediency control by the Prefect who was the
representative of the Central State (until 1994 when the Prefectures became
Prefectoral Self-governments). Accordingly, it was at the level of the Prefectoral
government that resources of the National Budget meant for the so-called local-
regional development were allocated and managed. It is characteristic that
there is no such term as prefectoral development, but the term regional development
has always been used instead. The term regional development is acquiring a more
specific content after the introduction of the Regions by Law 1622/1986
mentioned above, and mainly due to the paramount role attributed to the
Regions in the management of the European Funds' resources.
Legality control is exercised by the State on public bodies and
organisations regarding conformity of their Decisions with legal provisions. It
is supposed to be limited only to formal requirements, i.e. procedures as
provided for by law. On the other hand, expediency control involves apart from
legal conformity of procedures, the examination of Decisions as to whether
these should have been made in the first place. Although expediency control
can be used more easily to stifle powers and competencies and consequently
49 This section draws almost entirely on Raikos, A.G. (1982), "General Theom of State". Athens
(No publisher mentioned), pp. 102-121.
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LSGO development, legality control has been equally effective as a
means used by the Prefecture (i.e. before 1994), to block Local Self-
government's Decisions by delaying their legalisation. Expediency control was
abolished by Law 2218/1994.
• Local Self-government Organisations: Lack of Resources, Know-
how and the Dependency Bond with the Central State.
According to the central argument of this thesis, resistance to reforms is
analogous to the consequences that these involve for the existing distributional
patterns in regional development policies in Greece, and the threat presented
thereby to the actors involved at all levels, but ultimately to the centralised
clientelist State. Accordingly, the description of State organisation below is
seeking to highlight in particular the role of the various administrative tiers
and actors in the process of resource distribution for regional development.
Emphasis is placed on the organisational and financial incapacity of the Local
Self-government Organisations (LSGOs).
As noted above, Kapodistrias, the first Governor after Independence
achieved a robust invasion of the central state in the management of the local
affairs through the establishment of a system that divided the country into
thirteen prefectures, (in Greek, nomoi). Prefects were appointed as heads of the
nomoi, while each prefecture was divided into provinces, and each province
into towns and villages. This was in fact a system of local administration rather
than one of Local Self-government, since the sub national units were no more
than branches of the central administration headed by Kapodistrias's
appointees. After Kapodistrias's death, Otto's reign was the era during which the
Bavarian administrators who followed him in the newly created kingdom,
Chapter Two p. 73
consolidated a strictly centralised model of governance.50 They divided the
country into ten prefectures and forty-seven provinces.51 At the end of 1833 the
first merger of local government entities in Greek history occurred: thousands
of small communities were merged and the country was divided into 750
municipalities, as the first -and unique- degree (level) of Self-government.
Officials appointed by the Crown headed local-government entities and
despite the attempts at reform during the rest of the nineteenth century, Local-
government remained embraced by the State.52
The first half of the 20th century was marked by successive efforts at
rationalisation of the sub national organisation of the State with the entrance in
the political scene of "new men". E. Venizelos, one of the most eminent political
figures introduced Law ANZ'/1912 "On Establishment of the Municipalities and
Communes", a law that put an end to Bavarian mergers and in general the
Bavarian administrative model. Thus the country was fragmented into thousands
of "still-born" municipalities and communes with view to weakening the local
politicians in favour of a strong Central State.53 LSGO over-fragmentation has
been ever since one of their main traits and a reason for their inability to meet the
needs of any serious planning for local development.54 This weakness becomes
even more crucial in connection to the other important obstacle i.e. the chronic
50 On the first years of Independence and the developments in the establishment of the
centralised state, see among others: Komninos-Hlepas, N. (1994), "The Multi -level Self-
government - Theoretical Quests and Institutional Transformations" Sakkoulas, Athens-Komotini.
Also, Christophilopoulou-Kaler. P. (1989), supra.
51 The officials in head of these divisions were appointees of the Crown. However, extreme
concentration of power in the hands of the prefects was avoided, with a balanced share of
power between the latter and a number of other local officials who, nonetheless, were also
appointed by and answerable to the Crown.
52 Komninos-Hlepas, N. (1994), supra, pp. 43-55.
53 Ibid, pp. 109-110.
54 For a detailed account of the issue and the ensuing exacerbation of the developmental
problems see Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (1998), "The
organisation of the Local Self-government" Introduction to Law 2539/1997" (In Greek), Athens.
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dependence of the LSGO on the Central State, for resources. More specifically,
while one of the most important elements of self-government is financial
autonomy, the Greek State has never allowed LSGO adequate own resources.
Instead, LSGO funding has been used to keep local authorities hostages of the
Central State.55
A LSGO feature particular to the Greek political system has been their
utilisation by the political parties for Opposition policies. Because the Right
was in power for a very long time blocking all resources to the Opposition
parties, both the Left and later the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
used LSGO resources for their opposition policies. PASOK's promise (also as a
reward for the help received from LSGO while in opposition) was that once in
power it would enhance decentralisation and grassroots level decision making
by empowering institutionally and financially local self-government. The
party's Proclamation of Fundamental Principles and Objectives, of 3 September
1974 included specific clauses on enhancement of decentralisation of the State,
placing among its objectives, "the regionally decentralised social planning of the
economy...", involving the competent social agencies which are "the state, the
region, the municipality or community, in proportion to the size, the type and the
significance of the productive unit", and "administrative decentralisation with the
strengthening of local self-government".56 Therefore, a restructuring of regional
development policy process and economic planning, through among others,
the establishment of the Region as a subnational tier, co-responsible for social
planning was on PASOK's agenda already in 1974, long before Greece's full
membership and the introduction of the IMPs.
55 Apart from Komninos and Christophilopoulou, on LSGO funding see, Tatsos, N. (1988),
"State Allowances to Local Self-government". (In Greek) Athens, EETAA.
56 Clogg, R. (1987), Parties and elections in Greece. The Quest for Lesitunacy", London C. Hurst and
Company, p. 222.
Chapter Two p. 75
This is significant at any effort to establish a theoretical framework with
view to explaining empowerment of the Regions in the European context. It
has been -rather correctly- pointed out that, certain approaches attributing
subnational mobilisation exclusively to the application of Community policies
fail in fact to take into consideration factors like previously existing trends at
the international level, or exigencies stemming from domestic politics.57 It
seems that the establishment of the Regions in Greece offers an illustration to
this argument. This is discussed in a later chapter.
After PASOK's accession to power in 1981, significant changes occurred
in decentralisation policies. There were successive reforms in an effort to
enhance the role of LSG. However, governmental choices in this field were
finally influenced to a very large degree by the party's choices. It has been
argued that decentralisation in particular, is the field par excellence in which
policies affect the territorial distribution of power to a larger degree than the
socio-economic development, and as a consequence, governmental policies are
determined largely by party considerations, and in particular by power
distribution within the party organisation.58
As a result, PASOK's decentralisation policies became the field of intra-
party power conflict and was used to enhance the position of groups and
individual members of the party. There was a contradiction between the
announced decentralising policy of EATOP (a party committee created
specifically to promote decentralisation), and the centralist practices of the
same body. On the one hand it was announcing schemes for the strengthening
of local authorities and their associations. On the other hand, "it was exerting
57 See e.g. Jeffery, Ch. (1997), "The Emergence ofMulti-Level Governance in the European Union: A
Domestic Politics Approach", Paper presented at the 8eme Colloque International de la Revue
"POLITIQUES ET MANAGEMENT PUBLIC".
58 Christophilopoulou P. (1997), "PASOK and Local Self-Government: Organisational Structure and
Policies". In Spourdalakis, M. (Ed), "PASOK: Party - State - Society". Athens, Themelio, pp.195-
196.
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power behind the scenes". Through EATOP the municipalities and communes
politically affiliated to PASOK, were used for the support and promotion of the
governmental work and the party's goals. Even when reforms were
introduced, these in the long run served party purposes. More specifically,
EATOP made sure that the re structuring of the Municipal Organisations
served the party's interests. As characteristically argued, "EATOP made local-
government the area where the party had acquired knowledge, competence and control
of local government organisations to a degree unprecedented for political parties in the
post war period".59
LSGO weakness was exacerbated by the fact that, as has been always
the case in Greece, analogous transfer of resources did not accompany
whatever transfer of competencies to LSGO. This meant that LSGO had to
carry out additional tasks without possessing the necessary means. One of the
reasons why LSGO was not granted the financial means to carry out the new
responsibilities has been the fact that the State's resources were depleted.60
• The Prefectures and the Failure to Establish Prefectoral Self-
governmen t(PSG)
The successively amended Greek Constitutions provided for
administrative deconcentration. It was first guaranteed in Art. 105 of the
Constitution of 1925, the stipulations of which were repeated in the Art. 108 of
the Constitution of 1927. The Constitution of 1952 provided for
59Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P. (1990), supra, pp. 168-170.
60 As pointed out by a local government expert, "Decentralisation costs and the State could not
afford it; European finding was used to rescue PASOK's decentralisation policies." Interview with T.
Sapounakis, LSG expert, special consultant to the Minister for the Interior, Spring 2000.
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deconcentration, in the same article as for decentralisation, i.e. Art. 99 § 1,
although not in the same detailed manner as its predecessors. 61
The most dominant pattern of administrative deconcentration has been
division in prefectures borrowed from the French administrative model.62
Prefectures, which have played a cardinal role in regional policy-process and
through it the preservation of the over-centralised State, constituted simply
deconcentrated branches of the latter. There have been several abortive
attempts at the establishment of Prefectoral Self-government starting with the
royal Decree of 3rd April 1833. The second attempt was made after the
revolution of 3 September 1843. Much later, on 27 May 1887, a law on
Prefectoral Councils and their competencies, was passed in the Parliament, but
was abolished in 1890.63
The reason why these successive legal reforms were not implemented
should be sought in the fact that they challenged directly the core of the
political system, i.e. the clientelist politics and the actors benefiting from it. In
particular, they challenged the intricate clientelist networks built around the
Prefecture and the resources it allocated in the context of regional policy
procces.64
The most consistent effort to introduce PSG has been associated with
Charilaos Trikoupis, a prominent politician of the 19nth century, a 'modernised
aspiring to the modernisation of Greece according to the western standards,
61 Raikos, A. G. (1982), supra, p. 124.
62 Dagtoglou , P.D. (1984), "General Administrative Law", Sakkoulas, Athens, p.397. However,
another tier, the General Administrations were established to meet specific needs arising from
the acquisition of new lands as a result of wars. After several modifications they were
abolished by Law 3200/1955. See: Andronopoulos, V. and Mathioudakis, M. (1987), "Regional
Administration / Local Self-government: Historical Development", "ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM",
Nos 31-32, pp. 35-61.
63 Ibid.
64 Fully analysed in the following chapters.
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who was only too well aware of the role of the Prefectures in nurturing and
promoting clientelist electoral interests. His plans to re-organise the
administrative structure of the State, by introducing among others Prefectoral
Self-government, had as a main target precisely the enfeebling of clientelist
formations. In short, he believed the country's modernisation depended among
others, on departure from the " tradition ofpersonalistic, clientelist political parties
thatfmotioned as intermediary mechanisms for the possession of the State".65
Trikoupis introduced Law A<J>NC'/1887 on administrative re¬
organisation of the State. It was less ambitious than what he would have liked
it to be, but it was the only way he could have had it passed in the Parliament,
due to strong resistance by "old style" politicians, i.e., those attached to
clientelist practices and the over-centralised State. According to the new law,
Prefectoral self-government enjoyed own legal personality and the Prefect and
the Prefectoral Councillors were directly elected for a four-year term.
However, the most revolutionary innovation was introduced with Articles 5
and 7 of the above law, which stipulated exclusion of MPs, Mayors and
Presidents of Communes from the right to run for Prefectoral Councilors. This
meant that MPs, i.e. patrons at the central level, and Mayors and Presidents of
Communes i.e. patrons at the local level, could not use their clientele to get
elected and continue their clientelist politics at the Prefectoral level, by using
this time the resources allocated to the Prefectoral Self-government. In addition
to that, Article 31 prohibited political discussions in the Prefectoral Councils, as
well as interference in the Councillors' duties, obviously in an effort to isolate
their activities from clientelist practices. However, Law AONC/1987, was
abolished in 1890 by Th. Delighiannis, an "old style" politician during his term
of office as a Prime Minister.66 This attempt at establishing PSG is illustrative of
65 Chlepas, N. K. (1994): "The Multi-tier Self-government". Athens-Komotini, Sakkoulas, pp. 77-
78.
66 Ibid pp. 82-93. Delighiannis was an "old style" politician and a political opponent of
Trikoupis.
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the pattern repeated several times in Modern Greek history. It reveals the clash
between the two distinct cultural paradigms, the predominance of the older
one, confirming at the same time the cultural embeddedness of the
administrative arrangements as determined by power and resource
distribution.
The next most important phase in developments regarding State
organisation was the inter-war era, marked in the Greek history by the
presence of another inspiring political figure, Alexandros Papanastassiou, a
"moderniser" and a socialist. An ardent champion of the re-organisation and
democratisation of the State, he had concrete ideas regarding self-government
and deconcentration which he managed to get incorporated in the
Constitutions of 1925 and 1927.67 Nonetheless, once more the relevant
constitutional provisions were not enacted. Thus the Prefectures remained
parts of the Central State's legal personality.
After the WWII, the Constitution of 1952 in Article 99, very timidly and
laconically provided that "State organisation is based on deconcentration and local
self-government as provided by law", adding that "municipal and communal
authorities are directly elected". State organisation became so centralised that all
local problems were solved at the central level. This tendency, in connection to
the increased State activity necessary to meet the needs resulting from the
damages of the war placed a huge burden on the Central State bureaucracy,
leading to the need for deconcentration. It was against this background that
new legislation was enacted. More specifically, Law 3200/1955 "On
Administrative Deconcentration" as amended with Legislative Decree
3620/1956, transferred a large number of competencies from the Ministers to
the Prefects, which resulted in the creation of field services in the prefectures.
67 On Papanastassiou and his ideas on administrative and State organisation see Tahos, A. I.
(1987), The "Views ofA. Papanastassiou on the State and Public Administration". In Anastasiadis G.
et all (Eds) (1987), "Alexandros Papanastassiou. Institutions, Ideology and Politics in the Inter-war
Era." (in Greek) Athens, Polytypo, pp. 277-324. Also, Chlepas, N. K. (1994): supra, pp. 121-151.
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The Prefects, directly dependent and answerable to the Minister for the
Interior, were responsible for the application of the Government's policies at
the Prefectoral level.68
Prefectoral Councils were also established, vested with advisory powers
only, in order to assist the Prefect in his extended responsibilities. They
consisted of civil servants and a limited number of members elected by Local
Self-government Authorities. Law 439/1976. amending Law 3200/1955 added
to the composition of the Prefectoral Councils a representative of the labour
unions, but he was not elected, instead he was appointed by the Prefect. Thus,
the majority of the votes belonged to the appointed civil servants. In reality, the
decisions of the Prefectoral Councils "... were expression of the "State
Establishment""69 The important innovation however, significant for the
discussion in this thesis, was the creation of a Prefectoral Fund, also introduced
with Law 3200/1955, as a public legal personality, meant to function as a tool
for local and regional development planning70. For this purpose, the
Prefectoral Funds would be responsible for the administration of funds coming
from the State Budget or the Public Investment Budget (PIP)71, as well as funds
allocated to the Prefecture by the various Ministries.72
Nonetheless, due to the synthesis of both the Board of Directors of the
Prefectoral Fund, and that of the Prefectoral Council which made the final
68 On the development of the Prefectures see, Velonias, E. (1984), "Prefectoral Administration"
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, No 17, pp. 44-59.
69 Beteniotis, E.A. (1978), "Self-government and Regional Development". (In Greek), LOCAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT, No 1, pp. 22-23.
70 i.e. at the prefectoral level. . It should be noted that a step towards a more coherent
organisational pattern of the Prefectures was made with the Legislative Decree 532/1970
"Supplement to the Provisions on Administrative Deconcentration".
71 This is part of the State Budget allotted for productive projects.
72 The Board of Directors was composed of the Prefect as President, three high ranking civil
servants, one of the elected members of the Prefectoral Council, and a representative of the
Local Association ofMunicipalities and Communes (TEDK).
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decisions, all perspectives for a democratic local-regional development
planning were invalidated. The synthesis of these two bodies and the
respective balance of power within them, meant that allocation of funds for
local development projects was entirely under State control, exerted through
the Prefectoral Council, or rather the Prefect himself. This state of affairs
remained unchanged in the post dictatorial period. As characteristically noted,
" The Prefectoral Councils are dismantled collective bodies, without any initiative...the
Prefect represents not only the Government but the party as well. He is more ofa party
commissioner..." 73 It is precisely in this context that resource allocation to
LSGO for local development projects was used for electoral purposes. There
are two dimensions in this: A) Local Self-government Authorities (LSGA) used
the funds for projects - almost in their totality for small-scale basic
infrastructure public works-, in a way to ensure their re-election. B) Apart from
the local electoral interests, general election considerations also determined
how PIP and other resources were allocated. It makes sense that those LSGA
affiliated to the ruling party were likely to receive larger sums for their local
development projects, as this served also the central governments electoral
interests.
Law 1235/1982, "Application of the Governmental Policy and the
Establishment of Popular Participation in the Prefectures" passed by PASOK
shortly after its advent to power, was the first response to the needs of
European Integration. It introduced an improved version of the Prefectoral
Councils, composed of representatives of the local productive and professional
associations presided by the Prefect, and vested with decision making powers
on the distribution of the funds of the Public Investment Programme allotted to
the Prefecture. The aim of this reform was to achieve social consensus at the
local level, and dismantle the old clientelist networks my means of an open
communication between the administration and the local pressure groups.
73 Beteniotis, E.A. (1978), supra.
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However, the reform brought about erosion and weakening of the
clientelist bonds between the MPs at the central level on the one hand and the
local societies on the other, but this was done in favour of the party's local
organisations, which controlled the local interest groups through the
representatives of the latter in the Prefectural Council.74 This development is
related to the mode of interests aggregation and articulation in Greece as
discussed above, whereby union leaders are party members promoting their
personal interests through those of their party rather, than the interests of their
union. The new arrangements had the following results: the re-distribution of
power attempted through broader popular participation in Prefectoral
Councils provided for in the new law, in connection to the latters' authority to
handle funds from the Public Investment Programme, soon was seen by the
PASOK MPs as a threat. The MPs realised that the members of the new
Prefectoral Council had stronger ties with the respective local committees of
the party as being closer to them and therefore more easily subject to their
influence. This meant that the members of the party's local committees could
use their influence on the members of the Prefectoral Council, and as a result
the resources of the Public Investment Programme for their own clienteles, at
the expense of similar interests of the MPs who were at the centre, and
therefore less influential on the Prefectoral Councils. As a result, there were
conflicts regarding the nomination of candidates for the Prefectoral Councils,
especially when politicians with small influence on party apparatus were
trying to enhance their position through extension and strenthening of their
clientelist networks.75
74 Christofilopoulou-Kaler: (1990) supraL See also, Velonias, E. (1984), supra.
75 Christofilopoulou-Kaler: (1990) supra, pp. 244-245.
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• Local-Regional Development Programmes: Structures and Practices.
So far, it has been shown that LSGO have been institutionally and
organisationally weak ever since the emergence of the Modern Greek State,
and under strict State tutelage. The Prefectures, through which resources for
local development were distributed to LSGO, were headed by the Prefect
responsible for the application of governmental policies. However, there is
only a superficial contradiction between formal i.e. legal arrangements on the
one hand, and eventual practices on the other regarding local development
policies. In reality, legislation regarding distribution of powers and resources is
characterised in most cases by inherent contradictions. On the one hand it
devolves powers and competencies, while on the other hand it does not
provide in parallel for the resources necessary for the exercise of these
competencies. Therefore, legislation on deconcentration and decentralisation
most of the times contains the concealed intention of the legislators to retain
the existing status quo.
It is characteristic that in all Local Self-government Codes (codified
legislation concerning organisation and administration of LSGO), it is provided
that the latter are expected to draw their own developmental plans and submit
their proposals to the Prefecture for approval and inclusion in the Prefectoral
Development Programmes. Developmental planning is implemented at LSGO
level by the Municipal and Communal Councils. At the Prefectoral level the
responsibility for the initial approval of the plans belongs to the Directorate of
Planning. The Municipal and Communal Councils at LSGO level, and the
Directorates of Planning at the Prefectoral level were officially responsible for
planning. Before 1986 the common procedure consisted in forwarding
development proposals in the form of Municipal or Communal Council
Decisions to the Prefecture for approval. The Directorate of Planning after
studying the plans and in close collaboration with the Prefect would forward
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the approved works to the Prefectoral Council for the final approval. A work
could be financed in two ways:
1) with own LSGO resources
2) with state allowances or interference
The latter could be either a) by transfer of the necessary funds to LSGO
through the Prefecture, or b) if it concerned a work of a large scale it would be
implemented directly by the central government.
More specifically, the typical procedure before 1986 had as follows: the
national budget contained a portion for the Public Investment Programme
(PDE). This amount was divided among the various Ministries which would
then allocate these funds to their respective field services in the Prefectures
through a specific part of their budgets the so-called Collective Action
Decision(CAD). After the Budget was approved by the Parliament, the
Prefects, political appointees of the Government would claim the amounts
proportionate to their Prefectures. These resources were used then for the
funding of the Local Public Investment Programme (LPIP), i.e. at the level of
the Prefecture.76
One of the problems consisted in that the amounts were allocated to the
Prefectures according to the population criterion only, i.e. there was no prior
concrete planning proposal to serve as the basis for resource allocation to the
Prefectures. The Prefect would allocate the sums to the LSGO after approval of
the latters' developmental programmes, which were no more than mere lists of
small scale public works. There was total lack of ex-ante evaluation due to a)
lack of know-how and infrastructure of the LSGO but also of the Prefecture, b)
lack of planning strategy and the respective mechanism at the national,
prefectoral and local levels. It is characteristic that even the Ministry of Co-
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ordination, later Ministry of National Economy (YPETHO), responsible at the
national level for the implementation of the developmental policies lacked the
expertise necessary for programming, the notion of which was almost alien to
the Greek administration.
One of the reasons was the non-meritocratic criteria according to which
the stuff at all administrative levels was employed. Lack of knowledge was
combined with lack of continuing education, that would to a certain extend
remedy some of the flaws, while allowing to those initially qualified to keep up
with developments in the relevant fields. However, it seems that there was also
almost total lack of interest to change this situation, which has been attributed
partly to the classical security dilemma, but primarily to the fact that the
existing framework facilitated clientelist practices and the preservation of the
existing status quo.77
Thus it should not be surprising that the Prefectoral Programmes just as
the Local Developmental (LD) Programmes, were mere incoherent lists of
small scale works and projects, without technical details or ex ante evaluation
and environmental studies. A number of important points need to be made
here. There has always been in Greece lack of basic infrastructure and this
explains the overwhelming presence of basic infrastructure works in LD
Programmes. Their small scale is moreover related to other important
parameters: a) LSGO lack of resources, expertise and infrastructure would not
allow them to carry out large projects at any rate, b) Implementing many small
"fancy" works secured LSG politicians their re-election, while at the same time
allowed them to satisfy as many "clients" as possible, c) Fragmentation of
larger projects into small works allowed LSGA to bypass legal provisions
76 For a detailed analysis of the Local Public Investement Programmes and in general the
finances of the Local Self-government, see Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P. (1990), supra.
77 As pointed out by E. Plaskovitis, this weakness of the Greek State has been the reason why
the Commission's role has been particularly interventionist, often in violation of the principle
of partnership. Interview with E. Plaskovitis. The role of the Commission in the application of
the Greek CSFs is discussed in later chapters.
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regarding direct award of contracts, thus promoting once more clientelist
relationships.
Apart from fragmentation of resources, another main feature of public
works production has been the underestimation of budget by the contractors
during their offer of bids, with view to ensuring award of the contract. In the
course of the implementation, and owing to the legal framework, mainly Law
1418/84 "On public works and related matters", the contractors were allowed to
submit anew a list revising the costs of the works to be implemented, which
more often than not involved a 50% increase of the initial budget. As expected
this was beyond any consideration of serious planning, while once more, it
allowed and promoted the function of clientelist networks consisting in
contractors, and public actors.
In short LD programmes were mainly characterised by:
1) Ignorance, rudimentary planning, lack of integrated programming
and developmental logic, and improvisation of the public actors
involved both at the LSG and Prefecture level. It is characteristic that
even the necessary documents for the bidding were often prepared
by the contractors themselves, which is indicative of the interest the
latter had in the preservation of this system.
2) Over-fragmentation of resources into small-scale works and direct
award of contracts.
3) Under-estimation of budget by the contractors with view to achieve
award of contracts, followed by budget revision and increase in the
course of the implementation.
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4) The so-called diaploki78, i.e. the complex interaction and exchange,
along clientelist lines which constitutes as characteristically observed
by a former member of a Municipal Council, a "distortion of the notion
of partnership". It consists in a "partnership" among the contractors,
civil servants involved in the Public Works (PW) approval and
control at the Prefectoral level, Local self-government authorities,
members of the political parties' local organisations, as well as
bureaucrats and politicians at the Central level, and is characterised
by complete lack of transparency.79
This was a complex network and procedure. Final approval of the
Prefectoral Programmes was subject to the influences/demands of
bureauctrats at the central government level, the clientelist needs of the local
MP, who would be influenced by contractors and would exert pressure on the
Prefect, and the clientelist needs of the Mayors and Presidents of Communes.
The latter, in their effort to secure approval of the works they proposed, would
lobby along clientelist lines politicians and bureaucrats either at the central or
at the Prefectoral level, pursuing their interests in complete defiance of the
developmental needs of the broader area, in a manner lucking in integrated
logic.80 The main pre-occupation of those involved in the distribution of funds
was to pursue their own interest or at best, to ensure a balance between
78 Diaploki is an abstract noun meaning inter-weaving. Diaplekomena (interwoven), as a present
participle has entered modern Greek jargon meaning the interwoven interests along clientelist
lines.
79 Interview with S. Iatrou, Municipal Councilor of Keratea and Prefectoral Councilor of
Eastern Attica, June 1999.
80 Ibid.
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conflicting interests at the local level, not the far reaching consequences of their
choices on the development of a given area.81
Thus, the distribution of funds by the Prefecture to the LSGO for
developmental programmes constituted the most important tool of the State
for the achievement of political integration at the local level. It is characteristic
that, the Directorates of Planning of the Prefectures, responsible for the
approval of the LSG development plans constituted field services of the
Ministry for the Interior and not of the par-excellence competent Ministry of
National Economy. This is easily explained if one considers the fact that the
Ministry of the Interior, known for its conservatism, has always been
responsible for the development of Prefectoral, Regional and Local Self-
government policies and politics, but it is at the same time responsible for
shaping the electoral legislation. Therefore, its main interests lie with
promoting policies and politics of equal distribution and in general
accommodating conflicting interests and pressures.82
This pattern stands at the heart not only of the regional policy process,
but of the Greek political and administrative system, and its preservation has
been vital not only to the survival of groups and actors involved in the public
works projects, but to the preservation of the centralised clientelist State too. It
illustrates the central argument deployed here, according to which resistance
to reforms is analogous to the centrality of the elements challenged in the
existing domestic arrangements.
81 Ibid. This has also been stated by Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P., (1996) "Prefectoral
Administration and Self-government in the Greek Political System" Greek Review of Political
Science, No 7, (In Greek).
82 See Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P., (1996) supra.
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The IMPs and Law 1622A986 "On Local Self-government, Regional
Development and Democratic Planning"
The first signs of the inadequacy of this system in the light of Greece's
membership in the European Community appeared with the introduction of
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs). The lack of expertise of the
Local and Prefectoral administrations, as well as the often contradictory and
vague instructions received from the Central Government, posed considerable
difficulties to the Prefects in their effort to incorporate in the development
proposals the logic of "integrated". Law 1622/1986 seemed to be a response to
these developments, while it was at the same time the fulfilment of PASOK's
promises for a strong local government, and the building of democracy at
grassroots level.83.
The truth is that the concepts of subsidiarity and partnership infiltrating
the IMPs Regulations, and portrayed in Law 1622/1986, seemed particularly in
accordance with the officially pronounced ideology of the ruling party, as did
the middle-way approach, implied by the process of democratic planning
described in the Law. However, as already mentioned there was a discrepancy
between PASOK's officially announced decentralisation policies on the one
hand and the party practices on the other. It is argued here that Law 1622/1986
provides further support for this argument.84 More specifically Law 1622/1986
bears one of the most salient features of the Greek legislation concerning
decentralisation and developmental policies: while it provides for a democratic
planning process (also appearing in the title of Law 16622/1986), it does not
provide for allocation of the necessary resources to sub-national units.
Therefore, it should have been expected that it would not bring about the long
83 See Andrikopoulou, E. " Whither Regional Policy?" in Dunford, M. and Kafkalas, G. (1992),
"Cities and Resions in the New Europe". London, Belhaven, p. 201.
84 The inherent contradictions of Law 1622/1986 offer further support for the arguments
deployed in Christophilopoulou-Kaler's thesis, although the above law is not extensively
analysed by her.
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due reform of the administrative system and the institutional framework
regarding regional policies. Before further discussing this feature a short
presentation of the main provisions of this law is offered.
Very briefly the main innovations provided for in Law 1622/1986 have
as follows:
• the division of the country into 13 Regions, a direct consequence of
the IMPs Regulation
• the introduction of second tier of Self-government at the Prefectoral
level
• the voluntary merger of small inefficient municipalities and
communes into larger entities with view to creating larger and
stronger LSGO, capable of carrying out developmental plans
• a new four-tier planning system: National Plans -Regional Plans -
Prefectural Plans -Local Plans.
Provisions for co-operation, and a net of hierarchical interdependencies
were expected to guarantee co-ordination among the various tiers. The new
system was designed to ensure a process of development, combining the top-
down with the bottom-up paradigms. This was in conformity with the
integrated approach of the new Community Regional Policy. It came moreover
as a response to PASOK's Proclamation of Principles of 3 September 1974
regarding decentralisation and democratic planning.85 Nonetheless, carrying
this revolutionary plan into effect proved difficult. One of the few steps made
85On the integrated nature of the Community Regional Policy introduced in the early 1980 see
De Witte, Bruno (1990), "The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in the Context of Community
Regional Policy". Working Paper Law No 90/8, Florence, Badia Fiesolana, European University
Institute. The need to adopt an integrated process of Regional Development was stressed in the
statement of the Minister of Interior, made on the occasion of the publication of Law 1622/86,
in July 1986.
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was the establishment of the Regions, deemed necessary in the light of the
adoption of the IMPs. The country was divided into 13 Regions, established in
1987, which are part of the legal entity of the state.86 The Secretary General of
the Region is a political appointee, and answerable to the Central government.
The Regional Councils constitute fora of representation of the Prefectures, the
LSGO, and the social and economic partners. Their main competency consists
in making proposals to the Central Government with regards developmental
projects to be incorporated in the national developmental programme.
Until 1994, lodging the Secretariats of the Monitoring Committees of the
IMPs was perhaps the only serious raison d' etre of the Regions. 87 The
organisational and financial weakness of the new tiers reflected the respective
incapacity of LSGO. Throughout the application of the IMPs, (and until 1994),
the preponderance of the Prefectures in resource allocation for regional
development was left untouched, despite the introduction of the Regions. All
proposals submitted by the Prefectures to the Regional Council were approved,
while the Secretary General of the Region did not possess any real powers. The
Region remained throughout the application of the IMPs an institution of
almost no importance since it was again political balances that determined
programme objectives that decided about modification of programmes and
resource distribution. There was a redirection of the programmes with removal
of innovative projects to small infrastructure projects geared to serve the needs
86 For a fuller analysis of the Regions, see Velonias, E. (1987), "Regional Administration / Local
Government: Current situation". (In Greek), in "ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM" Trimestrial
Journal of Administrative Science. Athens, Nos 31-32 / July-December, pp. 103-106.
87 Article 9 of the Council Regulation 2088/85, for the adoption of the IMPs, provided for the
introduction of a Monitoring Committee for each IMP. On the Monitoring Committees of the
IMPs in Greece, see the contribution of Papageorghiou, F. and Verney, S. (1993), "Regional
Planning and the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in Greece" in Leonardi, R. (1993), (Ed.)
' The Regions and the European Community'. London, Cass,
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of local clienteles. This process was monitored at a central level and the one of
the main characterisitcs has been preoccupation with absorption.88
Against this background, the effort to combine the development from
above with development from below model, was not successful either. The
system tended to be over-centralised, as in the case of allocation of
autonomous financial resources. Considering the continuing weaknesses of the
local-government organisations, it is not surprising that democratic planning
could not be implemented. The taxes raised by the Local Authorities were
insufficient to allow them to redress the existing weaknesses, while control of
the European funds remained in the hands of the Central government.89 This
posed significant limitations to local development planning, especially for the
smaller and weaker local entities.90 On the other hand, the institutional
framework with its complexity and multiplicity of financial resources
exacerbated the situation. LSGO faced new challenges, while remaining
organisationally and financially weak.91 PW production process retained all the
pathological symptoms described above.
Moreover, once more, the establishment of the Prefectoral Self-
government provided by Law 1622/1986 was not brought into effect. The
Presidential Decrees required for the enactment of the provisions, were not
88 See Lavdas, K. (1997), "The Europeanisation ofGreece", Basingston, Macmillan. p. 227.
89 See Papagiannis, P. (1986), " The Chart for Self-government". (In Greek), LOCAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT, No 51
90 The Communist Party criticised the new law, among others, because while devolving
powers to the sub-national units, it did not attribute to them economic self-sufficiency as well,
which meant that the Local-government organisations would continue to be entirely
dependent on the Central State. KKE (Hellenic Communist Party), (1985), "Positions -
Propositions of the Central Committee of the KKE on Local Self-government". LOCAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT, Nos 1,2, pp.105-108.
91The weak points of the system and the need for a reform in the system of finance of Local
government, was emphasised in the Introductory Report to the Parliament, on Law 1828/1989.
See Ministry of Interior (Ed.) (1989), "Economic Self-sufficiency of the Local-Government
Organisationsi. (In Greek) Athens, January.
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prepared. As already noted, the delays of the technocrats in drawing up the
drafts of the Decrees, have been regarded as indicating the latent tendency of
the Greek political system, towards the old centralised structures with view to
preserving "domestic opportunity structures". In relation to this, it has been
argued that, one of the common ways of stifling all efforts at reform is through
the delegation of law-making power to the Executive. It involves the passing
by the Parliament of general laws and of delegation of the power to the
respective Ministries to issue decrees that make these laws specific. These
decrees are prepared by high-ranking bureaucrats, signed by the Ministers and
ratified by the President of the Republic. Owing to the paramount role of the
Ministerial officials in the preparation of these decrees, as well as of other legal
documents, the former have acquired considerable power as their expertise in
the complexity of the existing regulations make them indispensable. Thus they
are in a position to control and stifle any efforts at reforms that would
jeopardise the existing arrangements of power and resource distribution.92 An
illustration of this argument is the case of the bureaucrats of the Ministry of the
Interior, who hindered the issue of the Presidential Decrees necessary for the
ratification of legal provisions establishing the prefectoral self-government.
However, it is argued that, bureaucratic obstruction can be bent by
political will.93 Subsequently, the fact that in the case of Law 1622/1986
Prefectoral Self-government was not finally introduced should be attributed to
the politicians' lack of will to see it implemented and their parallel intention to
preserve the status quo. In that case then, the interest of the bureaucrats
coincided with that of the politicians. It would be thus simplistic and even
misleading to attribute failure to reform entirely and exclusively to
bureaucratic obstruction. The reasons are far more complex: they involve also
92Athanassopoulos, D. (1983), "The Greek Administration" Athens, Papazissis, p. 137, also,
Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P. (1990), supra, p. 286.
93 Christophilopoulou-Kaler, P. (1990), supra, p. 180
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the politicians, as well as a whole range of actors public and private at all
levels. More specifically, the role of actors at the lower levels has always been
paramount for the preservation of the traditional patterns of power and
resource distribution. As a consequence, the preferences of the politicians
regarding administrative reform are also shaped by the preferences of other
actors who promote the formers' electoral interests in parallel with their own.
As noted before, this is an intricate pattern of public and private actors with
vested interests in the preservation of the status quo.
Subsequently, the fact that enactment of the provisions regarding
Prefectoral Self-government was left at the discretion of the bureaucrats, as
well as the Law's inherent discrepancies obvious in the devolution of
competencies on the one hand and the preservation of financial and in general
resource dependence of the LSGO on the Central Government on the other,
suggest that the intention of the political actors was to ultimately avoid reform
and the resulting disturbance of the existing balance of power.
On the other hand, LSGO proved reluctant to rise to the challenges of
the external stimulus i.e. the IMPs. LSGA resorted once more to clientelist
practices instead of claiming collectively their rights. The four-tier system
failed to work also due to inherent weaknesses of the administration. As
regards partnership, it was hardly ever applied.94
Regarding mergers, they did not occur apart from very few cases
indeed. Thus, the element of over-fragmentation of the whole system, as
reflected in dispersion of resources in small-scale works, and in the large
number of tiny inefficient LSG entities remained a prevalent feature of the
regional development programmes throughout the application of the IMPs.
94 See Andrikopoulou, E. (1992), supra, p. 201.
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Summary
Clientelism and centralisation have always been the main features of the
Greek political system. These elements are so deeply embedded in culture, and
so well consolidated over the years, that despite the repeated efforts at reform
they persisted throughout the modern Greek history. Overall, the regional
policy process at the eve of the application of the 1st CSF for Greece had as
follows:
a) An over-centralised administrative system, with most decision¬
making occurring at the central level. The Prefecture as a
deconcentrated State entity, was headed by the Prefect who was a
political appointee, responsible for the application of governmental
policies and directly answerable to the Minister for the Interior. The
Prefecture's status was left untouched even after the introduction of
the Region which was organisationally and financially very weak
and functioned mainly to lodge the Secretariats of the Monitoring
Committees of the IMPs.
b) A weak Local Self-government, which despite its prestige of the
popular mandate as directly elected by the people, was financially
over-dependent on State allowances, and subject to legality and in
certain cases expediency control by the Prefect. Moreover, the
extremely large number of the LSGOs, and the small size of most of
them, made any serious planning difficult if not impossible.
PW production, having a central position in regional policies in Greece,
remained unchanged after the application of the IMPs. Regional Development
programmes were characterised by the overwhelming presence of basic
infrastructure small-scale works, lack of an integrated programming logic,
fragmentation, improvisation and rudimentary approach, absence of technical
and environmental studies, and evaluation culture. They were underlined by a
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re-distributional not a developmental logic, and were monitored and
controlled centrally, along complex clientelist networks that extended down to
the local level.
LGOs resource deprivation as reflected in lack of technical
infrastructure, personnel, know-how, and finances, a characteristic directly
connected to the preservation of the centralised State, had as a consequence not
only LSGA dependence on the Central State but also on the contractors. As a
result, project selection for the Prefectoral and subsequently the Regional
Development Programmes was not based on technical and developmental
criteria but on clientelist and electoral considerations.
The above pattern was directly challenged by the requirements of the
1988 CRP reform.
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Chapter Three: Greeceand European Integration: a Theoretical
Framework
Introductory Notes
According to the underlying thesis of this study, the operational rules
introduced with Structural Funds' regulations proved a major challenge for the
Greek administrative system, which exhibited a considerable degree of
resistance to changes induced in the process of adaptation. The Integrated
Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) application (not the object of the empirical
research here) left untouched the centralised clientelist mode of regional policy
process, and almost the same could be stated rather safely about the 1st
Community Support Framework (CSF). The institutions introduced in the
second programming period met with strong reaction, although they started
having some impact on domestic arrangements.
This chapter seeks to establish a theoretical framework with view to
explaining this resistance. In order to do so, several parameters have to be
considered. Firstly, it would be inaccurate to attribute the introduction of all
the reforms in CSFs' context exclusively to the exigencies of the European
policy process. It has already been shown for example, that some major
reforms were part of the Panellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) political
agenda as early as 1974.1 Similarly, the very idea of administrative reform has
been among the aspirations of certain political and intellectual milieus as early
as the 1960s.
Secondly, attempts at decentralisation and empowerment of subnational
tiers of government had failed already prior to the application of the CSFs and
-more significantly- even before the IMPs. Therefore, any attempt to interpret
1 See Chapter Two.
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domestic resistance exclusively as a reaction to lack of legitimacy due to rules
imposed by supra-national actors would be misleading, as failing to consider
powerful domestic factors of resistance.
Thirdly, the timing and the context of the introduction of certain reforms
should be given special attention and be studied in relation to other parallel
developments before any hasty conclusions are drawn. For example, the
establishment of self-government at the prefectoral level in 1994 should not be
interpreted as empowerment of this subnational tier solely induced from
European integration. This rather idealistic and simplistic approach would fail
to consider the background of this development, and possibly ignore the degree
of empowerment of the prefectoral government, particularly in relation to the
parallel evolution of the Regions in Greece.
The above issues direct the analysis primarily to the reforming capacity
of the Greek society in general and the State in particular, and subsequently
turn the investigation to the significance of European integration as an
argument and a process in the context of societal and state reform in Greece. In
other words, it is necessary to have some concrete idea of popular tendencies
and dispositions regarding a) State and societal reform, b) European
membership, and c) how these come together and crystallise in the political
parties policies, in order to be able to interpret the reaction of the Greek
administrative system to the application of Structural Funds' Regulations. This
will reveal the degree of self-reforming capacity of the Greek society, while it
will allow for a more accurate estimate of the contribution of European
integration in domestic reform in Greece.
This is even more important since it is argued here that domestic
administrative reform induced by the application of 1988 reform can have far
reaching repercussions not only on the administrative arrangements but also
beyond. To the degree it involves serious changes in resource and power
distribution it could signal transformation of the Greek society as a whole.
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Consequently, after a short reference to practical issues of Greece's
accession to the EU, the interaction of issues such as popular attitudes and
aspirations, political parties and the European argument will be discussed.
There are several important parameters directly linking political parties to the
issue of state modernisation and the reforming process in the European context:
a) Party ideology and organisation are significant because they influence party
policies, b) In turn, when parties accede to power, party policies and
organisation influence governmental policies and their application. Discussion
in Chapter Two has shown how PASOK's ideology and organisation impacted
on the party's decentralisation policies, and subsequently governmental policies
when PASOK acceded to power, c) Finally, political parties, constituting
traditional agents of interest aggregation and articulation should be expected to
reflect popular attitudes towards European membership and the induced
reforms. In the context of the present study this would suggest theoretically,
that when in government, they should be able to apply European policies and
introduce the necessary reforms with relevant success. This however has not
been the case in Greece, a reality pointing to the issue of party ideology and
how this is associated with the process of the reform.
An additional phenomenon of interest here linked to political parties
and reforms is the emergence of think tanks in the 1990s promoting the debate
on modernisation. The Association for the Modernisation of the Society
(OPEK), attached to PASOK is discussed here as the most illustrative case and
significant also because of its development, which offers support to the
argument of cultural embeddedness.
Finally, the theoretical framework for the interpretation of the response
of the Greek administrative system will be established.
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From the Association Agreement to theAct ofAccession
On 8 June 1959 Greece submitted an application for Association with the
EC. The Greek membership has been seen by students of the subject as the long
pursued outcome of the efforts of "a number of political and economic forces",
seeking to attach Greece's political economy to the West European sphere.2
Greece's joining the Community was dictated by the needs arising from
developments in the world economy in combination to Greece's idiosyncratic
socio-economic and political trajectory as a modern State in conbination to the
country's geopolitical position, namely the fact that it belonged to the Western
camp, and therefore should opt for a Western European institution. Additional
foreign policy considerations were connected to Greece's problematic relations
with Turkey.3
The decision to opt for EEC instead of EFTA was due to the fact that
unlike the Community, EFTA was not going to evolve into a form of political
co-operation offering Greece political protection vis-a-vis the then feared
Communist danger. Moreover, it was not addressing the problem of regional
disparities, and therefore did not envisage the possibility of economic aid for
its less developed members.4
As far as the Community was concerned, it had also to gain from
association with Greece. It would prove that it was an open union without
taking serious risks, since Greece did not have a highly competitive agricultural
sector as other candidate countries. More over, association with Greece offered
2 Lavdas, K. (1997), "The Europeanisation ofGreece", Basingston, Macmillan, p. 99.
3 On Greece's foreign policy in the context of the accession debate see, Macridis, R. (1979),
"Greek Foreign Policy: reality, illusion, options". In Tsoukalis, L. (1979), "Greece and the European
Community". London, Gower.
4 For a condensed but comprehensive presentation of the issues and reasons behind Greece's
accession to the EEC, see Verney, S. (1987), "Greece and the European Community". In
Featherstone, K. and Katsoudas D. (Eds): "Political Change in Greece. Before and After the
Colonels". London and Sidney, Croom Helm.
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an outlet to the agricultural produce of the Community, while at the same time
it served as a link for the countries of the South and the establishment of trade
relations between them and the Community.5
Regarding the official position of the Greek political parties of the times,
they supported in their majority association with the Community. The
negotiations lasted nearly two years and finally the Association Agreement
was signed between Greece and the Community, under Article 238 of the EEC
Treaty, in July 1961. It was in fact the first application of Art. 238 of the Treaty
of Rome. The main targets of the Association Agreement included the gradual
establishment of a customs union, harmonisation of economic policies,
especially as regards agriculture, and financial aid to help economic
development in Greece.
The establishment of the military dictatorship in 1967 caused the
'freezing' of the Association Agreement as regards policy harmonisation and
the funding mechanism, while elimination of the tariffs continued to be a
commitment for both parties. The European Parliament's appeals for a
unilateral discontinuance of the relations were not answered, on the contrary,
EC even negotiated with the Colonels on wine matters and issues related to the
first enlargement. Thus, "in the end the freezing of the Association ivas not at a
particularly low temperature",6 a fact that was due to influence popular opinion
and domestic political debate on the issue of membership, after the fall of the
junta.
At the re-opening of the negotiations after the fall of the junta in 1974
Greece had an additional reason to pursue accession: it was expected that
5 Haritos, S. (1981), "Greece - EEC 1959-1979 From Association to Fidl Membership". Athens,
Papazisis, p. 16.
6 Tsoukalis, L. (1981), "The European Community mid its Mediterranean Enlargement" London,
George Allen & Unwin. p. 31.
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membership would prevent recurrence of a dictatorship.7 However, there were
now strong reservations at the Community level. One reason was related to the
fact that the rates of economic growth in Greece were not as high as in the
period between 1962 and 1975, a situation deteriorated by the 1976 oil crisis. In
addition, there were doubts as to whether Greece would be able to adapt its
economy to those of the "nine", while it was also feared that Greek accession
would make more acute the problem of the inflexibility in EC decision-making
mechanisms.8
Furthermore, the oil crisis affected the economies of the Member States
and caused friction among them. As a result, the prospect of enlargement with
an economically weak partner caused a lot of anxiety to both wealthy Member
States facing the likelihood of increased contributions, and to the weaker ones
who feared shrinkage of their share of the Community aid.9 These fears were
exacerbated by the prospect of the Iberic enlargement. It was feared that
Greece's acceptance as a full member would set a precedent paving the way to
the other young democracies of the Iberic Peninsula. It was one thing to face
membership of one Mediterranean State and quite another to have to deal with
three. Moreover, K. Jenkins, then new President of the Commission maintained
that the institutions of the Community should be strengthened before
enlargement.10
7 On the economic and political expectations of the Greeks regarding membership, see
Woodhouse, C. M. (1983), "Greece and Europe" in Clogg, R."Greece in the 1980s", London,
Macmillan.
8 Katsoudas, D. (1977), "About the European Community: The recent friction a cause for a more
realistic approach to the issue?". EPIKENTRA, January 1977. For an analytical presentation of the
issues arisen domestically and at the EU level regarding Greece's membership, also in relation
to the candidature of Spain and Portugal see, Tsoukalis, L. (1981), supra.
9 See Wallace, W. (1979), "Grand Gestures and Second Thoughts: the response ofMember Countries to
Greece's Application" in Tsoukalis, L. (Ed.), (1979), "Greece and the European Community",
London, Gower. Also, Katsoudas, D. (1977), supra.
10 A discussion of the three candidatures is offered by Tsoukalis, L. (1981), supra. See also
Katsoudas, D. (1977), supra.
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At the domestic level the issue was handled solely at the governmental
level, with minimum participation of the interest groups, while the
negotiations with the Community were carried on in secrecy. Karamanlis
visited repeatedly the capitals of the Member-States in an effort to ensure
support, a policy which proved very effective.11 The Treaty of Accession was
signed in 1978, and Greece became a full member in January 1981, a few
months before the general election and the advent of PASOK to power.
Socio-economic development, ideology and the issue of reform in the
Greek society.
The discussion that follows is by no means an in depth analysis of the
issue of socio-economic development and ideology in Greece, nor is such an
analysis within the scope of this study. These issues are discussed here to the
degree that their understanding allows an estimation of the reforming capacity
in the Greek society, and at the same time supports the main hypothesis of this
thesis.
The demand for modernisation or renovation became increasingly
manifest in Greece in the post-war era. In the 1960s as well as in the period
immediately after the fall of the junta, the idea of reform though was mainly
connected to democratisation of the political regime. To the extent that there
were aspirations for a comprehensive reform encompassing the society, the
State in its narrow sense and the interaction between the two, followed by a
rationalisation of the State apparatus, these were fostered mainly by intellectual
and political elites but not by the wider popular strata. In reality this has been
the main problem in any reforming attempt, i.e. the fact that the cause of
modernisation was not espoused by the majority of the Greeks who remained
attached to traditional value systems.
11 Tsoukalis, L. (1981), supra. See also Katsoudas, D. (1977), supra.
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European membership raised the issue of reform in Greece from two
distinct but nonetheless complementary points of view. On the one hand
reform is seen as a need, a prerequisite for successful integration. On the other
hand membership is understood as a "force of modernisation"12. In this context
the cultural factor and the importance of the "human capital" have been
recognised by students of the issue as critical determinants.13 Significantly for
the main hypothesis employed here, distributional considerations and cultural
embeddeness are brought together as accounting for the difficulty of the Greek
State and society to reform.
More specifically, the low reforming capacity of the Greek society has
been attributed to economic and cultural backwardness owing to peculiar
models of economic development and the impact they had on social formation.
It should be noted that Greece has followed peculiar patterns of economic
development not only in the 19th century but also in the second half of the 20th
century, again with significant impacts on social formation and political
culture. The 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were marked by the rise of petty bourgeois
classes as a result of rapid economic development. These were characterised by
"ideological disorientation, a sense of loss of values,... a yearning for change without
any concrete notion ofzvhat change should bring about. ... Finally, a vague inchoate,
almost manichean sense ofclass antagonism vis-a-vis the 'privileged' strata. In short, a
new stratum zvithout as yet a distinct class identity, or ideology. ... it might perhaps be
more correct to speak of a 'guild-type' mentality in order to attempt to convey the
defensive stance, the insecurity, the parochial attitudes, the crass materialism.. .of this
12 Featherstone, K. (1996), Introduction In Featherstone, K. and Ifantis, K. (Eds), "Greece in a
changing Europe", Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press.
13 See among others, Drakopoulos, P. (Ed) (1979),/'Greece - E.E.C. Political Economic and Cultural
Aspects". Athens, Epopteia. Tsoukalas, C.: (1992) "Greek Identity in an Integrated Europe"L in
Psomiades, H. and Thomadakis, S. (Eds), "Greece the New Europe and the Changing International
Order". Pella. Pettifer, J. (1996) "Greek political culture and foreign policy", in Featherstone, K. and
Ifantis, K. (Eds), "Greece in a Changing Europe", Manchester and New York, Manchester
University Press. Lipovats, T. "Views on the political psychology of the Greeks. Perspectives for
2000". In Katsoulis, H. et al (Eds) (1988), "Greece towards 2000" Athens, Papazissis, Friedriech
Evert Stiftung.
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upwardly mobile stratum".14 As early as 1983, it was pointed out that there were
two parallel developments: on the one hand the rise of this new class and the
gradual dominance of its mentality, and on the other, the decline of the upper
bourgeoisie ideology, related to the Diaspora Greeks imbued with an
extroverted reformist mentality.15 This, it was maintained, would have
important implications on the political culture of the country.16
In reality, this 20th century socio-economic development in a way further
consolidated the already peculiar relation between the State on the one hand
and society on the other, which is not ideologically defined but rather on the
basis of particularist interests. Consequently, it has been argued, the issue in
Greek politics is not connected to ideology, but to the maintenance of the
existing social relations, or "rather the fact that no one is seeking to alter them".17
In parenthesis, the elements accounting here as obstacles to reform are
basically those composing the so called "social capital", which has been
recognised by the Commission in the Sixth Report on Social and Economic
Cohesion as an important factor in the developmental process, as discussed
above in Chapter One. The critical flaw in the Greek society then is precisely its
social capital, which is the result of the peculiar economic development
models. Research has highlighted precisely the nexus between resource
distribution on the one hand and cultural embeddedness on the other, and the
resistance of the existing opportunity structures to imported models of
14 On the emergence of new petty bourgeois classes in Greece after the 1960s and their
significance in the political culture and politics of the country, see Diamandouros, N. (1983),
"Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origms, Evolution, Current Trends". In Clogg, R.
(Ed.) "Greece in the 1980s", London, Macmillan.
15 On Diaspora mentality see Chapter Two.
16 Diamandouros, N. (1983), supra.
17 See, Simitis, K. (1989), Introduction, in Mouzelis, N. et al: "Populism and Politcs". Athens,
Gnossi, pp. 10-15. See also Chapter Two, footnote 41. Also, Diamandouros, N. (1996), "The
Impact of European Integration on the Domestic Structures". In Pappagiannakis, Michael and
Stephanou, Constantine (Eds.): "Greece in the European Union: Assessment of the First Fifteen Years
ofMej:ibership - Prospecs". Athens, Papazissis Publishers, pp. 201-207, to be discussed below.
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economic development. It has been found that imposed western models of
consumption and rational models of political and social organisation in the
1970s and 1980s have not been able to challenge successfully traditional values
and behaviours. It was argued that the reason why this happened is related to
the resistance of traditional behaviours "socially linked to the non-rational way of
economic consolidation of wide lower bourgeois strata, in the context of the preceding
(economic) development"J8 The high degree of politicisation observed in Greece
until 198519 is not necessarily connected to ideological considerations. It should
be stressed though that the point made here is not that the political debate
lacked in ideology but rather that the dominant mentality in the Greek society
was that of the rising petty bourgeoisie, characterised by materialism and
ideological confusion. This feature of the Greek society and politics during in the
1970s and 1980s described as "ideological fluidity"20 was reflected in the
organisation of the political parties of post dictatorial Greece in what has been
termed as "polyisyllectikotita ton kommaton",n i.e. the fact that each political
party comprised different ideological trends. This trait announced the ever-
closer ideological convergence of the parties which became more evident in the
1990s.
Moreover, as discussed below, it explains two phenomena of the Greek
politics in the post dictatorial period: a) that the European argument was used
as a point of cleavage between the two major parties, precisely in the light of
other major ideological cleavages, b) that pro-European attitudes were found
within both major political formations, despite the fact that their official
18 Alexandropoulos, S. (1988), "Parties and social transformation". In Katsoulis, E. et al (Eds),
"Greece towards 2000" Athens, Papazissis, Friedriech Evert Stiftung. pp. 123-124.
19 Lyringis, C. (1998), "Crisis in politics, new political trends and the prospects of 'Modernisation'", in
Spourdalakis, M. "PASOK: Party - State - Societu" Athens, Patakis, p.77.
20 Lyrintzis, Ch. (1984), "Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of 'Bureaucratic Clientelism'?"
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, Vol. 7, No 2, pp. 99-118.
21 Alexandropoulos, S. (1988), supra, p. 130.
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positions on European membership were diametrically opposite. These issues
are discussed below.
A third phenomenon and perhaps the most significant one in the
discussion of the reform in the European context is connected to a development
of the late 1980s and beyond. Namely, the fact that the high politicisation
mentioned above retreated as a result of profound popular disenchantment
regarding the performance of the political parties. This development has led to
apathy reflected among others in the high abstention from the elections in the
1990s. As shown below this popular distrust has given rise within the political
parties to movements advancing the idea of modernisation, with view to
improving the parties' profile regarding efficiency, a development connected to
the exigencies of European integration. It is on this point that the domestic
aspirations to reform and the reforms induced in the context of European
policies converge.
Public opinion and the European argument
Because this thesis is preoccupied with domestic reforms induced in the
European context, awareness of the reforming capacity of the Greek society
should be complemented by an understanding of popular attitudes towards
European integration. However the ramifications of the European argument in
the Greek politics can only be grasped if placed in the wider context of foreign
policy issues to which it has been directly connected before used in party
competition. The following parameters have determined popular attitudes
towards Europe:
a) The fact that Greek foreign policy had suffered from foreign
intervention and/or tutelage, i.e. economic and political dependence which
had left its imprint on popular consciousness. The sense of powerlessness vis-a-
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vis foreign interests and intervention gave rise to a "defensive" culture and
politics in the relations of the Greeks with the foreigners.22
b) The fact that in 1975, when the negotiations for full membership were
resumed, Greece had just come out of a seven-year military dictatorship most
often connected in the popular consciousness with USA and NATO support.
c) The rather tolerant attitude of the Community towards the Colonels
already mentioned above.
d) The role of the Americans and the West in general during the
invasion in Cyprus in 1974.
Due to factors (b), (c) and (d), the defensive aspect of the Greek society
was intensified and acquired the dimensions of an unprecedented nationalistic
resurgence characterised by strong anti-Americanism and anti-Europeanism,
pervading all popular strata and the entire political spectrum.23 Greece's
withdrawal from the military wing of NATO in 1974 by Karamanlis, the
conservative pro-European leader, on account of NATO's role in the Cyprus
crisis is indicative of the extend to which the Greek society had been permeated
by anti-West feelings.
These developments are significant in the analysis undertaken here
because as shown below, there was soon a deliberate association of the anti-
West attitudes to the issue of European membership used as a cleavage point
between the two main political parties (and not alone) for political recruitment
purposes, in the light of the "ideological fluidity" as discussed before. That this
22 Katsoulis, E. (1988), " The 'Human Capital' in the process of Modernisation, The Greek 'Defensive
Society' in front of the Challenge of 2000". In Katsoulis, E. et al (Eds), (1988), supra p. 37.
Xenophobia and the defensive attitudes towards the West have been noted also in Chapter
Two.
23 Spourdalakis, M. (1988), "PASOK. Structure, Internal Crises and Concentration of Power". (In
Greek). Athens, EXANTAS, pp. 99-100.
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has been the principal utility of the European or anti-European argument
becomes evident from the discussion that follows.
It was mentioned above that ideological confusion was evident among
others in the organisation of the parties which contained pro-European
followers regardless of their official policy towards membership. It is
characteristic that the anti European parties won altogether as much as 60.7 %
of the national vote in the 1981 elections, the year of Greece's entry to the
Community, while empirical research has proven that in reality popular
attitudes were far more pro - European. More specifically, it was found that at
the time of accession only 20% of the public in Greece were entirely against
membership.24 Political acceptance increased during the 1980s, as a result of the
benefits drawn from membership. This development was matched by a
remarkable change of the respective attitudes of the anti-European political
camp towards a clearly pro-European stance, of which most significant is the
transformation of PASOK especially in the 1990s. It is characteristic that the
Maastricht Treaty was ratified by the Greek Parliament with 286 votes out of
300, with the Communist Party of Greece remaining the only clearly anti -
European party.25
These findings indicate that a) the issue of membership has been used in
the Greek politics mainly in party competition and for electoral purposes, and
b) the fact that there was ideological confusion within the political parties.
However, the most important point made here in relation to the findings above,
is that integration enjoyed popular support and therefore, it could not be
argued that resistance to reform as displayed in the application of the two CSFs
stemmed from reaction to rules, norms and values introduced by a
supranational authority. Public opinion in Greece has been supportive of the
24 Bourantonis, D. and Tsoutsoplides, C. (1996), "Pnrchasijig loyalty: Greece and the EU". In
Paraskevopoulos et al (Eds) "Economic Integration and Public Policy in the European Union".
Cheltenham, UK - Brookfield, US. Edward Elgar. pp.285-286.
25 Ibid, p. 287. PASOK's evolution of attitudes is discussed in more detail the next section.
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process of integration, an attitude reflected among others in the rather
favourable acceptance of the painful measures introduced by the Greek
Government in the context of its convergence policies of the early 1990s.26
The truth is that the 1990s have been a decade during which the
relationship with the Community has been reconsidered due to the clash
between national on the one hand and Community policies on the other, such
as the reform of the CAP, while political issues as the case of Yugoslavia have
often led to oscillations in public opinion regarding the cost of integration.27 It
was correctly anticipated in the mid 1990s, that "as economies converge and politics
diverge, Greece will maintain its fundemental commitment to the Union, but will
acquire a more eclectically critical posture. Perhaps this will augur well for a more
mature relationship".28 Indeed, this has been increasingly the case especially after
the developments in the Balcans. However research has shown that the Greeks
connect their future welfare in general with the Community29 a stance which
remains a major determinant in the relations with the Community.
In the light of the above, the causes of resistance to institutional reform
should be sought elsewhere, namely to the threat that these reforms
represented for the existing opportunity structures. The distributional
foundations of resistance to reform have been repeatedly acknowledged.
Traditional ways of integration at the national level, i.e. distribution of
resources via clientelist networks and a type of idiosynchratic party-dominated
corporatism are being replaced by new rational mechanisms in the process of
integration. Non compliance with EEC Directives comes as a result of the
resistance of groups and actors whose economic interests are jeopardised by
the reforms. In that sense, resistance to change has been described as "the
26 See OECD (1991) Economic Surveys: "Greece".. Adjustment Programme 1991-1993, Paris.
27 Bourantonis, D. and Tsoutsoplides, C. supra, p. 294.
28 Ibid, p. 295.
29 Ibid p. 287.
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expression of the existential anguish of large social strata of the Greek society, xohich
with the perspective of this new logic of an open system are faced with issues of
existence and survival"30.
Similarly, the cultural element in the process of national adaptation is
recognised as a factor that hinders smooth adaptation. It is argued that even if
the Greek legal and institutional system complied with the rules of the EU, the
Greek society would need more time to adjust to the new realities, as
traditional structures and culture adapt with greater difficulty to changes, thus
hindering the reforming process. Characteristically, it is pointed out that, "the
success of Greece's integration to Europe, i.e. the very success of development and
modernisation will depend to a large extent, on the rapidity and the way in which the
traditional values, attitudes and behaviours will give in before the modern values and
behaviours" 37 In other words, opportunity structures on the one hand, and
cultural embeddedness on the other are viewed as barriers to successful
adaptation of the country to the reforms induced in the European context.
In sum, it is evident that the factors accounting for the failure of reform
have been located and acknowledged as being directly connected to patterns of
resource distribution embedded in culture. Foreign policy popular attitudes
complement and might intensify resistance, although it is primarily domestic
opportunity structures that account for obstruction to change. This suggests
that in the adaptation process it is not so vital whether the engines of reform
are domestic or supra-national, as whether they challenge traditional patterns
of power and resource distribution.
30 Diamandouros, N. (1996), "The Impact of European Integration on the Domestic Structures". In
Pappagiannakis, M. and Stephanou, C. (Eds.): "Greece in the European Union: Assessment of the
First Fifteen Years ofMembership - Prospecs". Athens, Papazissis Publishers, p. 204. K. Simitis, the
current P.M. made identical observations in 1989. See this chapter, footnote 17.
31 Katsoulis, E. (1988), supra, p. 38.
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Political parties in post-dictatorial Greece: ideology, organisation, the
issue ofmembership and the impact on the reforming process.
The Colonels had proscribed all political parties. The features of the
party system that emerged in 1974 apart from the popular trends as described
in a previous section of this chapter, were determined largely by the fact that
the old cleavage between the traditional liberal camp on the one hand
(represented by the centre) and the conservatives on the other was replaced by
a new enlarged centre-right camp on the one hand and the socialist and
communist left on the other.32 However, this change did not summon the
disappearance of the political tradition of the centre, retained in a large part of
the electoral body, as well as in political forces allied to the two major parties.33
This led to changes in the political profile of the two major parties as well as
their competition to attract this share of the electoral body. In addition,
research findings have shown that ND and PASOK voters did not differ largely
in terms of social position,34 all in accordance with the discussion about
ideological fluidity and the "polysyllektikotita ton kommaton" above. According
to an additional interpretation of the phenomenon of different ideologies
within the same party, "Greece was coming out of a period of 'ideological inertia'.
There were groups ofcarriers of new ideas", but these had not assumed a concrete form.
The political world was in search of new strategies but there were no specific ideas. In
other words there was "lack of ideological clarity"35
Due to the above there was a tendency to elevate the European
argument into an ideology expected to fill in the ideological void with view to
32 Alexandropoulos, S. (1988), supra, p. 120. Further elaboration on the reasons and timing of
this development are not of interest in this study. For a concise literature review of the
interpretations of this evolution see ibid, pp. 120-123.
33 Ibid, p. 128.
34 Ibid, p. 129.
35 Interview with Ch. Kastanides, Minister for Transport, and a leading figure in the
modernising movement of PASOK since the early times of the movement. Autumn 1999.
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attract voters. Whether as a pole of attraction of the liberal pro-European
elements of the centre by the right-wing ND, or as a pole of attraction of the left
anti-American anti-West voters by PASOK, the European argument has been
central in the electoral competition during the period after the fall of the junta.
However, as shown below, after full accession and during the 1980s, the
interest shifted from the political to the economic sphere, and this is directly
connected to the issue of modernisation in the European context.
• New Democracy(ND)
As noted above, political parties were proscribed by the authoritarian
regime and new political formations emerged in 1974. On his return from
France, Karamanlis, enjoying great prestige, assumed the task to lead the
country to normalisation. He formed a government of "national unity", and
announced the first general elections for the 17 November 1974.
In September of the same year, he founded the right-wing New
Democracy (ND), old ERE's successor. The party's statement of principles, a
rather vague document,36 included a clause that revealed its pro-European
position, and connected the issue of membership to democracy: "ND believes
that Greece is not only entitled to, but can assure, the distinguished place and the
happiness of its people within the Europe to which it belongs, if it mobilises all its
abilities and if it makes use of all the virtues of its people.... A fundamental
precondition, however, for all this is the implanting in our country of a genuine and
up-to-date democracy".57 Moreover, throughout the campaign, Karamanlis
stressed his intention to pursue full membership, insisting that Greece
36 Clogg, R. (1987), "Parties and elections in Greece: the search for legitimacy", London, C. Hurst &
Company, pp.61, 63.
37 Proclamation of the Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis on the foundation of the
political camp New Democracy. Ibid, p. 225.
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"belonged to the West", even after withdrawal from NATO on account of the
Cyprus crisis.38 Karamanlis won the elections with an impressive 54% of the
votes, after having placed the dilemma "Karamanlis or the tanks", launched as
a slogan during the campagne.
The second general elections, in November 1977 marked a turning point
in the political life of the country. ND although the winner lost a large share of
the electorate to PASOK which came second, attracting also followers of EDIK
i.e. what was left of the late George Papandreou's Union of the Centre which
suffered a strong blow. This had as a result its gradual disintegration. Apart
from those who went over to PASOK, a number of eminent EDIK party
members and some MPs left to join the ruling party of ND during 1978.39
This massive movement apart from signalling ND's expansion towards
the centre, had another significant parameter: it was directly and explicitly
connected to and even identified as the rallying of the pro-European political
forces vis-a-vis the anti European PASOK in particular. The political debate of
the times focused on the so-called "bipolarity" in the political life around the
issue of Greece's membership.40 A review of the press of the times reveals an
effort to elevate Europeanism into a political ideology.41 However,
Europeanism as an "ideology" is a rather vague notion, and at best it could be
seen as a doctrine, an "ideological principle" as declared by Karamanlis in his
38 Ibid, pp. 62-63. Overall, Karamanlis's government capitalised on the political factor to pursue
full membership. As shown below, when PASOK acceded to power, re-negotiated and
succeeded better economic terms. In short, there was this shift from emphasis on the political to
the economic factor.
39 See for example, ELEFTHEROTYPIA 27 March 1978, KATHIMERINI 9 July 1978, and 17
September 1978, (dailies).
40 See "The distinction of the Greeks into Enropeanists and anti-Enropeanists", article, 25 May 1978,
KATHIMERINI (daily).
41 The titles of articles are illustrative: "Enropeanists: The political ideology that will oppose PASOK"
KATHIMERINI, 16 July 1978, also "Enropeanists: the political ideology of enlargement"
KATHIMERINI 30 September 1978.
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speech in the 1st Party Congress of ND.42 The basic elements of this principle
however are significant for the issue of institutional adaptation to
Europeanisation.
More specifically, the Europeanists were proponents of societal and state
modernisation induced from Community membership. They aspired to
membership in order to " accelerate modernisation of all aspects of life according to
the European models and to reinforce the Executive, as a technically defined need in
order to achieve a social transplant in all possible levels -state apparatus, armed forces,
industry, organisation of political parties etc. ... The Europeanists believe that the
country's accession to Europe apart from securing the political regime and the borders,
will put an end to a period of instability, amorphy and malfunction of the Greek society,
and will pave the way for the formation of political parties with clear and specific
ideological contour... "43
There are two points here seeking attention: a) Awareness that lack of
ideology and the amorphy of the society were factors hindering reform point
directly to awareness of the issue of the "social capital", mentioned above, b)
Special attention should be paid to the fact that the need for modernisation of
political parties is mentioned twice in the small extract above. The necessity of
a "clear and specific ideological contour" of the political parties is pointed out,
which shows awareness of the importance of both the organisation and
ideological clarity in the process of modernisation. Indeed, as shown below,
these two elements have played a crucial role in the reforming process in the
context of the two CSFs.
Moreover, and most significantly, public administration reform in
particular was expected to result from the obligatory application of the rules
and regulations of the EEC: It was expected that "The obligatory application of the
42 Cited in Katsoudas, D. (1993), "PASOK and the European Community: an overview".
EPIKENTRA, No 75, pp. 51-66.
43 KATHIMERINI, (daily) 30 September 1978: " Europeanism: The political ideology ofenlargement".
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EEC regulations in our country will contribute to the modernisation of public
administration and the reduce of the bureaucracy.44 The special interest of this early
acknowledgement of the reformist dynamics of European policy application
lies in the emphasis placed lately precisely on this property or function of
"positive integration"45.
It should be pointed out though that this is as far as the discussion about
Europe and reform went. The Europeanists did not seem to consider the
existing institutions' resistance and persistence, or the means to deal with it.
They had not formulated a specific strategy or approach to the issue. Moreover,
there is no doubt that apart from the idealistic motives of the movement there
was in parallel a great deal of political speculation. The 1970s European
movement discussed above was dominated by the right-wing leader
Karamanlis. This did not mean that parties with an officially anti-European
profile did not contain pro-European tendencies: "The Europeanists are on
purpose identified with the riding party, while in reality they cover a broader (political)
spectrum and have fanatic supporters even within PASOK and the parties of the non-
dogmatic Eeft".46
44 This description of the aspirations of ND's Europeanists belongs to K. Simitis, current PM
and then Professor in the University of Giessen. Translation from the French text: "...La mise en
application obligatoire, dans notre pays, des dispositions et des reglements de la CEE contribuera a
moderniser V administration publique et a limiter la bureaucratie". Simitis, K. (1978), "Les Partis
Politiques Grecs Face d V Adhesion". Paper presented in the conference, "La Grece et la
Communaute". Organised by the Institut d' Etudes Europeennes, 5-6 May 1977 in Brussels.
Proceedings were published by the University of Brussels. (In French) p. 63.
45 On "positive integration" See Knill, Ch. and Lenschow, A. (1998), "Change as "Appropriate
Adaptation": Administrative Adjustment to European Environmental Policy in Britain and Germany"
European Integration on Line Papers, EIOP http://eiop.or.ateiop/texte/1998-001ahtm
46 KYRIAKATIKI "E", Sunday paper, 16 July 1978. It is interesting to compare this statement
with Haas's description of Europeanism as a doctrine. There are striking affinities between his
description and the one cited above. See Haas, B. E., (1958), "The Uniting of Europe. Political,
Social and Economical Forces 1950-1957". London, Stevens & Sons Limited, pp. 19-29.
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• Panellenic SocialistMovement (PASOK)
The anti-European tendency of the 1970s was represented mainly and
predominantly by PASOK, founded by Andreas Papandreou, who also
returned from abroad in 1974. Understanding the attitude of the early PASOK
towards the Community and its development will shed light to some
important aspects of the reforming process in the European context. These
aspects are related to the internal organisation of the party.
PASOK Proclamation of Fundamental Principles of the 3 September
1974 is seen as setting the framework for the synthesis among the various
ideological currents incorporated in it.47 The technocratic tendency, represented
mainly by academics and centre-right intellectuals, the socialists, consisting
mainly in members of the left and leftist resistance organisations formed
during the dictatorship, the conformists, or the so called 'palaiokomatikoi',
mainly old style politicians attached to traditional ideas and practices. In the
beginning, the technocratic wing was rather weak. Its profile was raised after
the 1977 elections, when PASOK became the main Opposition party. All the
above tendencies recognised in the Proclamation of 3rd September (as has been
known ever since the Proclamation of Fundamental Principles), those elements
that matched more or less their own ideology. For example, the Proclamation
referred among others to the modernisation of public administration, while it
also announced legal reforms in a large number of sectors, which attached to it
a technocratic dimension, thus responding to the technocrats' aspirations.48
Nonetheless, the real unifying component was nationalism.49 The seven-
year military regime and the Cyprus crisis were attributed to NATO and the
47 Spourdalakis, M. (1988), "PASOK, Structure, ultra - party crises and concentration of power".
Athens, EXANTAS. p. 89. **
48 Ibid, pp. 90-91. Andreas Papandreou's high academic profile was also appreciated by the
technocrats. Ibid, p. 93.
49 Ibid, p. 91.
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USA: "For the Panellinio Socinlistiko Kinima (PASOK), the military regime of the
junta, which was imposed by the coup of 21 April, was no ?nore than a particularly
brutal manifestation of the colonisation of Greece by the Pentagon and Nato, in co¬
operation with dependent West European and native comprador capital".50 In
addition, the slogan "Greece belongs to the Greeks" included in the
Proclamation, in contradiction to the Right-wing dictum "We belong to the
West", was meant to capitalise on the nationalistic resurgence of the times.51
Soon, there was a deliberate semantic linkage between USA and the Community, of
which characteristic example is the slogan "EEC and NATO - the same syndicate".
Papandreou's statements are also characteristic: "Western Europe is the intermediate
ring in the structure ofcontrol exerted by the American capital on Southern Europe...
The economic control has always a political and military dimension. Britain and West
Germany are under almost complete political and military control and their foreign
policy is also dictated by Washington ",52
This line of reasoning developed in total contradistinction to the
principles of the ruling ND party, aimed precisely at differentiating PASOK
from the Right, with view to winning it a large part of the electorate driven by
anti-western feelings, and create a hard party organisational nucleus.53
50 PASOK: Proclamation of Fundamental Principles and Objectives (Declaration of 3 September
1974). In Clogg, R. (1987), supra, p. 220. Also, "The root of the disaster lies in the dependent situation
of our Motherland. The seven medieval years that have passed with the black military dictatorship
constitute no more that an especially harsh expression of the dependence of Greece on the imperialistic
establishment of the USA and of NATO.... Our Motherland was transformed into an unfenced
vineyard, so that our economy could be plundered by the multinational companies of the United States of
America and of the West..." PASOK: Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles and Objectives
(Declaration of 3 September 1974). In Clogg, R. (1987), supra, p. 217.
51 Spourdalakis, M. (1988), supra, p. 91.
52 A. Papandreou's speech in a meeting of the Central Committee of PASOK, on 13 April 1975,
quoted in Katsoudas, D. (1993), "PASOK and the European EU: an overview". EPIKENTRA, No
75, pp. 51-66.
53 Papandreou refuted Karamanlis's famous slogan "We belong to the West", characterising it as
a "metaphysical concept". Interview of A. Papandreou to EXORMISI, PASOK's official paper,
16.4.1976. Quoted in Katsoudas, D. (1993), ibid.
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The election of 1977 placed PASOK in the position of the leading
Opposition party, while the centre EDIK, was disintegrated, with some of its
parts defecting to the ND, while others being absorbed by PASOK. The latter's
success and the prospect of power marked the beginning of a new phase as
regards its stance towards the ommunity. In order to attract additional
numbers of the moderate, pro-European voters of the disintegrating EDIK, the
hard anti-European party was softened. Very carefully, and very slowly
Papandreou's language started changing. In order to avoid the impression of
inconsistency a double talk was adopted. Instead of total rejection of the
Community, there were now references to "re-negotiation", "special
relationship", "special regime", which all meant that PASOK had departed
from its initial position.54
During the electoral period of 1981, on the one hand Papandreou
declared that after the elections and his accession to power, the already ratified
Treaty of Accession of Greece would be subject to a referendum while on the
other he kept reminding the people that according to the Constitution this is a
prerogative of the President of the Republic. It was clear that with Karamanlis
as a President, (Karamanlis had become President meanwhile) the odds were
against a referendum. Again this was a double talk: the reference to a
referendum was aiming at keeping up with the appearances, while by
reminding at the same time that this was a Presidential prerogative,
Papandreou was admitting that it was not likely to occur. In short, this was
simply an electoral firework.55
PASOK's ambivalent stance to the Community continued after it
acceded to power in 1981, overall however it was getting smoother. A number
of international and domestic factors favoured this development, the emerging
economic advantages of membership being the most obvious, especially at a
54 Ibid.
55 Spourdalakis, M. (1988), supra. Katsoudas, D. (1993), supra.
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time when domestic resources were depleted and Greece was experiencing
economic stagnation.56
Interestingly enough, parallel to the evolution of PASOK's attitude
towards the Community, there has been a development in the balance power
within the party. As already noted above, the technocratic wing of PASOK was
in the beginning weak in comparison to the conformists, old style politicians. The
advent of PASOK to power, the awareness of the benefits of membership, and
subsequently the fact that European funding was indispensable for the
economic survival of the country brought into relief the need of efficient
management. In short, the emphasis was from now on not on the political so
much as on the economic factor. It was therefore precisely the needs arising
from membership that signalled on the one hand PASOK's slow departure
from its anti European policies, and on the other the equally slow rise of the
modernising technocratic wing's to power in the party's organisation.57
This movement was led by K. Simitis and constituted in fact somewhat
of an Opposition within the party. Simitis was working with a number of
technocrats patiently towards the modernisation of the party apparatus, which
he deemed necessary for the modernisation of the State and Society in the light
of Greece's European and international commitments. In fact, he and those
around him saw in European integration process the external impetus required
for the reform of the State and society. Before proceeding to the discussion of
the final form this movement assumed, it is useful to trace its origins.
As already noted, there were in post war Greece groups and strata
aspiring to institutional reforms that would enhance progress in economic,
social and political terms, with emphasis on the rationalisation of the state
56 A meticulous analysis of PASOK's anti-Europeanism is offered in Katsoudas, D. (1993), supra.
57 Interview with Prof. Makrydimitris, University of Athens, Octover 2001.
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apparatus.58 These aspirations were similar in nature to those of the rising
bourgeoisies in the 19th century in West Europe, who sought the institutional
framework proper to the new economic and socio-political developments of the
times.
In the 1960s, these aspirations found expression in the emergence of the
so called "Alexandras Papanastassiou Association", a political-ideological
movement created by a group of politicians and intellectuals, who were not
ideologically affiliated to either the philo-Soviet Stalinist Left, or the
authoritarian RightWing. K. Simitis, the current PM was one of the founders of
the movement. They believed that the existing political formations were
dominated by traditional ideas and practices59, and therefore, could not
possibly bring about the long desired "transition to modernity" or the
"renovation" of the Greek society and State.60 This does not mean that these
parties did not comprise modernising tendencies. These did exist, their viability
though as internal party oppositions or as possible separate political formations
was rather limited. The "Alexandras Papanastassiou Association" was in touch
and exchanged views with these forces within the Left and the Right. It was
also in touch with A. Papandreou at a time when he was almost unknown in
Greek politics.
Their approach to modernisation was similar to that of the Social
Democrats in Europe, but the term was not used. Their ideological doctrine
crystallised in a liberalism of Anglo-Saxon type, similar to the one developed in
the 19th century Europe. There was a differentiation though in that the
paradigm elaborated by the Papanastasiou Association had in addition a "social
58 This section draws largely on information provided by Dr. V. Voutsakis, Special Councilor to
the Prime Minister, and Vice President of the "Association for the Modernisation of our
Society" (OPEK). Interview, December 1998.
59 On the various tendencies within the political parties see Clogg, R. (1987), "Parties and
elections in Greece: the search for legitimacy" London, C. Hurst.
60 Interview with Dr. V. Voutsakis, December 1998.
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face". It could be referred to as "social liberalism".61 However, the term Social
Democracy was avoided because it was much too closely related to the existing
socio-political model prevalent in the West at those times, which was already
seriously challenged. (The '68 Movement for instance).62
During the dictatorship, members of the "Alexandros Papanastassiou
Association" joined the various left or leftist resistance groups, and established
contact with A. Papandreou. After 1974 they joined him in the newly born
Panellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). In 1975, in the context of a crisis in the
party organisation as a result of which the 'palaiokommatikoi' advanced their
position while there was a shift towards concentration of power, members of
the modernising technocratic wing left PASOK, and a number of them came
back later. This turmoil is indicative of the rather unhappy coexistence of
various ideological tendencies within PASOK.63 Apart from other ideological
differences, one important parameter was the pro European stance of the
technocratic wing, as opposed to the anti European attitude of the others,
especially the old style politicians. The former espoused the European Social
Democrat solution, and also saw in Greece's membership in EEC, the means to
materialise State and societal reform. These views caused a major clash within
PASOK.64
In 1977, K. Simitis as responsible for political instruction, he launched
what remained in history as one of the most controversial slogans: "No to the
Europe of Monopolies, Yes to the Europe of Workers". This declaration was in




63 See Spourdalakis, M. (1988), supra.
64 Interview with Dr. V. Voutsakis, December 1998.
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party, regarding in particular the group's stance to the Community i.e. a pro
European social democrat proposal. It was also saying at the same time that
after all, there was or could be a good Europe. This diverged from the party's
official position and policy regarding EU and membership and as a result it cost
K. Simitis his post. However, he did not leave the party, believing that the battle
could be won from the inside.65 In 1981 when PASOK's advented to power, it
was forced to accept the value of the technocrats because of the need for a better
management of the Community financial transfers, and K. Simitis became
Minister of Agriculture.66
• TheAssociation for the Modernisation of the Society (OPEK).
PASOK's performance in the 1980s was disappointing in many respects.
Firstly, there was reinforcement of the phenomenon of statism in the already
huge and authoritarian state apparatus. Moreover, there was further
concentration of power not merely by reinforcement of the Executive vis-a-vis
the Parliament, but with continuous empowerment of the Prime Minister,
which involved also personification of power, while there was also exclusion of
certain sectors from democratic scrutiny. 67
Clientelism acquired huge dimensions with the entry of large numbers of
party followers in the public sector. Membership of the party became largely a
prerequisite for employment. As pointed out, during the first couple of years of
PASOK's office in government, the Greek State experienced "the most extensive
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. See also Spourdalakis, M. (1988), supra, pp. 240-244.
67 Spourdalakis, M. (1988), supra, p. 307.
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mass clientelist employment in its history".68 It is characteristic that 89% of the
party members were somehow related to the public sector.69
Moreover, at the end of the decade a corruption scandal discredited
PASOK administration in popular consciousness. This, in connection to the
general image of governmental inefficiency cost PASOK the power. The
Association for the Modernisation of Society, (OPEK)70 a think tank created by
K. Simitis and his political associates in 1991, should be seen precisely as the
response to the need to change the image of PASOK from a corrupted,
inefficient party, into an efficient, reliable, democratic party, capable among
others of meeting successfully the needs of European integration, in particular
regarding the application of the Community Support Frameworks.71
It is not accidental then that OPEK was founded in 1991, while PASOK
was not in power any more. Party members but also intellectuals, mainly
academics, joined it and it is characteristic that some of them were not even
politically affiliated to PASOK. It has been argued that in the beginning OPEK's
orientations seemed to be genuinely reformist and therefore those elements
among the intellectual elites aspiring to modernisation did not hesitate to join
even though they did not belong to PASOK.72
Although research in this area is almost non-existent, and it is beyond
the scope of the study here, it seems that right from the beginning, two distinct
logics could be identified within OPEK: one that recognised the need of an
efficient, reliable party with view to attracting voters and ensuring access to
68 Ibid. p. 314.
69 Ibid. p. 314.
70 Although OPEK is perhaps the most important, there are other similar think-tanks such as
"Civil Society". Their discussion here is beyond the scope of this study.
71 Interview with Professor M. Spourdalakis, University of Athens, October 2001
72 Interview with Prof. A. Makrydimitris, University of Athens, October 2001.
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power. In other words, the need to address the increasing apathy of the
electorate discussed in an earlier section in this chapter. The other, less self-
interested, accepting that there should be at last a new strategy as a response to
European integration and the international developments.73 Apparently, non¬
party members were attracted by this latter logic.
Indeed, as revealed in the title of the Association their goal was to
promote the reform of the Greek State and society. They moreover considered
the country's integration into Europe as the impetus and the proper context for
this reform. More specifically, "it urns thought that political and economic structures
of the country should take a European orientation, retaining however their Greek
identity74.
OPEK became pre-occupied with the issue of cultural embeddedness far
more concretely that the Europeanists of the 1970s, and formulated an equally
concrete approach to the issue of resistance of the institutions to reforms.
Another characteristic of the movement is that while it clearly and admittedly
sees in European integration the required external stimulus for State and
societal reform, it has avoided connecting the vision of the reform uniquely to
Europe as the Europeanists of the 1970s.
Although OPEK's approach in particular and the Modernisers more
generally has not assumed the status of a theory as such, there is a limited
number of articles and books describing the process of the reformist attempt
and the ensuing issues, while a number of interviews helped to complete the
73 Interview with Professor M. Spourdalakis. One more point needs to be made here. The
connection between modernisation of the country on the one hand and European Integration
on the other took place gradually. The turning point in this development i.e. the association of
the country's modernisation to European integration seems to have occurred after 1989, when
PASOK abandoned its Keynsian politics for a more capitalist-liberal oriented policy. It was
then, that resistance to new policies and practices following adoption of the new socio¬
economic approach grew considerably, making it difficult for the government to carry out
successfully its modernising programme.
74 Interview with Prof. D. Papoulias, University of Athens, President of OPEK, October 1998.
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profile of their proposal regarding the reforming process. Their understanding
of the process of modernisation as emerging from interviews and articles is
outlined by the following parameters:
a) Greece's integration to the Community and the process of
Europeanisation are connected and often identified with the country's
"transition to modernity". Principal agents of the movement have stressed the
fact that European integration acts as the external stimulus for the reform of the
Greek State and society.75
b) The role of cultural embeddedness is seriously considered. It is
recognised that major reforms cause strong reaction, because actors are
requested to abandon behavioural patterns consolidated as a result of repetition
over a long time period: «Societies are not laboratories where certain variables are
altered and then the results are examined. ... human behaviour expresses some
historically moulded mentalities and values. As a residt any reformist attempt is not
simply trying to change behaviours, but is inevitably interwoven with the umy
individuals understand themselves and their roles. It is because of this that serious
difficulties arise in the context of any reformist plan".76 Systems therefore are self-
referential and as such tend to reproduce themselves. Consequently, "it takes an
outsider, one with legitimate authority and a radical agenda to shake up the system and
introduce an alternative set ofselfunderstandings".77
c) Furthermore, as discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, the
distributional foundations of resistance to reform are acknowledged. The
traditional ways of integration at the national level, i.e. distribution of resources
75 Indicaticatively, the President of OPEK, and officials of the Ministries of YPETHO and
YPESDDA have all stated that European integration represents the last chance for Greece's
modernisation.
76 Papoulias, D. and Tsoukas, Ch., (1999), "Special edition - A different perspective of the issue". TO
VIMA, Sunday paper, 28.2.1999.
77 Papoulias, D. and Tsoukas, T. (1996) " Understandmg Social Reforms: A Conseptual Analysis", in
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY, No 47, pp. 853-863.
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via clientelist networks and a type of idiosyncratic party-dominated
corporatism are being replaced by new rational mechanisms in the process of
integration. The non-implementation of Community Regulations comes as a
result of the resistance of actors whose economic and other interests are
jeopardised in the light of the reforms. In that sense, resistance to change is "the
expression of the existential anguish of large social strata of the Greek society, which
with the perspective of this new logic of an open system are faced with issues of
existence and survival"78.
Summing up, for the Modernisers distributional considerations on the
one hand, and traditional patterns of interest aggregation and articulation, i.e.
the cultural factor on the other, together constitute the core element of political
and administrative practices in Greece and it takes an external, "legitimate
authority" to challenge this complex.
The Modernisers therefore, have correctly located all the major issues
arising in the reforming process. Regarding the issue of legitimacy in
particular, they are aware that the reforming ideal should be embraced by the
wider strata and become a popular cause.79 Their proposals as to how self-
understandings change, i.e. how value systems change, and how the legitimacy
question is tackled, place emphasis on the role of elites and institutions. In the
first place, State reform is seen against a more general societal reform. A special
role is acknowledged to the elites, as in the neo-functionalist theory. It is
expected that those who are to benefit from the new logic, i.e. those that are
qualified enough to fulfil the requirements of integration, "...will support and
promote this logic and will act as its ideological and political bearers".80
78 Diamandouros, N. (1996) supra, p. 204.
79 Interview with Prof. D. Papoulias, University of Athens, President of OPEK, October 1998.
80 Diamandouros, N. (1996), supra, pp. 201-207.
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A change in culture, which although retaining its Greekness should
espouse new societal and political norms and values is possible by means of
new institutions: ".. .culture is a product ofevery day practices, tactics, and strategies.
A certain behavioural pattern when repeated crystallises and becomes a reforming logic.
You can achieve this, by establishing new institutions, which function following new
norms, and they finally manage to induce new values and procedures. This is how new
values are made, and how reforms occur"8X. Subsequently, the new values are
expected to be diffused to administrators and social strata through everyday
application of new rules of conduct and interaction, and thus change self-
understandings and render the reform a legitimate cause, all in close doctrinal
affinity with the neo-functionalist "spill-over".
However, despite the formulation of a concrete approach to the process
of reform springing from the awareness of the role of culture and institutions,
the application of this approach proved problematic and produced poor results.
In later articles, the failure of the reforming effort has been attributed to two
major factors: a) the fact that on the part of the government there have been
inconsistencies as regards the application of the underlying principles, and this
has undermined the Modernisers' reliability and hence the legitimacy of the
reformist effort.82 b) The fact that the carriers of the reformist culture are
outnumbered by those attached to the traditional value system which has been
recognised as another crucial factor in the failure of the reforming attempt.83
There is one more development, directly connected to and illustrative of
the above factors that carries even further the institutionalist argument of
"challenged opportunity structures" and cultural embeddedness. Three elements
need to be recalled in the context of the argument deployed here: a) PASOK's
81 Interview with Prof. N. Diamandouros, Spring 1998.
82 It has been pointed out that this is an important factor in a reforming process. See: Papoulias,
D. and Tsoukas, Ch., (1999), "Special edition - A different perspective of the issue". TO V1MA,
Sunday paper, 28.2.1999.
83 Interview with Prof. N. Diamandouros, Spring 1998.
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party organisation, characterised by the coexistence of different tendencies, and
the prevalence of the traditional or old-style politicians, b) The rise of OPEK
within PASOK in an effort to redress governmental inefficiency resulting from
traditional politics and practices, c) The existence of two different logics within
OPEK itself. It is argued here that it is precisely the dynamics of this dualism in
logic that determined the evolution of this think tank. More precisely, there is
evidence supporting the argument according to which, those within OPEK that
regarded it as a means to attract voters and gain power prevailed over the more
idealist reformist wing. It is characteristic that those members coming from
different political formations left the movement. It has been argued that this
happened after they realised that OPEK had become merely a recruitment
pole.84
Further evidence is provided by the fact that during the campaign of the
1999 general election, several OPEK branches sprang in an effort to attract
voters with modernising aspirations. In other words, it seems that OPEK, its
branches and their counterparts,85 act as substitutes for the political parties, i.e.
the traditional institutions of political representation.86
It is argued here that the assimilation of OPEK by the party machine of
PASOK and its metabolism into a recruitment pole supports the argument
according to which, challenged power structures react by assimilating the new
institutions. However, the issue is not simply that OPEK has been transformed
into a recruitment pole. It could still have remained an advocate of innovative
ideas and a force of modernisation. The crucial development lies in the fact that
it has espoused traditional political practices, i.e. the very practices it was
supposed to eradicate from the Greek society and State. This is the reason why
84 Interview with Prof. A. Makrydimitris, University of Athens, October 2001.
85 As note before (current chapter footnote 70), discussion of other similar think tanks is beyond
the scope of this study.
86 Interview with Prof. M. Spourdalakis, University of Athens, October 2001.
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the "Modernisers" have been discredited in popular consciousness, to the point
that the term has acquired a pejorative content. Again, PASOK political actors
with a truly reforming logic are not necessarily attached to the so-called
modernising wing of the party.
It is not surprising then that the reform in general and in the European
context in particular had a disappointing outcome. As argued in the
introduction of this chapter, party organisation and ideology influence party
policies and these in turn impact upon governmental policies and their
application.87
A theoretical framework
So far, it has been shown that the institutional reforms introduced in
1988 aimed mainly at empowering the Regions towards the goal of economic
and social cohesion. This has been conceptualised by the Commission as a
change in decision making, which was until the 1980s limited in the interaction
between the national governments on the one hand and the supranational
institutions on the other. These changes, by introducing (an) additional level(s)
of governance as interlocutors and partners in decision-making involved in
turn changes in the balance of power at the national level, as existing domestic
administrative arrangements had to adapt when incompatible with the
introduced new rules of procedure.
These two elements i.e. departure from the two-party interaction in
decision making process on the one hand, and the degree of adaptability of the
domestic systems on the other have shifted the focus of scholarly concern to
changes occurring at the national level, and subsequently the need to develop
approaches that can interpret interaction and change of relations among
87 See also footnote 82 in this chapter, the relevant comments.
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domestic actors. The two main streams of thought developed to explain
European integration process, i.e. supranational theories mainly represented by
neo-functionalism and state-centric approaches of which inter-
governmentalism is the most prominent are preoccupied with the interaction
between supra-national institutions on the one hand and national governments
on the other. As such they fail to consider sub-national tiers of government and
their role and development in the process of integration.
It should be stressed though, that both the intergovernmental approach
stressing the centrality of national institutions in European policy-making, and
the supra-national argument of the influence of supranational institutions are
valid, and as such remained part of Multi-level governance (MLG) approaches.
These have focused on the emergence of the third level of governance in the
European decision-making process, and in doing so have summoned departure
from state-centric and supranational explanations. Transcending the rather
over-optimistic view of the rise of a 'Europe of the Regions' expected to result
from the weakening of national governments and the parallel empowerment of
the Regions, studies have turned to more sophisticated approaches.
Research in the context of this thesis has shown both the importance of
the Commission as a supranational actor as well as the centrality of national
institutions. Therefore, any attempt to interpret the impact of the application of
the two CSFs, on domestic administrative structures and practices, has to
consider these two dimensions. MLG arguments do highlight the role of the
Commission in sub-national mobilisation, examining the interplay between the
Community level on the one hand and the central state on the other. 88 Some
works within the MLG approach in this context go even further to investigate
88 See among others, Marks, G. (1992),"Structural Policy in the European Community", in Sbragia,
A. M. (Ed.), Euro-Politics. Institutions and Policy-making in the "Neiv Europe". Washington, The
Brookings Institute.
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the intra-state factors in the process of sub-national mobilisation.89 However,
the findings of the empirical research here suggest that a MLG approach
should be complemented by elements of the institutionalist theory, which
places emphasis on the cultural and distributional determinants in the process
of the reform.
• New Institutionalism
New institutionalism comprises basically three different approaches,
which share the view that institutions are essential in the interpretation of
social and political phenomena. However, there is in each of them an internal
debate and differentiation while the theory as a whole is in constant evolution,
apparently as a result of new findings in the empirical research.90 Very briefly,
the basic elements of the three different institutionalist approaches can be
summarised as follows:
Rational choice institutionalism, places emphasis on individuals and their
strategic calculations. More specifically, it is argued that "institutions are created
by utility maximising individuals with clear intentions. Yet once institutions exist
they set parameters for further action"9'1. Significantly for the study of the Greek
administrative system's adaptation, the old concept of the distributive role of
institutions has been further elaborated by rational choice institutionalism.
More specifically, it is argued that any interpretation of the development of
89 Jeffery, Ch. (2000), "Sub-National Mobilisation and European Integration: Does it make Any
Difference?", JCMS, Vol. 38, No 1, pp. 1-23.
90 On a concise presentation of the three new institutionalist approaches see Hall, P. A. and
Taylor, R. C. R. (1996), "Political Science and the Three Institutionalims", POLITICAL STUDIES,
XLIV, 936-957.
91 Koelble, T. A. (1995), «The New Istitutionalism in Political Science and Sociology».
COMPARATIVE POLITICS, January 1995, pp. 231-243.
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institutions should take into consideration the distributive effects that this
development implies, and therefore the conflict that originates in this change.92
This approach then stresses the role of the individuals and their
decisions, vis-a-vis the institutions, while at the same time recognises their
dynamic influence once they are created. This argument very much like the
Greek Modernisers' idea of reform cannot offer an explanation for the poor
results of the reforms in Greece. On the other hand, the proposal regarding the
distributive effects of changes in institutions is extremely useful and even
necessary for the understanding of administrative resistance to reform in
Greece.
Historical institntionalism shares the views of the sociological approach93
regarding limited rationality and information, but goes still further to argue
that conventions and customs are also very important, because individuals are
embedded in culture, which is why most of them cannot even conceive of
alternative institutional arrangements, or ways of doing things. In contrast to
rational choice, it is the institutions that shape and determine human
behaviour. What is though most interesting in this approach is the concept of
appropriateness, as a criterion for the response of the actors to the introduction of
new rules. This concept suggests that a new rule introduced will be applied or
not, according to the degree of appropriateness to the existing institutions
which is in turn determined by the learned rules and procedures that once
established and followed became a certain logic.94
92 See Knight, J. (1994), "bistitutions and Social Conflict", Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, pp. 13-14. Also, Christensen, }. G.: "Interpreting Administrative Change: Bureaucratic Self-
interest and Insitational Inheritance in Government". GOVERNANCE, Vol. 10, No 2, April 1997,
pp. 143-174.
93 For a discussion of the sociological institutionalism see, DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W.
(Eds) (1991), "The New Institutionalism in Organisational analysis", Chicago, University of
Chicago Press
94 See, March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1989), "Rediscovering Institutions", New York, Toronto, The
Free Press.
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Applied in the Greek case, the notion of appropriateness helps to
interpret the response of the domestic system to the reforms introduced during
the application of the two CSFs. The empirical research has shown that there
has been a very slow change in national regional policy process, and the reason
has been located precisely in lack of suitability between the newly introduced
institutions on the one hand and the traditional ones on the other. Rules and
procedures long established and consolidated over time, and crystallysed in a
certain logic persisted throughout the two programming periods, hindering
successful adaptation to the new operational tools.
However, the notion of appropriateness is only the initial step in the
effort to interpret the low degree of domestic institutional adaptation. It
suggests that "administrative adaptation depends on the 'goodness of the fit' between
European policy requirements and existing national structures and procedures"95,
stressing the incompatibility between the new and the old institutions, and
therefore pointing to the need of further interpretation as to the nature of this
incompatibility. Research findings of the current project clearly showed that it
is the distributional dimensions of the reforms that account for low adaptability
of the domestic system.
More specifically, and as shown in Chapter Two, regional policy process
in Greece has been directly connected to the preservation of the centralised
clientelist State. Resource and power distribution in this process occurs
according to criteria other than effectiveness and efficiency, as well as beyond
developmental considerations. Vested interests of administrative and political
personnel as well as private actors mainly contractors and engineers, are
served in the context of traditional institutions the function of which follows a
certain logic. This logic contradicts that of the institutions introduced with the
95 See, Knill Ch. and Lenschow A., (1998), "Change as "Appropriate Adaptation": Administrative
Adjustmetit to European Environmental Policy in Britain and Germany" EIOP, URL:
http:/eiop.or.at/eiop/ texte/ 1998-001a.htm
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application of the Community Regional Policy. Adoption of the rationalised
operational tools entails destruction of the traditional edifice of resource and
power distribution. Consequently, the case of Greece suggests that the
durability of the domestic system should be attributed not so much to the
common bureaucratic security dilemma, as to distributional considerations.
There are two distinct nonetheless interconnected distributional scopes
associated with resistance. One of them, already mentioned above is related to
the vested interests of the political and administrative personnel and of private
actors. The main goal of the above groups in retaining the existing status quo in
resource allocation for regional policies is the maximisation of their profits. On
the other hand, in depth analysis of the role of regional development resource
allocation has shown the manipulation of LGO by the political parties in
accessing power, as well as utilisation of resource allocation mechanisms for
local development along clientelist lines and for electoral purposes. It has
further been shown how the decentralisation reforms have resulted merely in a
mutation of the existing clientelist system, as it absorbed and metabolised the
new institutions, and shifted the level of clientelist network formations from
the Prefectures to the Regions due to the management of the Community funds
by the latter.96
In this context, due to the intricate nexus between individual vested
interests on the one hand and centre - periphery relations and electoral
considerations on the other, all in the context of clientelist networks, resistance
to reform is not simply a case of bureaucratic obstruction due to self-interest
and security dilemmas. It is the effort to preserve the existing opportunity
structures, and more specifically, the maintenance of the centralised state,
through control of European resource allocation for regional development.
There is an abundance of evidence brought in by interviewees at all levels,
which points to the use of European resources in a way that reproduces the
96 Christophilopoulou - Kaler, P. (1996), "Prefectoral Administration..." supra.
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existing pattern, i.e., central distribution of the funds, and control of the local
government organisations along clientelist networks.
The clientelist mode of resource allocation in regional development
policies however, is a complex one. It contains ideological elements, such as
perceptions of social justice, and in this case, the regional dimension of social
justice. It is argued here, that clientelism is both a way of action, a "rational
choice", and a moral code, an ideology. This latter attribute makes clientelism
"ideologically rooted" in the Greek public policy-making paradigm. Resource
allocation to local government along clientelist networks is not serving only
practical electoral considerations. Inherent though less decisive in this mode of
action is the element of the "moral" bond between the patrons and the clients
as discussed in Chapter Two, which also influences the notion of the regional
dimension of "justice". This combination of a "way of action" and of a "moral
code" renders this pattern a "core" element of Greek regional policy process.97
In view of the above discussion, two elements are important for the
interpretation of resistance to change in Greece: a) the distributive function of
the institutions, and b) the centrality of this element in the preservation of the
centralised State in Greece. As correctly pointed out, "resource dependency needs
to be embedded in an institutionalist understanding of Europeanisation... domestic
institutions determine the distribution of resources among domestic actors...
Europeanisation changes this distribution to the extend that there is an incompatibility
between the European rules and regidations, on the one hand, and the institutional
structures of the State, on the other".98
97 On the concept of "core" and "peripheral parts" of administrative institutions, see: Knill, C.
and Lenschow, A. (1998), supra.
98 Borzel, T. (1999), "Tozvards convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanisation in
Germany and Spam". JCMS, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 573-596. Other studies have shown along the
same line of thought that Europeanisation does not necessarily bring about changes in
Member-States. See among others, Goetz, K.H. (2000), "European Integration and National
Executives: A Cause in Search of an Effect?" WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, Vol. 23„ No. 4. pp.
211-231. Furthermore, it is noted by institutionalist studies that "the institutional legacy ... is
important in several ways: first, it embeds vested interests bound to institutional and organisational
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As regards the relation between the centrality of the challenged elements
of domestic policy process on the one hand and the degree of domestic
resistance on the other, it has been pointed out that "well established institutions
and traditions not easily adapt to exogenous pressures".99 The introduction of new
rules in the Greek regional policy making as a response to the pressures of
European integration, and persistence of traditional patterns highlight the
validity of this argument.
There are additional reasons why an institutionalist approach can offer a
satisfactory explanation of the reforming process in Greece. The distinction
between organisations on the one hand and institutions on the other, and the
cohabitation of formal with informal institutions help to shed light to all the
parameters in the difficulty of the Greek administrative system to adapt.
More specifically, according to D. C. North, organisations "provide a
structure to human interaction... they are groups of individuals bound by some
common purpose to achieve objectives".W0On the other hand "institutions include
any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction"101, they
are "the rides of the game..." 102 Significantly, he points out that institutions can
be formal, i.e. written, or informal i.e. unwritten behavioural codes underlying
and holding a subsidiary role to the formal ones. While formal institutions
choices of the past. Second, it accounts for the continuity and inertia characterising governmental
organisation. Third it explains variations in solutions to identical organisational problems between
different countries that frequently have very similar policy-making and administrairve institutions
Thelen, K. and Steinmo, S.: "Structuring Politics". New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992,
quoted in Christensen, J. G.: "Interpreting Administrative.,," supra. On the changing distribution
of power and resources see also, Knill, Ch. and Lehmkuhl, D. (1999), "How Europe Matters.
Different Mechanisms of Europeanisation". EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON LINE PAPERS, Vol.
3, No 7. URL: http:/ /eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007a.htm
99 Knill, C. and Lenschow, A. (1998), supra.
100 North, D. C. (1994), "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance". New York,
Cambridge University Press.
101 Ibid, p. 4.
i°2 Ibid.
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"may change overnight as a result ofpolitical or judicial decisions, informal constraints
embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to
deliberate polices"103 Thus, North clearly distinguishes between institutions on
the one hand and organisations on the other. This differentiation between
institutions and organisations, and formal and informal institutions and the
allotment of distinct functions in each of them is of special value in the analysis
attempted here for the following reasons:
a) reforms undertaken in the process of Europeanisation in Greece
involve both new organisations as well as new institutions introduced either
along with the new organisations or in already existing organisations, with
view to alter the "rules of the game".
b) The tenacity of informal rules as opposed to formal ones in Greece is
an old problem as discussed in Chapter Two. This pattern was repeated during
application of the CSFs.
Finally an important remark should be made: the distributional
dimension of domestic resistance as outlined in the institutionalist approach is
appropriate to the description of the reforming capacity of the Greek society.
As pointed out before in this chapter, owing to the peculiar economic
development, the prevalent attitude is that of a class characterised by
"ideological disorientation, a sense of loss ofvalues a 'guild-type' mentality ...the crass
materialism..." It was more over noted that because of this, the relation between
the State and the society is not ideologically defined but on the basis of
particularist interests. Consequently, it was argued, the main issue in Greek
politics is the maintenance of the existing social relations, or "rather the fact that
no one is seeking to alter them". The fact that clientelism was found above to
contain ideological elements is not contradicting this argument, on the contrary
it supports it, as clientelist 'ideology' should not be understood in classical
103 Ibid, p. 6.
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terms, especially in light of the ideological convergence and lack of real
cleavages between the political parties also discussed above. In other words,
clientelist relations are defined along the lines of a socialist or liberal ideology
only in a superficial manner, and focus rather on materialist distributional
aspects and the power structures attached to them, which become the
appropriate way of political and social integration, i.e. an 'ideology' in itself.
This is the reason why the self reforming and thus self-regulatory capacity of
the Greek society is impaired.
One more point should be made: empirical research and in particular
the case study has revealed the significance of personalities in the reforming
process. Therefore, three factors should be considered for the interpretation of
the domestic response in the process of Europeanisation here: opportunity
structures as rooted in culture, the common security dilemma, and the role of
individual actors in the reforming process.
Summary
The European argument was in the beginning mainly connected to
economic and foreign policy considerations. In the 1970s it entered domestic
political debate as a line of division between political parties and was used as a
recruitment pole. On the other hand, it was also connected to the old vision of
modernisation of the Greek State and society. In the 1990s the crisis of the
political parties led to the creation of reforming movements within the parties
of which the most important is the Association for the Modernisation of the
Society (OPEK), initially affiliated to PASOK but attracting members from
other political formations. There have been two distinct logics and tendencies
within OPEK, one associated with electoral considerations and another
aspiring to the modernisation especially in light of European integration.
Finally, OPEK was absorbed and metabolised into a recruitment pole.
Chapter Three p. 140
This development is illustrative of the wider issue of low self-reforming
capacity of the Greek society. Social strata arising as a result of peculiar models
of economic development are characterised by ideological confusion and an
emphasis on materialism. This in connection to the fact that social interests are
aggregated and articulated along personalistic clientelist lines, is hindering
efforts to reform as actors benefiting from this state of affairs have an interest in
preserving existing opportunity structures. Reform becomes even more
problematic because institutions preserving these patterns are deeply rooted in
culture.
In light of the above, an institutionalist approach is deemed as the most
appropriate theoretical framework for studying and explaining the poor
adaptability of the domestic institutions to the rules introduced in the process
of application of Community regional policy.
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Chapter Four: CSF1989-1993: NewPrinciples v. Traditional Patterns
"In most cases, the administration ofCommunity funds was adapted to pre
existing practices rather than the other way round"1
Introductory notes
As noted before, studies have shown that the process of integration has
caused different impacts on administrative arrangements of the member-states. In
all cases the existing national administrative patterns have influenced the nature
and degree of adaptation. Greece has not been an exception. In fact, and despite
the introduction of innovations, the first programming period did not bring about
any substantial changes in regional policy making. The results of the application
of the 1st CSF clearly suggest that institutions like the Monitoring Committees
were absorbed by traditional structures and practices which ignored and bypassed
the principles introduced with the 1988 revision of the Structural Funds.
This chapter will discuss the application of the regional section of the CSF
1989-1993 in Greece. Although the application of the CSFs impacted on structures
and modes of interaction at the central level too, this dissertation focuses on
changes occurring at the sub-national level. Therefore, central level is discussed
here to the extent that it is involved in the developments at the sub-national level.
Discussion examines the application of the principles common to all Structural
Funds, but focuses on public works production funded by the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF). It does not discuss reforms in the context of the other
1 Plaskovitis, E.(1994): "EC Regional Policy in Greece: Ten Years of Structural Funds Intervention". In
Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P.C "Greece and EC membership evaluated". London, Pinter, p. 123.
ChapterFour p. 142
Structural Funds. Public works production was chosen as the most appropriate
theme for analysis here, because as already noted, production of basic
infrastructure projects and works has been par excellence connected with the
regional policy process. More particularly, it is directly linked to the clientelist
networks of public and private actors built around the Prefecture, and as such
constitutes a most illustrative example of opportunity structures embedded in
culture. These structures were challenged by the principles of the reformed
Community Regional Policy (CRP), and displayed a high degree of resistance.
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Authorities involved in CSF decision making
Each year the Annual State Budget which has a direct effect on the Public
Investment Budget and consequently the financing of the programmes, is prepared by the
Government, submitted to and approved by the Parliament In accordance with Law
1622/1986. The Parliament also approves projects of great national importance such as
Large Project Athens Metro.
• The Ministry for National Economv(YPETHO). is responsible for the general
programming and monitoring of the implementation of the CSF. YPETHO Deputy
Minister is the President of the CSF Monitoring Committee.
• The Ministry of the Interior appointed the Prefects up to January 1995 when the first
Prefectoral Self-governments were established. It appoints the Secretaries General and
the General Directors of the Regions. It has the co ordination and surveillance of the
Regions, the Prefectoral Self-governments, Municipalities and Communes, and
monitored the implementation of the Special Develpoment Programmes for Local Self-
government (EAPTA), which were Subprogrammes contained in the Regional
Operational Programmes.(ROPs).
• The Ministry of Public Works (YPECHODE) and other ministries are responsible for the
implementation, surveying, and management of projects.
• The Ministries for Agriculture. Labour, and National Economy, corresponding to the
EAGGF, ESF, and ERDF for the monitoring of the expenditures of actions in the context
of the respective Funds. There are respective Directorates in the ministries assigned
with the follow up of the CSF.
• The role of the Regions has been gradually enhanced during the period 1989-1999. It
has lodged since its establishment in 1988 the Secretariat of the Monitoring Committee
of the ROP of which the Secretary General of the Region, known as the Peripheriarch is
the President. Recently, it acquired by law its own Collective Decision for Action (RCAD)
and the Regional Development Fund (RDF), both introduced initially in four Regions of
the country, and then in the remaining nine Regions. This means that the regions will
from now on be able to draw their own development plans, while the RDF will be
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responsible for payments made through the European Funds. The Regional Council is
also involved in the preparation of the Regional Operational Programme, according to
Law 1622/94.
The prefectoral tier, (as Prefectures until 1 January 1995, and as Prefectoral Self-
governments ever since that date), and the Local Self-government Organisations
(LSGOs), are responsible for implementing and monitoring projects.
The CSF Monitoring Committee, with the Undersecretary of YPETHO as President
consisted of high ranking Commission officials and the Presidents of the other
Monitoring Committees, as well as high ranking officials of YPETHO and other
Ministries. It takes the decisions concerning revision of the budget of the Programmes,
follows the implementation of the whole CSF and in general intervenes whenever it
considers it necessary.
The ROP, OP. and LP Momitoring Committees follow the implementation of their
particular programmes. The Monitoring Committees and their Secretariats composed of
the Sub programmes Responsibles, propose revisions at the level of their Pogrammes.
These decisions are subject to final approval by the CSF - MC.
Ministry for National Economy: Central Programming and Financing Agent of the
CSF
Legal Framework
L. 1558/85 "Government and Governmental Bodies".
Presidential Decree 437/85 "Competencies of the Ministry for National Economy".
Presidential Decree 138/83 "Organisation Chart and Rules of Procedure of the Ministry
for National Economy".
No 2974/24.1.1996 Joint Decision of the Prime Minister and the Minister for National
Economy, "Definition of the Competencies of the Deputy Ministers of the Ministry for
National Economy"
Short description of competencies
Formulation and negotiation of the structure, content and budget of the CSF.
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General monitoring and co-ordination of the application of the CSF on the part of the
Greek Government.
Appointment and support of the Monitoring Committee of the CSF.
General co-ordination of the financial flow of the CSF on the part of the Greek
Government.
General co-ordination of and co-operation with the programming agents of the
Operational Programmes for the establishment of the Monitoring Committees of the
Secretariats of the Operational Programmes, as well as the employment of Programme
Managers and Evaluators.
Responsibility for a central information system.




Ministerial Decisions on the appointment of the CSF MC.
Rules of Procedure of the CSF MC
Short description of competencies
Co-ordination of various structural interventions including those in the context of the
Community Initiatives
Co-ordination with other Community policies with view to implementing the strategic
goals of the CSF.
Monitoring, and assessment of the intermediate evaluations of the CSF.
Elaboration of proposals and decision making on re-programming of the CSF.
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CSF MONITORING FLOW CHART
CSF MONITORING COMMITTEE
Synthesis
1. YPETHO: Deputy Minister (President of the Committee)
2. European Commission Directorates
3. European Investment Bank
4. Presidents of the Monitoring Committees of the OPs and
ROPs












PRESIDENT: Secretary General of the Ministry that is
the Implementation Agent of the respective OP
MONITORING COMMITTEE SECRETARY: Co
ordinator of the Secretariat of the Monitoring
Committee (Head of a Directorate of the competent
Ministry)
European Union representatives
Representatives of the Ministries sharing responsibility
for the execution of the respective OP
5. Social and EconomicPartners(2" CSF)
SECRETARIAT OF OPERATIONA1 PROGRAMME
MONITORING COMMITTEE
Synthesis
1. Co ordinator of the Secretariate of the Monitoring
Committee (Head of a Directorate of the competent
Ministry and Secretary of the OP Monitoring
Committee





PRESIDENT: Secretary General of the respective
Region
2. European Union Representatives
3. Head of the Directorate of Planning and Development
of the Region
4. Representatives of the Local Gov/nt Authorities
Association
5. Representatives of competent Ministries
6. Social and Economic Partners (2nd CSF)
Technical Consultant^" CSF only)
Implementation Agency
Implementation Agency Source: unpublishedMOU document.
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Profile of the CSF.
Greece as a whole has been listed as Objective 1 Region, therefore, the CSFs
concern the whole of the country.
Both Greek CSFs were divided each in a National and a Regional Section,
meaning that actions were classified along two lines of programming. The
National Section covered large scale projects, and/or programmes and actions of
national scope, while the Regional Section comprised thirteen (13) Regional
Operational Programmes corresponding to the Regions. The ROPs are multifund
operational programmes comprising all measures under the Funds "aimed at
developing each Region's specific potential".2
During the first CSF, each ROP was structured in Sub-programs
corresponding to the Structural Funds. Additionally, each Sub-program was
divided into Measures corresponding to the sectors of economic activity or to the
various categories of infrastructures. It was argued that, this was a way to control
the distribution of available funds by sector and, consequently by each central
Ministry's competence.3
One more special feature of the ROPs in both programming periods, has
been the inclusion in them of the Special Local Authorities Development
Programme (EAPTA) which is an operational programme encompassing small-
scale projects and works. It was an initiative of the Central Union ofMunicipalities
and Communes (KEDKE), and was drawn with technical assistance from the
Greek Enterprise for Local Government and Local Development (EETAA). It
included many small scale works financed by ERDF, which were not eligible for
2 Commission of the European Communities, (1989), "Community Support Framework 1989-1993 -
Greece" p. 10.
3 EVALION, (1995), Ex Post Evaluation of the CSF 1989-1993 for Greece. Athens.
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other sub-programmes precisely because of their small size. These works were
grouped under EAPTA with view to allowing Local Authorities most often
lacking the means to pursue large scale works, to be involved in the process of
regional development.
A common characteristic of both national and regional sections has been the
importance attributed to basic infrastructure and the subsequent preponderance of
basic infrastructure projects and works.
The ROPs: The weaknesses of the centralised, clientelist State and the
application of the new operational tools.
The Regional Development Plan (RDP) for Greece, which became the 1st
Community Support Framework was prepared along the traditional lines of
regional policy process, as described in Chapter Two, despite the requirements of
the 1988 reform.4 Actors at Local Self-government (LSG) level have pointed out
that the ministerial circulars containing instructions as to how individual ROPs
(i.e. of the thirteen Regions) should be prepared reached the interested parties
with considerable delay, allowing very limited or no time at all for the preparation
phase.5
At any rate, it was not so much the delayed circulars as the chronic
deficiencies of the State at all levels that determined the quality of planning and
programming. As discussed in Chapter Two, all levels of the administration
lacked the logic and the infrastructure necessary for planning. This situation
4 Interview with P. Colias, YPETHO official, October 1999.
5 Interview with S. Iatrou, and several inteviews other LSG actors in Attica and Boiotia, held
between 1998-2001.
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remained unchanged in 1989. There were incomplete or no studies at all of spatial
development or other studies of technical nature at national or sub-national levels,
which meant that objectives could not be defined according to the real needs of
each Region. This meant moreover, that technical and organisational incapacity
made impossible the application of the principles introduced with 1988 reform,
and provided the conditions necessary for the maintenance of the traditional
centralised patterns in policy making.
• Concentration
The following example provides an illustration of the above argument:
Concerning school buildings in the Region of Eastern Macedonia - Thrace, the
respective needs were assessed only for some areas and even then in a rather
fragmentary manner. As a result, it was not possible to determine with precision
the objective, and consequently, the financial objective did not correspond to the
real needs either. It should be added that funds allocation to the Prefectures was
decided at the central level of the government. Taking into consideration the
absence of a developmental logic and relevant studies, this meant, that the funds
for school buildings were distributed to the five Prefectures of the Region not
according to their respective real needs, but on the basis of other criteria. It is
characteristic that in certain cases the technical object of a project did not refer to a
specific building but vaguely to the construction of school-buildings in general.
More particularly, in the Prefecture of Kavala, (Region of Eastern
Macedonia - Thrace), the project under the title "School Buildings" concerned five
buildings of a total initial budget of 330 m dr., while in reality the amount
required for completion of the project was three times as much. In the same
Region there was a considerable degree of inequality in the funds allotted to the
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five Prefectures for school buildings. This may have been justified, but since there
were no studies on the real needs of all the Prefectures, assessment of their
eligibility was impossible.6 Therefore, the principle of concentration could be
easily infringed. The example of school-buildings in the Region of Eastern
Macedonia - Thrace is only an illustration of what has been the rule in all ROPs.7
There are several dimensions in the issue. Firstly, the principle of
concentration suggests that resources be allotted according to the needs of each
Region and respectively, in the example above, according to the needs of each
Prefecture-component of the Region, and as such it presents a serious challenge
for the centralised clientelist State described in Chapter Two. It means that no
other criteria, such as balance of electoral interests should be considered in funds
distribution. This however has been the practice ever since the creation of the
modern Greek State, and therefore, a core element of the political and
administrative system was challenged by the application of concentration.
On the other hand, the deficiencies of the State at all levels and especially at
the sub-national tiers, as reflected in the absence of the required studies were
conducive to traditional practices as they provided the framework for violation of
concentration. Again, these deficiencies are directly related to the clientelist
centralised state, since as shown in Chapter Two, a) Local Self-government has
been kept organisationally and institutionally weak so that it remained dependent
on the central State, b) personnel at all levels has been employed along clientelist
practices, which meant that most often they lacked the necessary qualifications
and this is related to the inability to prepare studies at all levels of the
6 On-going Evaluation Report of ROP Eastern Macedonia - Thrace 1989-1993, September 1992.
7 See for example the annual evaluation reports of the ROP Peloponnese 1989-1993, as well as the
Ex-post Evaluation report of the CSF1989-1993.
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administration. This vicious circle was maintained during the application of the 1st
CSF.
• The Prefecture and the Region
Persistence of traditional patterns is also illustrated in the predominance of
the Prefecture in planning and programming, which was retained throughout the
1st programming period, at the expense of the role of the Region and the Regional
Council. More specifically, Local Self-government development programmes,
which were as before 1988 mere lists of small-scale works were submitted to the
Prefectoral Council. The Prefectoral Council, dominated by the Prefect, decided on
the composition of the Prefectoral Development Programme and submitted it to
the Regional Council for appoval. However, the real power for project selection
resided with the Prefecture. There has scarcely ever been a case in which the
Secretary General of the Region or the Regional Council changed a prefectoral
programme.8 This means that between the appointed Prefect and the also
appointed Secretary General of the Region, the real power resided with the
former, despite the fact that the latter was at a higher level in the hierarchy, and
that by Law, it was the Regional Council that should determine the composition of
the Regional Operational Programme. Instead, each ROP was not conceived and
formulated with view to responding to the needs of the Region as a planning
entity. On the contrary, it was the result of the juxtaposition of inarticulate
prefectoral programmes, each of them containing inarticulate local programmes.
Indicative of the importance of the Prefecture in the maintenance of the
existing opportunity structures is the fact that the provisions of Law 1622/1986
8 Stated by all interviewed actors involved in the process. Among others, S. Kopitsi Co-ordinator of
ROP Attica, P. Kolias YPETHO official, Ch. Palaiologos Mayor of Livadia, June 2001.
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introducing the Prefectoral Self-government remained inactive during the 1st
programming period. Directly elected Prefectoral Authorities would not be
necessarily politically affiliated to the Government, which meant that the latter
would lose control over resource allocation and subsequently over Local Self-
government Organisations (LSGO), which would in turn reduce its influence on
the electoral body.9 Moreover, intricate networks of public and private actors,
whose economic and political interests were traditionally aggregated and
articulated around the Prefecture and its function as dispenser of resources, had
every reason to retain the status quo.10
As pointed out, "the fact that the Government had agreed to establish the Regions
was rendered void by the absence of a real regional tier of government in Greece".n
Indicative of these attitudes is the fact that the newly established Region remained
institutionally and organisationally incapacitated. It is characteristic that in most
cases, the Regions lacked almost completely the necessary personnel to staff the
Secretariats of the Monitoring Committees. Moreover, although officially
responsible for the application of the ROPs, the Regions lacked the mechanism
and the competence to become implementing and financing agents, in contrast to
the Prefectures that could do so through the Prefectoral Funds. The need for the
establishment of Regional Funds (legal personalities of private law) and
deconcentration of competencies from Central State agents to the Regions was
emphasised in the reports of the Evaluators of the ROPs.12 The intention of the
9 Unless competencies were taken away from the elected Prefectoral Authorities, which happened
when the reform was finally introduced.
10 This has been strongly argued by all actors interviewed. The issue is also treated in
Christopholopoulou, P. (1996), "Prefectoral Administration and Self Government in the Greek Political
System". (In Greek), GREEK REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VOL. 7, pp. 124-152. To be further
discussed in Chapter Five.
11 Interview with Ch. Palaiologos, Mayor of Livadia, June 2001.
12 See e.g., Ex-post Evaluation Report of ROP Peloponnese 1989-1993.
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central government to perpetuate the institutional and organisational weakness of
the Region was reflected also in its reluctance to devolve to the Regions
competencies such as approval of environmental studies, which caused
considerable delay in implementation.13
In sum, the Region lacked the resources to carry out successfully
monitoring, and also lacked the competencies and resources necessary for
technical monitoring and financial management despite its responsibility for the
application of the ROPs. As characteristically pointed out, the Regions had "no
powers, xuhich rested in the hands of the Prefectures, the Ministries or the other
implementing agencies".14 In short, the marginal role of the Region in policy process,
the failure to empower this newly established tier, and the preservation of the
Prefecture's predominance in resource allocation were directly related to
persistence of traditional opportunity structures. As discussed in Chapter One in
relation to compliance with Community legislation, the Commission has shown
preference to mild, informal procedures as opposed to those provided for by Art.
169. It was noted that it is precisely against this background that the soft law
aspect of the CSF and the context of partnerships acquire special value. An
illustration of this argument is offered in the Greek CSF 1989-1993 for Greece. In it,
specific reference is made to the existing centralisation of monitoring and financial
management regarding the regional section measures, and the need for
decentralisation of these competencies with view to achieving more effective
administration of the ROPs. As noted, the Greek authorities had committed
themselves to proceeding to decentralisation and gradually completing it by the
13 See Evaluation Reports of ROP Eastern Macedonia - Thrace, and Ex Post Evaluation Report of
the CSF 1989-1993.
14 Ex-post Evaluation of the CSF for Greece 1989-1993. Also, interviews with Ch. Palaiologos,
Mayor of Livadia, S. Iatrou, Prefectoral Councilor of Eastern Attica, and staff of the MC Secretariat
of ROP Crete, and ROP Attica, held between March 1999 - June 2001.
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end of 1991. Moreover, it is added that, "failing this, ad hoc arrangements/solutions
will he worked out under the partnership procedure".15 However, these informal
measures did not prove effective, since at the end of the first programming period
no steps to decentralisation had been made, despite the Commission's pressure on
the Greek government.16 Although the centralisation of competencies seriously
hampered effective application, there was not much the Commission could do
apart from exerting pressure unofficially, as the Regions are not required in the
Funds' Regulations, but simply the logic of the Funds suggest that there should be
a regional tier.17
• Partnership
Furthermore, there was centralisation of power beyond the national level,
owing to a) the already mentioned weaknesses of the administration and its
inability to respond to the needs of multi annual programming and b) national
authorities' low negotiation power owing to i) special financial assistance granted
by the Community in 1986, ii) demand for a new Community loan with view to
meeting the needs of national contribution to CSF financing, and iii) the fact that
the CSF was seen as the very "last chance" for economic recovery. In light of the
above, Commission interference has been heavy in the whole process of planning
and programming, especially in the case the ROPs and owing to the extremely low
15 Commission of the European Communities, (1989), supra, p. 21.
16 Document: letter of E. Landaburu to A. Tsiplakos, 23.7.1991. Personal archives of A. Tsiplakos,
Deputy Minister for National Economy 1990-1993.
17 Interview with Bruce Millan, European Commission, November 1998.
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capacity of the Regions. The national authorities tended to comply with the
Commission's proposals at the expense of the principle of partnership.18
The Commission's interference has been intense especially in
reprogramming. More specifically, a common observation has been that it used
veto in MC decisions. In general, MC decisions were already reached before the
meeting of the Committee, between the Secretary General, his consultants and the
representative of the Commission, the latter enjoying veto. When the MC met
officially, everything had been decided in advance, and the other members of the
Committee simply complied, as the Commission threatened to block funding
unless its proposals were accepted.19 On the other hand, it seems that in most
cases the Commission "had no other choice"20 as an overseer of the application of
Community legislation.
Partnership was also hampered, and the Central State's and Commission's
roles were enhanced with the so-called 'written procedure', which substituted for
the formal meetings of the Monitoring Committee. Instead, a written proposal
would be circulated among the members of the Monitoring Committee, who had a
certain amount of time to submit their opinion individually. The proposal was
also sent to the Ministry of National Economy and the Commission. In case of
disagreement, this was discussed and resolved between the Commission and the
Ministry for National Economy, since, in the case of Greece subsidiarity is
restricted at the Community level on the one hand and the national government
18 Ex-post evaluation of the CSF 1989-1993. Commission's strong interference has been confirmed
also by YPETHO officials, and ROPs Secretariats staff.
19 Stated by all national actors. Among others, M. Antoniou YPETHO official, N. Nikolaidou and S.
Kopitsi ROP Attica MC Secretariat, F. Papageorghiou Evaluator ROP Peloponese, Spring 1999. On
the marginal role of the MC in general see also Ex-post Evaluation Report of the CSF 1989-1993.
20 This has been a common statement of Commission officials: Interviews with D. Chalikia March
2001, H. Helmi and G. Giannoussis, November 1997.
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on the other.21 Clearly, despite the flexibility of this approach, the openness and
transparency implied by the principle of partnership have been greatly impaired,
while there has been further centralisation of power.
• Programming, over-fragmentation, technical criteria, and budget
underestimation.
All the weaknesses, and core features of the clientelist centralised State
crystallise in project selection process. Owing to lack of political will to put an end
to the vicious circle of clientelist relations, traditional practices persisted
throughout the 1st programming period.22 This section focuses on three issues that
have had a detrimental effect on the programmes, i.e. over-fragmentation of
resources in small-scale, basic infrastructure works, lack of technical criteria and
under estimation of budgets. Indeed, a common characteristic of all ROPs has
been the over-fragmentation of resources in basic infrastructure projects an issue
connected moreover to direct award of contracts. Non-realistic prices and
respectively budget under-estimation as well as selection of projects lacking the
technical criteria have also been widespread practices. The resulting impact on the
efficiency of the programmes was even bigger because of the predominance of this
category in all ROPs. Moreover, the issue acquired bigger dimensions, as there has
been through reprogramming a considerable transfer of resources from the
national to the regional section and from innovative projects to basic infrastructure
small-scale works.23 As shown, these practices are connected to electoral
considerations and the networks of private and public actors involved in this
21 Ex-post Evaluation Report of the CSF1989-1993.
22 Interview with P. Kollias, YPETHO official, October 1999.
23 Ibid
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policy sector. The principles introduced with 1988 reform left traditional patterns
untouched during the 1st programming period.24
The so-called Technical Fische, a form containing information on the basis
of which a project is selected or rejected, existed in a rudimentary form and
included only a very general description of the technical object and the budget
required. These forms which were used in the initial phase of planning were not
revised or specialised later during reprogramming. There were some new forms of
Technical Fische prepared by the Secretariats of the Monitoring Committees or the
Programme Managers, but these were used to facilitate monitoring and in no way
could they substitute goal setting.25 However, even these simple forms
represented a challenge for the small LGOs, which were not in position to fill them
in.
A common observation in all evaluation reports concerns the dominant
attitude of agents involved in the implementation of ROPs to favour small scale
works rather than integrated programmes, owing to attachment to long
established patterns. As a result the ROPs ended up by being a collection of
projects without a clearly defined objective, which rendered aim setting
impossible.26 This was particularly observed in the Special Local Authorities'
Development Programme(EAPTA), which was addressed to small LSG entities
without the appropriate infrastructure and know-how.27 EAPTA offers an
illustration of the argument that decentralisation is not panacea. Most of the times
the elected Local Authorities repeating old practices, were too conscious of the
24 Several interviews with S. Iatrou Eastern Attica Prefectoral Councilor, ROPs MCs Secretariat
staff, during the period 1996-2001.
25 See Ex post Evaluation Report of ROP Peloponnese 1989-1993.
26 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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local needs and interests ignoring the developmental priorities of the larger area,
while this attitude was most often re enforced by political considerations.28
Broader party politics had also an impact on selection of the projects, as this
was most often the result of negotiations in the context of clientelist relations. In
general, Local Authorities would be inclined to pursue policies that would ensure
their re election, with what could be called "fancy projects", bearing "fancy
names" such as the "remodelling" or "refurbishing" of this or that part of their
town. As a result, these projects while often absorbing considerable amounts of
national and Community resources, nevertheless failed to incorporate the logic of
regional development, since their goal was to satisfy local electoral needs.29 More
specifically, during the programming but also re-programming phases, -project
selection was an on-going process that lasted throughout the application of the
ROP-, fragmentation allowed the Prefectoral Council to distribute resources to a
larger number of Local Authorities, ensuring a balance between various political
interests. In turn, by means of fragmentation, Local Authoritieswere able to satisfy
a larger number of contractors thus retaining and reinforcing their clienteles. At
the same time, this practice allowed for direct award of contracts, against the
provisions of Community Directives aiming to ensure a healthy competitive
environment. Clientelist practices were also facilitated by the fact that the aims of
the ROPs were rather vague, and did not set concrete goals, which meant that the
ROPs could be filled up with any kind of projects.30 In most cases, the technical
criteria were not met yet the projects were selected. As pointed out, selection in
28 Ex post evaluation of the Greek CSF1989-1993, supra.
29 Interviews with a) Katsoudas, Secretary General of the Ministry for Agriculture during the
period 1991-1993, August 1997, b) Kopitsi Stella, Co-ordinator, Secretariat of the ROP Attica
Monitoring Committee, May 1997.
30 Clientelist practices as facilitated and at the same time indicated by the content of the
programmes were pointed out interview with A. Bougas, European Commission official, interview
June 1995.
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both programming and re-programming processes was dictated not by objective
programming considerations, but by the "changing balance between various interested
actors(private) on the one hand, and administrative and political actors on the other".3'1
One of the most serious problems encountered and reported by all
evaluators has been that budgets were estimated through unrealistic studies that
led to heavy discounts. The causes of these discounts were connected to the
existing legislation (Law 1418/84), according to which the main criteria for
selection of tender offers were based heavily on the financial aspect. This
encouraged the contractors to offer the lowest possible bid so that they were
awarded the contract and then they would revise the budget upwards as expenses
increased. As a result of the combination of the low bids, and the 50% rule32, the
projects ended up without the funds necessary for their successful
implementation.33
For example, the project "Re-designing of the Seashore of Rapsani", had an
initial budget of 100 m. dr. while the real cost was 400 m. dr. The initial budget of
the "Prefectoral General Hospital of Xanthi", was 3,75 billion Dr., while another 3
billion was required.34 The project "Takas Irrigation" is another characteristic
example:
31 Economou, D. (1994), "Planning mid Implementation Problems of the 1st CSF for Greece". (In Greek).
TOPOS No 7, pp. 57-91, p.79. Political balance as a criterion for project selection has been
confirmed by all actors interviewed. It was pointed out that it was necessary to achieve a balance
between ministries, prefectures and Local Authorities. Depending on the time, the political or the
technical criteria would prevail. Announcement of certain public works at a certain time often
served political purposes. Interview with J. Koune, YPETHO official, October 1997.
32 According to this rule a project's initial budget cannot be revised by more that 50% during
reprogramming.
33 Ex-post Evaluation Report of the CSF 1989-1993. See also the evaluation reports of ROPs
Peloponnese, Central Greece, and Eastern Macedonia-Thrace.
34 Evaluation Report 1992 A' of ROP Eastern Macedonia-Thrace.
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• It was initially included in the ROP Peloponnese with a budget of 833
KECU including technical studies and construction.
• By the end of 1992 the budget was reduced to 667 KECU, although the
technical studies were not even commissioned at that time.
• The studies were finally assigned in 1993 and their cost reached the sum
initially meant for both studies and construction.
• The final cost of the project was 30.000 KECU!35
There are several issues here: a) 40:1 (4.000%) deviation between the initial
and the final cost of the project, b) The studies were assigned with more than two
years delay, c) The project was still included in the ROP in the beginning of 199436
with the initial budget of 833 KECU.37 Lack of preliminary technical studies is
certainly one factor allowing for discounts. Such great deviations though, seek
more satisfactory explanations. It is argued, that budget underestimation is related
to the role of programmes as support mechanisms of clientelist networks
involving private and public actors.38 Given the fixed amount of funds allotted to
each programme, underestimation allows for a larger number of projects to be
selected and therefore the satisfaction of a larger number of private and public
interests. The examples cited above are only illustrative of what has been a settled
practice in all ROPs: "projects are selected consciously with underestimated budgets, and
according to the criterion of 'political output' xvhich is better served through selection of
35 Mid-term Evaluation Report of ROP Peloponnese 1989-1993, February 1994.
36 The Greek CSF was given one more year to be implemented.
37 Mid-term Evaluation Report of ROP Peloponnese 1989-1993. February 1994.
38 Economou, D. (1994), supra, pp. 57-91, p.82. Also interview with M. Antoniou, YPETHO official,
October 2000. As she pointed out, "this suggests some sort of informal agreement".
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many projects that will remain unfinished, rather than with a smaller number projects
which will be completed".39
This practice on the one hand allowed and facilitated the function of
clientelist networks of public and private actors. On the other hand it resulted
towards the end of the 1st programming period, in a large number of unfinished
works.40
• Additionality
Application of additionality is one more instance of domestic weakness
influencing implementation of Community policies. Initially, the ratio of national
and Community shares was 50/50. However, national resources were not enough
to complement Community funds at that ratio and the Greek government had to
resort to a solution, which allowed it to participate with the national resources
available. It reduced its own share, changing the ratio to 25/75.






a) 50/50 100 units 100 units 200 units
b) 25/75 33 units
(app.)
100 units 133 units
(app.)
39 Mid-term Evaluation Report of ROP Peloponnese 1989-1993. February 1994.
40 Interview with H. Helmi, European Commission official, November 1997. As pointed out, this
was not the case of e.g. Ireland and Portugal, where as a result, Commission interference was not
of the same scale as in Greece. This is further discussed in Chapter Five.
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The "trick" here consists in that the Community share is fixed. It is
precisely because of that that, by reducing the national share the total amount of
funds is also reduced. More analytically:
• In (a) in order to get 100 units from the Community another 100 of
national resources were required.
• In (b) in order to take 100 units from the Community only 33 (app.)
units of national resources were required.
The reasons for this change had to do with various parameters. According
to A. Tsiplakos, Deputy Minister of YPETHO who introduced it, it was lack of
national resources that dictated it.41 However, it was also argued that even if the
Greek State possessed the necessary funds to retain the 50/50 ratio, its
organisational capacity could meet the requirements of only a limited number of
rather small scale projects. Therefore, the change of ratio came to address the issue
of lack of resources but as well as that of the organisational weakness of the State
at all levels.42
This change however, precisely because it involved reduction of resources
meant that projects already selected for the programmes had to be removed. It is
characteristic that the announcement about the change of the ratio was made by
the Under-Secretary of YPETHO during a Pan-Hellenic Congress of the
Associations of Local Self-government in Thessaloniki in 1990, but no one realised
what it really meant. Because no further explanation was given, there was a
misunderstanding followed by euphoria among the Mayors, as it was wrongly
thought that more resources would be available for projects. It was only later
41 Interview with A. Tsiplakos, October 2001.
42 Interview with I. Nikolaidou, member-staff of the Region of Attica, later of the MOU, and
currently of the Managing Authority of YPETHO for the 3rd CSF, September 1999.
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when the time came for revision of the programmes and therefore exclusion of
initially selected projects that the Mayors became aware of the loss and reacted
with fury.43 The repercussions of this overbooking on the efficiency of the
Programmes are obvious, as are the pressures exerted by the LGA and other actors
involved, trying to ensure that their projects were not removed.
Organisational inadequacy of the Regions and the introduction of parallel
structures
• Technical Assistance.
Use of Technical Assistance begun with a delay, due to procedural
difficulties, i.e. absence of a flexible legislative framework. A non profit company
had to be created in order to make it possible for the Regions to use funds
available from Technical Assistance, since the legislative and administrative
reforms introducing decentralisation of financial management, although long
foreshadowed, had not occurred. Other Member States had already the proper
legislative frameworks and so did not face similar problems. Finally the Council of
State, supreme administrative Court, ruled that a limited liability company could
manage public money. A proposal was submitted to the Parliament, and was
adopted after a considerable delay owing to political disagreement.44 The creation
of a "Company for the Management of Technical Assistance S.A" to handle
Technical Assistance funds allowed the Regions to pay for general administration
expenses, among others equipment and personnel assisting the Secretariats of the
43 Interview with Prof. D. Economou, July 1999.
44 Interview with M. Delighiannakis, General Director of ELKEPA (Greek Centre of Investment)
1991-1993, and one of the officials involved in the process of establishment of "Technical Assistance
S.A.", April 1999.
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Monitoring Committees. At the same time a relevant guide of functions and
procedures relating to Technical Assistance was drawn up in June 1992. Since then
the company was entrusted a series of studies for the needs of the ROPs, given the
inability of many agencies to implement a specific project and prepare
implementation studies.45
• Programme Managers and Evaluators
In light of the Regions' organisational incapacity, there were efforts on the
part of the Deputy Minister of YPETHO, as early as 1990, to introduce private
actors in the management of the programmes.46 The Commission was in favour of
a parallel matrix, because they believed it was the only way to tackle the issue of
administrative deficiencies in the application of the CSF for Greece, and they were
urging the national authorities to proceed with the new measures.47 The main
problem was located in the Secretariats of the Monitoring Committees, which
were under-staffed. Programme Managers (PMs) (private firms of economic
consultants) were introduced initially in the ROPs, later in certain national section
operational programmes. They were appointed on the basis of annual contracts
signed with YPETHO. They were responsible among others for proposing action
needed to accelerate project implementation, updating the information system of
the ROPs and sending data each month to the Ministry for National Economy.
Initially there was distrust towards the PMs by the employees of the
implementing agencies. This could be explained by the fact that the Public Sector
45 Ex-post Evaluation Report of CSF 1989-1993 - Greece.
46 Interview with A. Tsiplakos, Deputy Minister for National Economy, 1990-1993. October 2001.
47 Documents, personal archives of A. Tsiplakos.
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employees were paid much less that the PMs, and also by their unfamiliarity with
this new innovative concept.48
The Programme Managers acted as an institution complementary to public
administration. However the value added of this institution varied depending on
the capacity of the Regions. For example in ROPs such as Central Macedonia and
Attica with rather well staffed Secretariats, the need for PMs was limited and
specific to certain projects, whereas in other ROPs, such as North Aegean Islands,
Peloponnese and West Macedonia, the needs were much larger and the PMs had
important roles to play.49
Evaluators for the ROPs were appointed between 1991-1992. According to
the contracts also signed by YPETHO, the Evaluators were expected to produce
intermediate and annual reports on the evaluation of a) the management system,
b) the implementation of actions, c) the output and impact of actions. Their
comments on the aims of the programmes, their evaluation of the management
system, and of the physical output and impact of the projects, as well as the help
they provided in the planning of the CSF 1994-1999, made them important
contributors to planning, revision and implementation of the ROPs as well as
programming of the new CSF have beenof considerable value. Despite the
problems mainly arising from lack of a specific, widely accepted methodology for
on going evaluation and the deficiencies of the information system,50 overall, the
48 Ex post Evaluation Report of CSF 1989-1993.
49 Several interviews with members of the MC Secretariat of ROP Attica, held between 1996-2001.
Also, Ex-post Evaluation of CSF 1989-1993.
50 See for instance the Evaluation Report of ROP Eastern Macedonia - Thrace, September 1992, and
Ex-post Evaluation Report of the ROP Peloponnese 1989-1994. The issue of the form of the
Evaluation reports was not solved during the 1st programming period. One of the problems
consisted in lack of prior experience even on the part of the Commission, as to how reports should
be formulated. It is characteristic that in 1996 during one of the CSF Monitoring Committee's
meetings the Commission's representative stated: «we start by discussing the Evaluators1 proposals
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value added of the Evaluators has been great, especially in the ROPs where their
contribution was particularly appreciated in light of the organisational weakness
of the Regions.
As noted in Chapter One, evaluation has had a different impact on the
administrative culture of the Member-States. In some of them, it remains a
statutory obligation arising from the Structural Funds Regulations, although it is
gradually considered as a management tool. In other Member-States though,
evaluation is seen as a political act, i.e. it provides information for the public and
"becomes a tool in the democratic game". This has not been the case in Greece. As
argued below, societal actors are not interested in efficiency and effectiveness of
the programmes, because they seek promotion of their interests in ways that on
the contrary impede effective and efficient application of the programmes. In
other words, it is domestic opportunity structures that have determined the
impact of evaluation on the administrative and political culture and not the other
way round. The interaction between public and private actors has not been
affected by the results of the evaluation reports, because traditional practices are
well consolidated and vested interests far too powerful to allow use of evaluation
for social control of the developmental programmes.
Opportunity structures, programmes efficiency, and social control
Efficiency of the programmes is not within the scope of this dissertation. It
is though interesting to reflect on the reasons why groups and actors that should
have reacted to the poor implementation of the programmes as the main
beneficiaries of a successful development programme remained inactive and
because we don't have on the outset prior relevant knowledge allowing us to impose a certain methodology".
Galanis, Greek official of the European Community. Minutes, CSF1994-1999 MC meeting, Tuesday
17 Sept 1996.
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allowed for repetition of old patterns. Popular distrust towards previous
developmental efforts of the State, and in particular the never implemented five-
year plans contributed to the unresponsiveness of the social and economic groups
to regional development planning. Lack of appropriate infrastructure of the
business associations and labour unions, as well as lack of information also
account to some extend for lack of interest on the part of economic partners.
Nonetheless, the main reason has been located in the existing opportunity
structures.
In an interesting contribution, D. Economou has argued that economic
actors seek to create a favourable economic environment for their business with
strategies that do not involve healthy competitiveness and application of relevant
rules, but on the contrary infringement of rules with view to reducing the cost of
production. In that sense, importance is attributed to and interest focuses on not
the benefits to be drawn from participation in the formulation and application of a
developmental programme, but on personal relations with public actors, both
political and administrative personnel, which will allow infringement of rules.51
Against this background the groups that benefit from this state of affairs belong to
two large categories:
1. Civil servants and political personnel who seek to promote their
personal interest and increase their income though control of the
management of the programmes. As explained by the author, the
advantages to be drawn range from economic benefits in the narrow
sense to project selection via clientelist mechanisms. The fact that the
main pre-occupation of the State in the 1st CSF has been absorption of
the Community funds while effectiveness and efficiency of the
51 Economou, D. (1995), "Developmental programmes and social interests" in Spanou, K. "Collective
claims and governmental policies", Athens-Komotini, A.N. Sakkoulas, pp. 209-222.
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programmes were given much less attention, is due according to the
author to the fact that lack of efficiency and effectiveness does not
challenge the opportunity structures of the above groups.52
Support for this argument is offered in the Ex-post Evaluation Report of
the CSF. Indeed, Decision No 1 of 28, November 1991 of the CSF Central
Monitoring Committee, established the so-called "80% mechanism". As
stipulated in this decision, programmes that did not manage to absorb
80% of previous years' cumulative commitments were refused their
corresponding deflators and moreover, had their commitment for the
following year cut to the amount representing the difference between
target and absorption of the year to which the reduced absorption
referred. The resources pooled in this way were allocated with CSF
Central Monitoring Committee decisions to other programmes. As
pointed out, the so-called "absorption syndrome" became thus the main
re-programming incentive. There were huge transfers of resources to
projects "on the basis of their expected high absorption, without evidence either
of their coincidence with initial aim setting or of their maturity and therefore
their functional completion within CSF timetables".53 Although there has
been effectiveness in terms of absorption, the whole procedure has been
highly centralised, while the quality of planning of the programmes as
well as the positive impact on the logic of regional development policy
have been minimal. As pointed out: "From the administrative point of view
the ERDF was nothing but a complementary financial instrument. The
52 ibid
53 Ex-post Evaluation Report CSF 1989-1993.
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maximalisation of the rate of absorption thus became the only criterion for
success". 54
2. The second category contains groups connected to networks of public
works production such as contractors and engineers. As pointed out,
these groups are interested in the projects as such not their
developmental impact. It was not accidental that the CSF was
predominantly oriented towards construction works, to a far larger
degree than CSFs in other Member-States. This according to the author,
is evidence that this logic was acceptable by the planning agents i.e.
both administrators and political personnel. As argued, the small size of
the projects and works of the programmes is appropriate to the also
small size of the construction firms, while lack of studies (as discussed
above) allows underestimation of budgets and prevents qualitative
control of the projects.55
The above analysis explains to a certain degree the indifference displayed
with regards programmes effectiveness and efficiency by the various social and
economic actors, highlighting the reasons why the self-reforming ability of the
Greek society is rather low, directly affecting the self-regulatory capacity in the
European context. As discussed in Chapter One, because application of Directives
often involves apart from public also private actors, and because moreover, it has
distributional consequences, it is mainly a question of the civil society's discipline.
In the case of Greece, as also shown in the contribution analysed above, the
defective civil society linked to the State with intricate clientelist bonds has an
interest in preserving the existing arrangements and so has the centralised State.
This is also relevant to the analysis in Chapter Three, which shows that the
54 Plaskovitis, E. (1995) supra, p. 123.
55 Economou, D. (1995), supra, pp. 209-222.
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peculiar economic development in Greece has produced social strata whose main
feature is ideological confusion, and self-definition on the basis of materialistic not
ideological determinants.
Therefore, it is rather easy to explain the pre-occupation of the social
groups with absorption rather that programme efficiency. Moreover, it has been
argued that traditional patterns have rather benefited from application of the CSF,
because Community has made available a huge amount of resources, access to
which is ensured mainly through clientelist channels.56
Summary
The application of the first Community Support Framework and the
requirements of the Community Regional Policy had only a minor effect on
domestic policy process. The prevalence of the Prefecture in resource distribution,
its preservation as the sub-national level of aggregation and articulation of public
and private interests, ran in parallel with the continued institutional and
organisational weakness of the Region. The institutions introduced during the first
programming period helped to redress to some extent the managerial flaws of the
Regions, but in no way did they contribute to their empowerment. On the
contrary, institutions like the Programme Managers, while established in the
Regions were directly answerable to YPETHO, which rather reinforced the
dependence of the Regions, a development suggesting the intentions of the State
to retain centralisation of power.
56 Interviews with Dr. G. Alogoskoufis, ND Shadow Minister for Finance, October 1998, and F.
Papagheorghiou, Evaluator of ROP Peloponnese, April 1999.
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Public works production, a core element in the traditional policy process,
remained unchanged despite Community Regulations requirements. Infringement
of the principle of concentration in geographical and financial terms, as reflected
in the arbitrary-centrally decided- distribution of funds to the Prefectures, as well
as the over fragmentation of resources in small basic infrastructure projects,
suggest persistence of clientelist practices. Similarly, repeated budget revisions
reveal the durability of traditional opportunity structures. On the other hand, the
organisational weakness of the State at all levels contributed greatly to the
preservation of old patterns and even served as an alibi, while it allowed at the
same time for increased Commission interference in policy process.
In short, at the end of the 1st programming period, structures and practices
in regional policy process remained almost unchanged. This has been attributed to
the fact that the operational tools introduced with 1988 reform and applying in the
CSFs, challenged core elements of the traditional patterns of resources and power
distribution, causing the reaction of national actors in public and private spheres
involved in regional policy process.
Indeed, the low self-reforming and self-regulatory capacity of the Greek
society is reflected in the preservation of old distributional patterns that served
individual interests of public and private actors.
Chapter Four p. 172
Chapter Five: Community SupportFramework 1994-1999, theNew
insitutionsand the roee of the commission.
Introductory notes
This chapter will discuss the introduction of reforms during the 2nd
programming period. Following the experience and disappointing results of the 1st
Community Support Framework (CSF), negotiations of the 2nd one included on
the Commission's initiative, the introduction of reforms that would improve
effectiveness and efficiency of the actions undertaken in the 2nd programming
period. It should be pointed out though, that some of the innovations introduced
during this period were not included in the provisions of the CSF. They have been
the result of pressure by the Commission, while others had been on the domestic
agenda for a long time and were accelerated by the process of European
integration. Among the latter, the introduction of the self-government at the
prefectoral level, the mergers of small Local Self-government Organisations
(LSGO), and the establishment of the Regional Development Funds in the Regions
were not statutory obligations arising from Community legislation, but their
introduction was certainly accelerated by the application of the CSFs.
Reforms provided for in the CSF concerned the establishment of
management organisation units mainly in the light of the Regions' organisational
weakness, and improvement of the public works production system, and highlight
the Commission's dynamic role in the process of domestic reform. The response of
the Greek administrative system illustrates the importance of opportunity
structures embedded in culture and the link between them and the self-regulatory
capacity of the society.
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It is noted that at completion of this thesis, ex-post Evaluation Reports for
the second CSF and the individual ROPs were not even commissioned, which
posed considerable difficulties in collecting information for the whole of the
country. However, a general picture arises from interviews, and official
documents such as minutes of the CSF Monitoring Committee. Moreover, the case
study in Chapter Six complements the assessment of the changes during the
second programming period.
The Regions, and the introduction of the Prefectoral Self-government
As pointed out in Chapter Four, the first programming period was
concluded without any steps taken towards empowerment of the Regions despite
the relevant -informal- commitments of the Greek government, the pressures
exerted by the Commission, and the comments in the Evaluation Reports
regarding the difficulties posed by the incapacity of the Regions in the
management of the ROPs. Similarly, the long-due decentralisation of powers with
the establishment of self-government at the prefectoral level had not come into
effect. In 1994, the first year of the 2nd programming period, PASOK had
succeeded New Democracy (ND) in government and announced its intention to
proceed with the introduction of the prefectoral self-government. This
development was going to signal a significant change in the status of the Regions
as well, although as shown below, it should not be interpreted as 'empowerment'
of either tier. Moreover, as explained below, this change can be fully understood
only in the context of European integration although not directly dictated by it.
As already shown in Chapter Two, the attempts to establish the prefectoral
self-government dated back to the 19th century. Electoral - clientelist
considerations related to resource and power distribution by the appointed Prefect
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had been hindering this reform. The application of the IMPs and CSF 1989-1993,
despite the creation of the Regions, had not reduced the influence of the
Prefecture, resulting precisely from its function as resource dispenser and locus of
clientelist networks.
Indicative of the reasons why the reform was delayed is the following
statement by I. Kefalogiannis, (Conservative (ND) Minister for the Interior in 1992,
interviewed on the establishment of the Prefectoral Self-government. As he
pointed out, the reform would create "very big problems...it alters the administrative
structure of the State, and calls in question an institution, the institution of the MP, the
representative of the Nation" d This statement leaves no doubts as to the MPs'
apprehension of losing power to a lower level of elected authorities, of loyalties
being transferred to or shared with an intermediate tier of government vested
with the popular mandate, in short, of losing electoral clientele to the directly
elected prefectoral authorities.
Finally, it was the government of the Panellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) that passed Law 2218/1994 on "Introduction of prefectoral self-government,
amendment of the provisions on local self-government and the region and other
provisions", which allotted far too many competencies to the elected Prefectoral
Authorities and therefore caused strong reaction. Opposition ND's criticism
focused on risks posed by the new law for national security, as Moslem Prefects
could be elected in northeastern Greece. Flowever, strong reactions even within
the ruling party (PASOK), a reflection of the antagonism between the
palaiokommatikoi (old-style politicians) and the modernisers2 suggest the strong
1 Emphasis added. See: Hellenic Agency for Regional Development and Local Government,
(EETAA): Information Bulletin, Athens Oct.-Nov. 1992, No 21. p. 9.
2 PASOK's decentralisation policies as a point of conflict between the modernisers on the one hand
and the palaiokommatikoi on the other is treated in Christophilopoulou P. (1997), "PASOK and Local
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tendency within both parties to retain political and administrative centralisation.
More specifically, reserves of similar nature to those of the Conservative Minister
in 1992 were expressed by members of the Socialist Cabinet, as PASOK MPs
feared that elected Prefects might be an obstacle to their own re-election.3 Among
others, it was argued that Law 2218/94 transferred too many powers to the
Prefectoral Self-government, and striped the Central government of powers,
which it would not be able to recover.4
Following these reactions there was shortly an amendment of Law
2218/1994. Law 2240/1994, "Amendment of provisions on Prefectoral Self-government
and other provisions", provided for the introduction of the so-called Regional
Administration headed by the Regional Director5, a substitute for the old
appointed Prefect, that would function in parallel with the new elected one at the
level of the Prefecture. (The term Regional Director does not suggest the level of
the Region). In other words, this was not a new tier between the Prefecture and the
Region. It was simply the preservation of State control at the prefectoral level
through a State appointee, which among others created confusion as to the
competencies of the elected Prefect on the one hand and the Regional Director on
the other. This development points directly to considerations linked to the
Prefecture as an electoral constituency, since the Secretary General of the Region
as a deconcentrated branch of the State could have taken over the competencies
appropriate to State control. Among the competencies transferred to the Regional
Self-Government: Organisational Structure and Policies". In Spourdalakis, M. (Ed), "PASOK: PARTY -
State - Societu". Athens, Themelio.
3 Christopholopoulou, P. (1996), "Prefectoral Administration and SelfGovernment in the Greek Political
System". (In Greek), In GREEK REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VOL. 7, pp. 124-152.
4 See Greek weekly "To Vima", Athens 28 August 1994, article under the title: "On installments the power to
the Prefects". p. A4
5 Art. 3 provided that the Regional Director would be appointed by the Minister for the Interior.
Chapter Five p. 176
Director from the old Prefect was legality control of the acts of Local Self-
government Authorities (LSGA).
After a lot of friction between the elected Prefects and the appointed
Regional Directors and continuous protests, the Regional Administrations were
repealed and their competencies were transferred to the Regions. Additional
competencies have been transferred from the Prefectoral to the Regional tier ever
since, while some of the old Prefecture's competencies were devolved to the Local
Self-government Organisations (LSGOs). Thus, a large number of the old
Prefecture's powers were shared between the lower and the upper tiers. In terms
of resources however, all three levels remained weak. In other words, while the
introduction of the self-government at the prefectoral level on the one hand, and
the devolution of additional competencies to the Regions and the LSGOs on the
other might have signalled empowerment of sub-national tiers, in reality, it
happened the other way round. All three tiers continue to suffer from lack of
financial, technical and human resources. As regards the Regions in particular, to
which additional powers are being devolved from the ministries in an effort to
reduce the volume of work at the central governmental level, most often they are
not in a case to carry out successfully the new tasks. As shown below, the
supportive mechanisms implanted in the Regions aimed exclusively at facilitating
the management of the ROPs, yet, under the control of the Central State. There has
been an effort to promote also the developmental capacity of the LSGOs with the
adoption of a new law on mergers discussed below, although the results have
been poor until now. The PSG has suffered most of all three levels, as it has been
undergoing a constant shrinkage in terms of competencies while it also suffers
from lack of financial resources. Most significantly, the PSG has completely lost
power in resource allocation. This is indicative of the intention to weaken the
prefectoral tier which is not anymore part of the legal personality of the State and
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After 1995 important decisions for ROPs are reached
mainly at two sub national levels: Local Self-government
and the Region. The latter is under strict surveillance of
the Central State, which retains the ultimate power as to
resource allocation.
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therefore not under the latter's tight control, especially in cases in which the
elected Prefects are not politically affiliated to the ruling party.
In order to better explain these developments the European dimension has
to be introduced in the analysis. More specifically, one of the few important
competencies left to the PSGs by Law 2218/1994, is the so-called Democratic
Planning. This means that the PSGs are responsible for making proposals to the
Regions regarding development plans. Formally, after submission of the Local
Development Plans by the municipalities, the PSG aggregates and assesses the
local proposals, and formulates the development plan of the Prefecture, which is
submitted by the Prefect to the Prefectoral Council for discussion and approval.
The Prefectoral Development Plan thus formulated is then forwarded to the
Region. The Secretary General of the Region assesses in turn the four or five
Prefectoral Development Plans -depending on the number of the Prefectures of
each Region-, and submits the Regional Development Plans to the Regional
Council for approval. The same process should be followed in all phases of the
programming process, from initial project selection for the Regional Operational
Programmes (ROPs) to their revision, which is an on going process as noted in
Chapter Four. Consequently, the law assigns to the PSG a pivotal role in assessing
local proposals and formulating the Prefectoral Develpoment Plans, and therefore
also in resource distribution.
However, once again the "extra-institutional consensus"6 characteristic of the
Greek political system is repeated here, depriving the PSG of real power and
reducing dramatically its weight in regional policy process. In reality, the
decisions are reached informally, mainly between the Region on the one hand and
the LSGOs on the other. There are also contacts with the PSG but only in order to
6 See Chapter Two. The term is borrowed from Charalambis, D. (1989), "Clientelist Relations and
Populism: the Extra Institutional Concensus in the Greek Political System". (In Greek), Athens, Exantas.
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assure that the Prefectoral Development Plan will coincide with what has been
agreed between the LSGOs and the Region. Then, during the formal process, the
Prefectoral Council approves the proposals of the Local Self-government
Organisations (LSGOs) as submitted. In other words, the roles of the Region on
the one hand and the Prefecture on the other have been reversed ever since the
prefectoral tier became self-government. Similarly, the whole network of private
interests i.e. contractors and engineers is now structured around the Region not
the Prefecture anymore.7 As pointed out by the Secretary General of the Ministry
for Labour, the centralised, clientelist system has once more displayed a high
degree of adaptability to new institutions and has simply undergone a mutation.8
In an illuminating article, P. Christophilopoulou, discusses and explains
this system mutation. As pointed out, the Regions as part of the legal personality
of the State are under its tight control. As a result, the resources managed by the
Region are allocated according to the central State's choices and interests. The
increasing importance of the Region is directly linked to fact that this tier is
responsible for management of the Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs)
under the co-ordination of the Secretary General of the Region. Owing to the fact
that national resources are dramatically reduced9 and therefore the investing
power of the State is also diminishing, the ROPs, funded with 75% Community
resources have become almost the only means for funding local public works, as
the Prefectoral Programmes contain at best the constantly shrinking national
contribution. On the other hand, the ROPs, like the old national Public Investment
7 Several Interviews with Ch. Palaiologos, S. Iatrou, S. Kopitsi during the period 1996-2001.
8 Unsolicited interview with P. Christophilopoulou, Secretary General of the Ministry for Labour,
Spring 1999.
9 Owing to the due to the disastrous policies adopted during the 1980s. See OECD (1991), Economic
Surveys: "Greece". Paris.
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Programmes, remain lists of inarticulate projects and works responding to LSGOs
basic needs as well as needs of other local actors.
Under the new circumstances the negotiation for project selection in the
ROPs is transferred to the next level i.e. that of the Region. On the other hand, the
Secretaries General of the Regions10 try to apply YPESDDA's policies regarding
funds allocation according to local needs. Just like the old appointed Prefects,
some of the Secretaries General use their office to advance their personal schemes.
Against this background, the Central State retains to a large degree control of
resource distribution in the ROPs context, despite the Commission's warnings
about the deficiencies of the Greek programmes.11 As a result, the PSGs lost
gradually their significance as centres of decision making in resource distribution,
while new clientelist networks are built around the Region. In fact it is precisely
the awareness on the part of the interested actors that due to Community
programmes the Region was substituting for the Prefecture in resource allocation
that made possible the introduction of Prefectoral Self-government. Furthermore,
Christophilopoulou points to the new clientelist networks structured between the
Regions on the one hand and the Ministry for National Economy (YPETHO) on
the other, because of the latter's co-ordinating and distributive role in the CSF.12
There are three significant points in the discussion above: a) Preservation of
the clientelist centralised State and even shift of the whole system of resource
allocation for local development to a level closer to the Centre, b) Apart from
preservation of centralisation of power in bodies directly controlled by the State
10 Directly answerable to the Minister YPESDDA.
11 Chris topholopoulou, P. (1996), supra. The connection between the political ambitions of some
Secretaries General and project selection for ROPs has been pointed out in interviews with
European Commission officials too.
12 Ibid
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and concentration in the sense that there has been a shift to upper governmental
tiers, there is also concentration at the same level of government,13 as YPETHO
accumulates power and increases its influence owing to its co-ordinating role in
the implementation of the CSFs. This has changed the balance of power among
YPETHO on the one hand and other Ministries, e.g. YPESDDA on the other, c)
Most importantly, the above developments have come as a result of the
application of the Community Regional Policy.
The clauses of the 2nd CSF regarding administrative reforms and their
introduction
The implementation of the first CSF yielded disappointing results. The
main problems were connected to the managerial and organisational incapacity of
the Regions an issue related also to centralisation of competencies at the
ministerial level, and the production of public works. Both issues were negotiated
between the Commission and the Greek authorities in light of the 2nd
programming period. As a result there were specific clauses agreed upon and
included in the final document of the CSF referring to the introduction of a
Management Organisation Unit (MOU) and the improvement of the public works
production system. It was stipulated that both measures would be in operation the
latest by 1 January 1995.14 MOU creation was quite delayed, while the Joint
Steering Commttee (JSC) which was assigned the public works production reform
was set up in 1995. MOU, a private company under YPETHO's control, was
staffed with public and private personnel, while the JSC was a sub-committee of
13 See above, Chapter Two, section: The Organisation of the State - Constitutional and Legal
Arrangements. -Definitions.
14 European Commission (1995), "Greece, Conwiunitu Support Framework 1994-1999", p. 118.
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the CSF Monitoring Committee and its staff was recruited entirely from the
private sector. In relation to the Commission's preference for private actors it was
pointed out, that "for the Commission anything public in Greece xvas bad".15 Both
institutions were repealed at the end of the 2nd programming period following the
establishment of the Management Authorities for the 3rd CSF.
Management Organisation Unit (MOU)
The introduction of MOU has been widely reported as the result of
Commission's pressure on the Greek government. However, its establishment and
evolution reveals also YPETHO's anxiety to retain a tight control over the
Programmes. Undoubtedly, the Commission aimed at redressing the problem of
lack of specialised and competent personnel of the Regions, while at the same
time, a unit designed and introduced at the Commission's initiative and funded
with Community resources was expected to ensure the latter's tighter control of
the programmes. Accordingly, it has been argued that this was connected to
considerations of efficiency mainly, although it is also suggestive of a tendency on
the part of Commission to enhance its role. Owing to a number of factors ranging
from overlapping competencies with other actors in programmes application,16 to
power conflicts with actors of the Ministries, and moreover its partial absorption
by traditional patterns, MOU, despite a good start failed in the end to consolidate
its position.
15 Interview with M. Antoniou, YPETHO official, October 1999.
16 The CSF clauses provided that the Programme Managers would continue to operate in parallel
with the MOU units, during a transition period.
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It was founded in 1996 by Law 2372/96 "Establishment of agencies for
acceleration of the developmental process and other provisions", and was financed by
1994-1999 CSF "Technical Assistance" Operational Programme.
The role of a M.O.U. Project Team consisted in:
• Locating in good time problems in the application of the Operational
Programmes
• Working out and propose to the political authority responsible for the
application of a specific programme corrective actions
• Monitoring the implementation of corrective actions
• Assisting the implementing authority in concluding successfully
application of the operational programme.
MOU staff was recruited among experienced and qualified civil servants
but also qualified personnel from the private sector. The fact that most of those
employed were civil servants was used by opponents of MOU to support the
argument according to which, the issue of managerial deficiency could be tackled
from within the public administration, without having to introduce an external
body subject to the Commission's control. By 1998 there were ten MOU units in
total. Six of them were established in the Regions, while M.O.U. network
expanded gradually to 21 units covering all the Regions of Greece and some
Ministries. The overall goal sought was to establish a single, unified, management,
monitoring and reporting system for the CSF's Operational Programmes through
the introduction and operation of new tools, which were expected to diffuse a new
logic in the programming, implementation and monitoring of programmes.
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The idea was to rationalise the operation of this new body to such a degree
that staff could be replaced while continuity and consistency were preserved. This
idea very close to the Weberian model, on the one hand would ensure rational
operation of MOU and of the administration of the Funds. On the other hand, it
has been argued that it would facilitate control of the unit by either the
Commission or YPETHO.17 Such has been the conflict over control of MOU that
although it was supposed to have been set up by 1 January 1995, it finally started
functioning nearly two years later, and then again only when the Commission
threatened to discontinue Technical Assistance funding unless the Greek
Authorities complied with the relevant clauses of the CSF. Resistance was located
mainly in YPETHO administrators, who despite the below cited explicit reference
in the relevant clauses of the CSF, feared that MOU would strip them of
considerable powers, as it would intervene between them and the various actors
in the application of the Funds. It is characteristic that even after the central MOU
was set up and started recruiting staff for the regional and sectional units, actors of
the central government did not abandon the idea of repealing the institution.
The phrasing of the relevant clauses in the 2nd CSF is indicative of the
motives of the various actors in MOU introduction: "In order to ensure the successfid
implementation of the 1994-99 CSF, a special CSF Management Organisation Unit
(MOU) xoill be created under the giddance and control of the Ministry of National
Economy, but external to its civil service structure. The legal status of the Unit must be
such that, although it avoids the administrative and economic constraints characterising
the Greek civil service, it maintains and enhances the supervisory and co-ordinating role of
theMinistry ofNational Economy"d8
17 Interview with I. Nikolaidou, May 2000.
18 Emphasis added. European Commission (1995), "Greece...", supra, pp. 117-118.
Chapter Five p. 186
The emphasis on the role of YPETHO, a result of the negotiations with the
Commission leaves no doubts as to the preoccupation of YPETHO to retain
control of the programmes, vis-a-vis both the Commission and the national
agencies. It was argued that the Commission literally imposed MOU on the Greek
Authorities, due to the latter's low negotiating capacity19, a factor mentioned
before in relation to the Commission's strong interference.20 All actors interviewed
agreed that MOU creation aimed at ensuring the Commission's tight control over
the implementation of the CSF, because it did not trust the Greek public sector's
efficiency. The general tendency towards the use of private actors in the
management of the CSF reflects precisely the Commission's distrust of the Greek
public administration.21 On the other hand, it has been argued that MOU was
created not only because of the Commission's pressure, but also because a certain
circle of YPETHO officials aspired to control it and through it the programmes.
When they realised this was not possible they adopted an antagonistic attitude
towards it.22
There were power conflicts due to the establishment of MOU units in the
Regions, because they were seen as -and indeed were- 'outsiders' not controlled
by the Secretaries General of the Regions but by YPETHO and the Commission.
Indicative of these attitudes are statements made during a CSF Monitoring
Committee meeting, by Secretaries General of Regions. There were concerns that
the external matrix would in fact substitute for the Public Administration. It was
argued that in fact, MOU was composed mainly of knowledgeable civil servants
19 Interview with N Papadodimas, General Director of YPETHO, May 1999.
20 See above, Chapter Four.
21 Interviews with N. Nikolaidou, M. Antoniou, N. Papadodimas, during the period 1999-2001.
22 Interview with M. Kassotaki, Director of the Regional Development Fund of the Region of Crete,
and YPESDDA official, May 1999.
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and only a few private specialists, which meant public administration was capable
of addressing the issue of everyday monitoring of the implementation. It was
pointed out that these external mechanisms might take over becoming themselves
another "State".23
In defence of the MOU, I. Plaskovitis the Secretary General of YPETHO,
argued that the intention was not to replace the civil services, but to implant MOU
units in services where "something already worked", and this was done. The cases
whereby it did not work, were those in which nothing worked previously. It is
characteristic that the comments of the representative of the Commission in the
same meeting were really enthusiastic regarding MOU. She announced the
Commission's intention to examine establishment of MOU units in other
programmes too, pointing to the need of raising the relevant budget.24
One year later, in a meeting held in YPETHO, participants included high
ranking officials of YPETHO, YPESDDA, the Ministry of Finance, the Directors of
the Regional Funds for Development, the Directors of Planning and Development
of the thirteen Regions, as well as General Directors of Regions. The meeting was
held with view to locating problems and finding solutions concerning the RDFs
which had just started operating at an experimental level. During the meeting, the
issue of MOU was brought up. The General Director of one of the Regions, a
former member-staff of YPESDDA, argued that if it were not for him, control of
23 Statement by D. Kaloudiotis, Secretary General of the Region of Epirous. Minutes of the CSF
Central Monitoring Committee Meeting, 27 May 1998.
24 Statement by H. Jankowski, Commission Representative, ibid. These comments on the new
institution reflect the various attitudes of the actors involved in programmes application and their
interests. The stance of the Commission's Representative is easily explained. Similarly, the
Secretary General of YPETHO belonged to the political personnel that had negotiated and agreed
the introduction of MOU. Moreover, he was aware of the need to address the deficiencies of the
public sector and open to solutions involving private actors. As he pointed out, it was precisely the
domestic system's weakness that caused Commission's interference. Interview with E. Plaskovitis,
October 1999.
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the Region would have passed to MOU staff, who were apparently in bad terms
also with the Secretariat of the Monitoring Committee of the Region. He suggested
that MOU's powers were restricted because its intervention in the implementation
of the ROP "made a mess ofeverything", adding that if it were not for his presence in
the Region, "everything would have fallen apart", explaining that power would have
been lost to the MOU.25
This attitude is easily interpreted if seen in the following context: the
General Directors of the Regions are appointed by YPESDDA and known for their
loyalty to the ruling party and the officials that appointed them. Some of them
belonged to the staff of the ministry before they got their current position. As
expected their loyalties lie with the Ministry rather than with the Region. In this
specific case, the General Director of the Region, a former high ranking civil
servant of YPESDDA, spoke as the representative of the Central State, and the
guardian of the latter's interests in the Region, warning his colleagues at the
central level that their powers were in jeopardy because of MOU's presence.
Law 2860/2000 provided for new institutions regarding management of the
3rd CSF. One central and twenty four regional and sectional Managerial
Authorities were set up, responsible for the management of the CSF, in which the
MOU keeps only a supportive, rather marginal role.
One more point should be made: apart from frictions with central level
actors and regional actors whose loyalties lay with the Central State, there have
been cases of antagonism for jurisdiction with the maintained Programme
Managers, and with the below discussed Technical Consultants. These power
struggles occurring ivithin the Region among actors answerable and/or loyal to the
25 The meeting was held in YPETHO, on 20 May 1999.
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Central State reveal the degree of control exerted on the Region by Central State
and private agents in relation to and on account ofCommunity programmes.
The Joint Steering Committee for Public Works and the reform of the public
works production system.
As noted in Chapter Four, at the end of the first programming period there
was a large number of unfinished infrastructure projects, owing to the flaws in the
system of public works production. The Commission decided that it was
necessary to change the legal framework regarding public works and it was
because of the Commission's persistence that specific clauses were negotiated and
included in the 2nd CSF.26 The restriction of changes in the technical and economic
objects after the adjudication which, as shown in Chapter Four have been wide
spread practices, was deemed among the most urgently needed measures.27
• The Joint Steering Committee (JSC) for Public Works
It was established in January 1995 at the Ministry for National Economy, as
a sub committee of the CSF Monitoring Committee (CSF - MC). It was composed
of officials of the Ministry for Public Works (YPEHODE), Commission officials
and one YPETHO member-staff as the Secretary of the Committee. Despite the
overwhelming presence of YPEHODE officials in JSC, interviewees have pointed
to YPETHO's pre-eminence -as compared to YPEHODE- in enhancing the
Committee's action. It was argued that JSC and the measures adopted on its
26 Interview with H. Helmi, European Commission official, November 1997.
27 European Commission, (1995), "Greece Community Support Framework 1994-1999", p.117.
Chapter Five p. 190
recommendation, illustrate primarily the Commission's dynamic intervention, but
also YPETHO's intention to ensure firm control of the programmes, in the context
of its antagonism with YPEHODE.28
Analysis here will focus on three innovations introduced after JSC's
proposal as the most illustrative of the challenge of the existing arrangements,
although the Committee's task covered a much wider area.29 The new form of
Technical Fiche (TF), a tool for project selection, and the Ministerial Circular No
2/96 on budget under-estimation directly clashed with the traditional public
works production system. The Technical Consultants, experts hired by YEPTHO,
were established in the Regions to see to it that the TFs and the Ministerial
Circular were applied.
28 Interview with M. Antoniou, YPETHO official. October 2000.
29 The Institute of Construction Economy (ICE), was created with view to collecting, processing and
evaluating information related to the construction activity, of both the public and the private
sectors of the economy, as well as the research and study on the qualitative production of
manufacturing materials and products, their costing, the manufacturing methods followed and the
qualitative and quantitative sufficiency of the available resources and means, so that the projects
are implemented according to the initially determined cost, time and quality. The JSC elaborated
and submitted the relevant proposals to the competent Ministers.
The Monitoring Unit on Public Procurement (MUPP) was introduced as an independent mechanism
for public work and service contracts, aiming to provide technical assistance on public
procurement for works and services and to achieve a timely preventive and corrective control of
project tendering and awarding, subject to the national and Community legal framework.
Significantly, it was appointed and supervised by YPETHO, although its action falls within the
field of YPEHODE. The main aim has been to identify deviations from the Community Law and,
by adopting the appropriate measures, to prevent complications in the PW contract awarding and
implementation procedures, recourse to the European Court of Justice and friction with the
European Commission. It carried out control of the pre-contractual stage of public contract
awarding as well as controls during the contractual stage, pursuant to the requirements of the
Community Law. It has drawn up reports on the controls carried out, submitted to the Ministry of
National Economy, and to the Chairman of the CSF Monitoring Committee. Source: YPETHO
(1998), "Joint Steering Committee's action report". Unpublished document.
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As characteristically stated by an YPETHO official, the CSF is a "loose piece
of legislation"30, a form of soft law allowing for individual action. The introduction
of the Technical Fiche, the Circular No 2 and the Technical Consultants has been
the result of the work of Commission officials31 with the tolerance of YPETHO.
Moreover it reveals competition between YPEHODE and YPETHO. It is
characteristic that although public works fall within the former's competencies, the
latter tried to substitute for it with the adoption of the above tools. This stance is
explained if it is considered that the two Ministries approach planning from two
different points of view. More specifically, YPEHODE's logic in selection of
projects is to select the projects first and then secure the necessary funds. On the
other hand, YPETHO owing to its responsibility before the Commission for
implementation of the CSF is obliged to adopt the Commission's proposals often
regardless how strict they are, in order to ensure efficiency of the programmes.32
• The new Technical Fische
Project selection had been for a long time among the most serious
preoccupations of the Commission in the Greek CSFs. Greek officials of DG XVI
were aware of the clientelist practices and sought a means to address the issue.33
The TF, like all the reforms concerning public works has been principally their
idea. The majority of the national actors, resented its adoption even by YPETHO
officials, the Ministry which has promoted all the relevant reforms. As argued,
30 Interview with M. Antoniou, October 2000.
31 The inception and introduction of the three innovations discussed here have been connected
mainly with a Greek official of the Commission, who seems to have played a predominant role in
this process.
32 Ibid.
33 Interview with G. Giannoussis, European Commission, November 1997.
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there has been great pressure on the part of the Commission for the introduction
of measures and institutions that had not been explicitly included in the CSF and
thus were not part of the official agreement between the Commission and the
Greek Government. The new forms of Technical Fische, far more sophisticated
than those already in use since the IMPs have been one instance of this.34 In order
to better understand the significance of the innovation the following should be
considered: the T.F. forms are fundamental programming tools. They describe the
works and projects eligible for inclusion in a ROP, i.e. they do not simply contain
instructions as to how they should be filled in or how the project should be
monitored. They also include guidelines as to what projects and works should be
selected to be included in a programme. In other words, they interfere directly in
programming, the most important phase of the application of a ROP.
There are several dimensions here: the most important is related to the
catalytic effect the TF has on clientelist practices, and therefore the challenge it
represents for traditional opportunity structures. It suggests that project selection
cannot anymore serve as a means of preservation of the status quo in the process
of resource allocation for local programmes. Secondly, this tool was imposed by a
supranational actor, which made more crucial the legitimacy issue to those
affected by its introduction. It has been seen as a violation of the principle of
proportionality and a blow to national sovereignty.35 Moreover, although the same
views were shared by national administrators at all levels, regional and local
political and administrative personnel have seen it as an authoritarian action on
the part both of the Commission and YPETHO, as application of the TF was
controlled by the Technical Consultants,36 YPETHO's employees.
34 Interview with M. Antoniou and I. Nikolaidou Autumn 2000.
35 Interview with A. Kritikos, Secretary General of the Region of Attica, Autumn 1998.
36 Discussed immediately below.
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Furthermore, the regional and local partners were not consulted on its
introduction.37 It was introduced towards the end of 1995 first in the Regions,
because it was mainly meant to address the chaos created by clientelist practices in
the ROPs.38 The elaboration of these forms was entrusted to three private
companies, which also circulated the first copies to the Regions unaccompanied by
any official governmental document. In the seminars organised with view to
presenting and explaining the use of the TF, it was a Commission representative
that addressed first the implementing agents attending the seminars.39 On the
whole, from inception to final introduction, the TF has been the product of supra¬
national and private actors, with the tolerance of the political leadership of
YPETHO.
• Ministerial CircularNo 2/1996
On JSC recommendation, a series of legislative measures were adopted to
tackle the issue of repeated budget revisions. As discussed in Chapters Two and
Four, this has been a traditional practice facilitated by the national legal
framework.40 The 50% increase of the physical object during the implementation
37 Interview with M. AntoniouOctober 2000.
38 Interview with G. Giannoussis, European Commission official, involved in TF introduction from
its inception, November 1997.
39 Interviews with M. Antoniou, YPETHO official, and I. Nikolaidou, MC Secretariat of ROP Attica.
As pointed out by the Secretary General of YPETHO, the elaboration of the TF had to be assigned
to private agents owing to lack of know-how on the part of YPETHO. This was attributed to the
endemic pathology of the Greek public sector, such as non-meritocratic criteria in YPETHO staff
employment, and absence of continuing education for civil servants. Interview with E. Plaskovitis,
Secretary General of YPETHO, November 1999.
40 Law 1418/84 "Public Works and related matters".
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of the works, apart from creating problems in funds absorption and programmes
efficiency, it also involved in reality direct award of contracts in violation of the
Community Directives. There is no doubt that the issue should be addressed in a
drastic manner, but the solution adopted finally was rather provocative.
According to the Greek Constitution, a piece of legislation can be repealed
only by another piece of legislation adopted by the Greek Parliament. On the other
hand the national authorities must apply Community Law. Community Directives
on award of public works contracts, while prohibiting fragmentation with view to
direct award of contracts, do not prohibit budget revisions during
implementation. The issue was addressed in Greece initially with adoption of Law
2338/1995, prohibiting budget overruns for contracts awarded after 14 October
1995, the cost of which was equal or exceeded 5.000.000 ECU.
On 15 June 1996, after pressure from the Commission, with YPETHO's
tolerance and on JSC recommendation, the Ministerial Circular No 2 was issued,
on "Approximation or/and finalisation of the economic object of contracts and works co-
financed by Community resources, not subject to the provisions of Law 2338/1995". The
Circular dealt with budget overruns of contracts of less than 5.000 .000 ECU, i.e. it
amended Law 1418/1996, covering the transition period until a new law was
adopted by the Parliament. Pursuant to the Circular, budget revisions for the
above category of projects were prohibited. Moreover, for projects already under
construction, contractors should submit within four months the latest a report
with the final cost required for the completion of the project, or if this was not
possible, of a part of the project functional in itself, or, at least, of a group of works
that ensured satisfactory completion of the project. The above should be achieved
without increase of the initial cost or of the last'Comparison Table'.41
41 Table with details of the revised cost, used until then for budget revision during implementation.
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As expected, there were fierce reactions and great confusion among the
agents involved in public works production. The pattern followed until then was
brought up side down with the Circular. One of the most common arguments has
been that a Ministerial Circular came to repeal a law, which is infringement of the
Constitution. Animosity was even greater because the Circular was imposed by
the Commission. By the end of February of the same year, i.e. nearly six weeks
later, Art. 4 of Law 2372/1996 adopted by the Parliament annulled the so-called
'Comparison Tables'. Budget revisions were permitted strictly for additional works
which became necessary due to unforeseen circumstances of extreme urgency.
In short, the formal process whereby a law is first adopted by the
Parliament and a ministerial circular follows with instructions about its
application was reversed in this case. It has been argued that the practical results
would have been the same even if the formal process had been followed, which is
true. It is also true that the chaos resulting from persistence of traditional practices
should be terminated. It is not clear why the formal process was not followed
instead, in which case at least appearances would have been saved. Research has
revealed that the role of Greek officials of the Commission as responsible for this
development is much resented. Most often it has been argued that patterns deeply
rooted in culture do not change abruptly only because some formal measures are
introduced, and that non-Greek Commission officials have always shown more
understanding for cultural embeddedness of domestic institutions than their
Greek colleagues.42
42 Interviews with P. Skoteiniotes, Prefect of Magnesia, June 2001.YPETHO officials and members
of ROP Attica Secretariat, April -June 2001.
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• Technical Consultants
This was a support mechanism created specifically to assist the
management, planning and implementation of public works projects of the ROPs,
in short, the measure was addressed to the Regions in light of their organisational
and managerial inadequacy. Only later and after a lot of resistance it was also
introduced at the central level, i.e. in Operational Programmes monitored by
Ministries and other central government agents. This mechanism consisted in 66
jobs in total, staffed with private civil engineers. Their task involved examination
of the TF forms in order to judge the eligibility of the projects and suggest to the
Secretary General of the Region which projects should be selected for the ROP.
Small groups of Technical Consultants were established in the 13 Regions, and in
most cases were very badly received by the Secretaries General and the civil
servants. They were seen as outsiders, agents of YPETHO, who limited the
authority of the Secretary General. There have been cases in which, for a long
time, they were not even allowed a desk.43 It took nearly one year and a half
before they were finally accepted by the political and administrative personnel of
the Regions.44 As characteristically pointed out by a Secretary General, "this is a
form of para-administration that takes decisions in the name of technocracy, which then I
am expected to endorse".45
43 Interviews with Technical Consultants, Spring 2000.
44 Minutes, CSF 1994-1999 Monitoring Committee Meeting of 31 October 1997.
45 Statement by G. Moutsopoulos, Secretary General of the Region of Western Greece. Ibid.
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• The response of the system
The above three innovations were expected to alter the patterns of public
works production, which had a detrimental impact on programme efficiency. It
was precisely awareness of the repercussions of the existing arrangements on the
developmental process as a whole that had produced the reforms. As stated by a
Commission official early in 1995, " the system of public works production is stifling
progress in this country".46 On the other hand, national political actors realised that
the problem was not simply a question of reforming the legal framework and the
public sector. More specifically, as argued by the Deputy Minister of YPETHO
during the same period, acquisition of know-how on the part of the civil servants
was not enough. The social partners should realise that it is not only the public
sphere and the government's fault when things do not work, the social partners
are to blame as well. It should therefore be realised that there was a need for a new
concept of development and departure from the logic of basic infrastructure
projects as an idea of economic development.47
In other words, the Deputy Minister was aware of the role of the civil
society in the reforming process, as analysed above in Chapter One in relation to
application of Directives. In this specific case, the statements regarding basic
infrastructure projects as the dominant concept of economic development among
social partners indirectly suggested the interests aggregated around and sustained
from public works production system, pointing to the difficulty to achieve reform
unless private actors' mentality changed as well.
46 Statement by S. Gaudenzi, Commission representative, Minutes of CSF1994-1999 MC meeting,
March 1995.
47 Statement by G. Romeos. See minutes, ibid.
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Indeed, in May 1998, while all three tools had been in operation for nearly
two years, according to a JSC report on project maturity in ROPs as reflected in the
forms of the new TFs, projects were finally selected for the ROPs either with
defective studies or without studies at all. Indicatively, 35% of the projects selected
for the ROPs in 1997, were accompanied by studies of which only 25% were found
eligible when examined, while during the first three months of 1998, only 15% of
projects examined for final selection met the requirements. These percentages
which differed from one Region to another, reflected the old problems of budget
revisions.48
Moreover, Circular No 2 was applied only to 60% of the projects two years
after the deadline it set had expired. As stated by the President of the JSC, the
percentage of the projects finalised within the limit of the initial cost as stipulated
by the Circular was very small, which meant that additional resources were
required for the completion of the physical object of the projects. Similarly, Law
2372/96, was only applied to a limited degree. For example, in 400 Financial
Tables accompanying projects submitted, only 70 were found eligible.49
The JSC's report caused a lot of concern to the Commission. The Greek
Government was warned that budget overruns resulting from infringement of law
would be rejected as non eligible. In response it was pointed out by the Deputy
Minister of YPETHO that improvement of the public works system was a difficult
institutional reform which became even tougher because it ran parallel to the CSF
implementation. As argued, the new legal framework may have well put formally
an end to the old practices, however the big issue was non-compliance with it.
"The services, those who prepare the studies, and the contractors must acknowledge and
48 Minutes, CSF 1994-1999 MC meeting, 27 May 1998.
49 Ibid.
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accept the new regime, which clashes directly with well consolidated practices, but is the
only way to improve and modernise public works production" .50
The discussion so far illustrates the main arguments put forward in this
dissertation. The impact of opportunity structures embedded in culture on the
outcome of the reform process is manifest. Similarly, the role of the Commission in
the application of Community policies is outlined in its vigorous interference in
the introduction of innovations, a role enhanced by the weakness of the Greek
administrative system. The dependence of the Region on the Central State and the
control exerted on it by Central State actors through the MOU and JSC Technical
Consultants is obvious. The contribution of MOU and the Technical Consultants
should not be underestimated. The majority of their staff were well qualified and
willing to help. They certainly helped redress temporarily the Region's
organisational and managerial inadequacy. However, this solution did not in any
way solve the big problem of the Regions' incapacity and dependence on the Central State.
On the contrary it strengthened and consolidated the dependency bond. Moreover, it may
have remedy to some extent the inadequacy of the Regions, but did not change at
all the situation at the lower tiers, i.e. the incapacity of the local and Prefectoral
Self-government Organisations, that as implementing agents were and still are
unable to monitor implementation of the projects, remaining as noted above "at
the mercy of the contractors". As correctly pointed out by the Secretary General of
the Region of South Aegean, both MOU and JSC Technical Consultants help until
the contract is signed. Beyond that point, the two tiers of self-government as
implementing agents are in no position to carry out implementation of projects.51
50 Stated by G. Pahtas, Deputy Minister of YPETHO, Minutes, CSF 1994-1999 MC meeting, 21 July
1998. It was more over noted that "miracles take time...", and it should not be expected to "achieve a
20% improvement of the public works production simply with the introduction of a Circular No 2 and a few
new laws".
51 Statement by I. Yotakis, Minutes, CSF 1994-1999 MC meeting, 27 May 1998.
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This issue was not solved with the LSGOs mergers discussed below. It may
be too early to assess the result of this reform, however the point is that, at
completion of this thesis, despite the slight improvement, the endemic weaknesses
of the system at all levels persisted.
The Regional Collective Decision of Action(RCAD) and the Regional
Development Fund(RDF).
Although Law 2218/1994 provided for the creation of the Regional
Development Funds, legal personalities of private law, their introduction was
delayed. As a result, the Regions relied on the Central Government even for
remuneration of the personnel employed in them. Payments were made after the
various Ministers signed the relevant decisions. Law 2503/1997 "Administration,
staff of the Regions, arrangement of issues regarding local self-government and other
provisions" repeated the relevant provisions. The introduction of the Regional
Development Fund would activate at the same time the Regional Collective
Decision of Action (RCAD), also provided for in the same Law, thus ensuring the
Region's financial self-sufficiency.
Among the competencies of the RDF would be management of Community
funds and funds from other international organisations for development
programmes. Its operation would avoid the rigidity of the existing time
consuming system, allowing acceleration of project implementation, as the
deconcentration of competencies transferred decision making about financial
management at the Regional level. Under the relevant provisions, the Region
would be able to even re-allocate funds from one project to another during ROP
revision. Moreover, RDF operation would ensure transparency, since within the
new legal framework payments are subject to control by State Accountants. In the
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old system payments were the diffused responsibility of various civil servants, a
process which posed considerable difficulties to efficient control, and which was
often far from transparent. Nonetheless, while most of the other provisions of Law
2503/1997 transferring competencies to the Regions were enacted in 1997, the
creation of the RDFs was delayed again. Research has unveiled a number of
reasons as to why its introduction was delayed as well as why it was finally made
possible.
The RDF was not a statutory obligation arising from Community
legislation, and despite the pressures exerted until then by the Commission on the
Greek authorities as mentioned in Chapter Four, deconcentration of competencies
had not occurred. However, handling funds of a considerable size in the context of
Community programmes was increasingly placing a burden on the institutionally
weak Regions, while it also involved additional volume ofwork for the Ministries.
The need to devolve powers increased precisely against this background.
Therefore there is an indirect link between application of Community policies and
devolution of financial management competencies to the Regions.52
Furthermore, application of Community Regional Policy (CRP) is related to
devolution of financial competencies to the Regions in another sense. As noted in
the previous section, YPETHO acquired additional powers owing to its overall
responsibility for the implementation of the CSFs. On the contrary, the influence
of YPESDDA on the Regions has been diminishing precisely because of YPETHO's
predominance in the application of the ROPs. Despite the apparent unwillingness
of YPESDDA bureaucrats to devolve powers to the Regions, an attitude shared
with the other Ministries, it was finally this Ministry that promoted the reform. It
52 Unsolicited interview with Ch. Daoussi, Special Consultant to the Minister for the Interior,
Spring 2000 and M. Exarhos, Special Consultant to the Secretary General of the Region of Thessaly,
July 2000.
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was -wrongly- thought that by empowering the Regions, their dependence on
YPETHO would be reduced, and therefore the balance of power between the two
ministries would be somehow restored.53 In particular, the increasing influence of
YPETHO on the Secretaries General of the Regions, as well as on the Mayors,
meant that YPESDDA was constantly losing control of sub-national tiers to
YPETHO.54 It has been argued that before membership and in particular before
1988, the Greek State was extremely centralised. However, all the Ministries
shared centralisation of power. Owing to the management of the Funds,
competencies and power are being increasingly concentrated in YPETHO, and
more specifically in the hands of the Deputy Minister who is the President of the
Monitoring Committee of the CSF.55 This development explains the fact that while
YPESDDA promoted the RDF introduction, YPETHO was in against it. 56
On the other hand, the introduction of the RDFs is illustrative of the
validity of the actor-centred approach in the process of reforms. More specifically,
the establishement of RDFs was greatly advanced by the joined efforts of a
member-staff of the Region of Thessaly and the Secretary General of the same
Region. As Responsible for the sub programme "Implementation" of the ROP
Thessaly, this member-staff was aware of the advantages drawn by flexible
mechanisms which bypass the rigidity and subsequent delays of the Public
Accounts System, and was also able to identify the usefulness of a tool such as the
RDF. Apart from the fact that the process of payments would be accelerated
facilitating implementation, there could be far reaching consequences with regards
53 Unsolicited interview with Ch. Daoussi, Spring 2000.
54 Interviews with Ch. Daoussi, and G. Kominatos, YPESDDA official, Spring 2000.
55 Interview with YPESDDA official.
56 Unsolicited interview with Ch. Daoussi, Spring 2000.
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empowerment of the Region: through the RDF, the latter would be able to pursue
co-operation directly with the Commission, as well as with other Regions at the
European level, bypassing the bureaucratic obstructions of the Central
Government. These ideas were enthusiastically accepted by the Secretary General
of the Region. He systematically lobbied the political personnel of the Ministry for
the Interior where he found an ally in the Secretary General of the Ministry. After
long negotiations with the political and administrative personnel the RDF was
finally introduced.57
It was established initially only in the Region of Thessaly as a pilot project,
and immediately after at three other Regions at an experimental level. Certainly,
there have been reactions at the central level which were expected. The new
institutions (the establishment of the RDFs involved the immediate activation of
the RCADs) met with resistance on the part of political and administrative
personnel of the Ministries again owing to power considerations. It is
characteristic that certain Ministries (e.g. the Ministry for Culture), did not abolish
their individual CAD which means they did not devolve financial competencies to
the Regions.58
Nonetheless, the centralised tendencies of actors in the Ministries have not
been the only or the most serious problem. The usual improvisation characterising
policy making in Greece has been to a large degree responsible for the failure of
the RDFs to transcend the traditional rigidity of the public sector, and provide a
flexible tool for the needs of regional policy process. When drafting the relevant
law, the Secretary General of YPESDDA did not take into consideration the
complexity of the Public Accounts System. She was rather eager to establish the
57 Inteview with A. Heliopoulou, member-staff, Region of Thessaly, July 2000.
58 Interview M. Exarhos, Special Consultant to the Secretary General of the Region of Thessaly, July
2000.
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Fund so that the Regional Collective Decisions of Action stipulated by Law
2503/1997 could be activated. YPESDDA officials tend to believe that she might
have foreseen the ensuing problems, but she was determined to have it
established and solve the problems on the way. After the relevant Law was
adopted, the General Accounts Authority intervened pointing out that this was a
Private Law Entity and could not manage public money without the usual legal
controls. New controls were introduced making the system complex. As a result,
the following paradox was produced: while the creation of the RDF was expected
to surpass the rigidity of the Public Accounts System, it ended up by simply being
another Public Accounts System only this time even more complex than the
existing one. The situation was aggravated by the "security dilemma" of the actors
involved in its operation in the Regions.59 At completion of this dissertation, the
RDFs were considered to have failed their purpose of furthering the Region's
capacity.60
The LSGOs mergers.
The inability of the LSGOs to respond to their tasks as implementing agents
of projects -which involves supervision of the contractors-, especially in the
context of the Community programmes as described before, was coming
increasingly into relief as the application of the 2nd CSF proceeded. In 1998, this
inability was reported in the central CSF Monitoring Committee meeting as a
major issue. As stated by the Secretary General of the Region of South Aegean, the
main problem is that the LSGOs as implementing agents are in no position at all to
implement the projects. As a result, in his Region, both the LSGOs and the PSGs
59 Further highlighted in Chapter Six.
60 Interviews with Ch. Daoussi and YPESDDA officials, Spring 2000.
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"have been transformed into mechanisms of award of contracts... After contracts are
awarded we are left at the mercy of the contractors, no one controls them".6'1 By that time,
Law 2539/97 "Organisation of Local Self-government" launching the "Programme
Kapodistrias"62 stipulating the compulsory mergers of the small LGOs into larger
ones had already been adopted, yet it was -and still is- too early to yield
satisfactory results.
As the Community does not interfere with the internal organisation of the
Member-States, this reform like the introduction of the Prefectoral Self-
government was not an obligation arising directly from Community legislative
arrangements. Nonetheless, it has been informed by European integration, the
needs arisen by the application of Community development programmes, and the
role assigned by the relevant Regulations to subnational tiers of government.
Indicative of this is the relevant reference made in the "Introduction to Law
2539/97". As one of the most important reasons for proceeding to LSGOs mergers
is mentioned the elevation of local self-government in Europe during the past few
decades into a crucial level of local and regional developmental planning.63
As pointed out, this role cannot be assumed successfully by fragmented,
tiny, inefficient entities, that has been the dominant pattern of the Greek local self-
government. It is characteristic that in the Introduction the weakness of the LSGOs
is identified as a precondition for the maintenance of the traditional opportunity
structures as argued above in Chapter Four: "The larger municipalities are in a
positiott to respond to their developmental role, the smaller municipalities and communes
61 Minutes, Meeting of the CSF Central Monitoring Committee, 27 May 1998.
62 The new law introduced apart from small local entities' mergers, a new integrated financing
mechanism regarding national resources for local development. It was named after the first
Governor ofModern Greece. See Chapter Two.
63 Ministry for the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (1998), "Introduction to Law
2539/97, on Organisation ofLocal Self-government". Athens, National Printing House.
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have to remain bystanders, or, at best, to modify institutions ofdevelopmental co-operation
into mechanisms of resource and project distribution."64 It is moreover noted that the
reforms introduced "clash inevitably xvith those political formations that have been
nurturing for decades centralisation, lack of transparency, favouritism and clientelist
relations, as well as the vested interests of those groups that remain indifferent to the
collective interests of the society".65
Indeed, the new law on mergers met with very strong resistance before and
after it came into force.66 Although mergers may have not occurred in all cases on
the basis of purely developmental criteria, it is important that the first step was
made. The new law was enacted towards the end of the application of the 2nd CSF,
therefore, the elapsed time span does not allow an assessment, as the reform was
not given enough time to materialise. According to actors interviewed, and as
noted before, in most cases the mergers have not produced entities capable to cope
with the demands of the developmental programmes.67
64 Ibid. This argument is supported by the statement of the Secretary General of the Region of
Sought Aegean cited above, this chapter's footnote No 51.
65 Ibid. On State reform as induced in the context of European integration see also the article "The
plight of the clientelist relations", in weekly TO VIMA, 12.3.2000.
66 Discussion of the long and fiery political debate on the mergers does not fall within the scope of
this dissertation. It should be mentioned though, that apart from populist explosions of localism,
one of the frequent accusations made by the Opposition has been that the mergers served electoral
interests of the ruling party. See among others, article "The theorem of the 'vote of the feet' in weekly
TO VIMA, 29.6.1997.
67 Among others, YPESDDA official, and Ch. Bessas, Municipality of Volos, June 2001.
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Summary
The second programming period was marked by the introduction of
substantial innovations in the structures and practices in regional policy process.
However, despite the slight change, traditional patterns were more or less
retained. The introduction of the Prefectoral Self government and the transfer of
powers to the regional and local tiers far from empowering subnational
government have resulted in further organisational weakness and centralisation of
power. Moreover, there has been concentration of power at YPETHO owing to its
role as responsible for the implementation of the CSF.
The establishment of the parallel structures with view to enhancing the
managerial capacity of the Regions as regard the monitoring of the ROPs did not
empower this tier, on the contrary it signalled its further dependence on external
actors and the Central State. The introduction of the Regional Development Fund
and the mergers of the LSGOs had a very limited positive effect as well.
The adoption of new legislative measures in an effort to improve the public
works production system has revealed the Commission's dynamic intervention as
a agent responsible for the application of the Community policies, while at the
same time has brought into relief the tenacity of opportunity structures embedded
in culture.
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Chapter Six - Case Study: The Two Regional Operational
Programmes (ROPs) Thessaly
Introductory notes
The aim of this chapter is to illuminate some the main points made in
previous chapters. It attempts to do so by looking into the issues arisen in the
application of the two ROPs, the reforms introduced in response, and the
degree of adaptability of the Region of Thessaly.
Thessaly was chosen for the case study because it brings together several
important elements in the analysis regarding the response of the administrative
system to the process of adaptation to reforms, which are not found in all
Greek Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs). Among others, the validity
of the actor-centred approach in the reforming process is revealed.
Briefly, the research in Thessaly has revealed the following: The 1st ROP
has been as characteristically pointed out by numerous interviewees "a waste of
resources". All the features of the traditional policy process were retained. It
was the 2nd ROP that signalled a slow transformation, which became apparent
as the implementation proceeded. In general though, resistance of the system
has been strong, while change, to the degree it occurred has been attributed
mainly to the role of the Commission, and to a lesser degree to other factors,
such as the presence of individuals with a reformist mentality and a
technocratic approach to the management of the Funds.
It is argued here, that as indicated in the case of Thessaly, empowering
the Region as an administrative tier does not necessarily imply its capacitating as
a developmental entity. This has proven to be a far more complex issue, involving
a whole range of transformations beyond the introduction of legislative
reforms.
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After an introduction to the profile of the Region of Thessaly, this
chapter will examine the two programming periods, the introduction of new
institutions and the impact on the application of the ROP. Analysis is
concerned with shifts of power and resource distribution with emphasis on
public works production.
Profile of the Region of Thessaly:
The Region of Thessaly occupies the centre-eastern part of Greece and is
subdivided into four Prefectures: Karditsa, Larissa (the seat of the Region)
Magnesia and Trikala. It covers 13.929 sq. kms, and is the third Region of the
country in terms of population with 742.254 inhabitants. It is characterised by
structural lagging and a considerable deviation in the living standards from the
respective Community average. In terms of peripherality, the Region shares the
more general problem of Greece regarding the distance from the geographical
and economic centre of the Union although this drawback is counterweighted
by the central position of the Region in the national space. This advantage will
further increase when the under construction basic infrastructure is completed,
a development that will enhance the productive activities related to Trans
European networks.1
Thessaly, like other South European Regions has a difficulty in adjusting
to technological and productive developments characterising the more
developed Regions of the Union. Characterised as strongly agricultural until
st
1989 when the application of the 1 ROP started, Thessaly has been
experiencing during the past few years social tensions arising from the
Region's difficulty to cope with the shrinking primary and industrial sectors.
There has been however a steady growth in per head GDP which rose in the
past fifteen years which is the period of the IMPs and the CSFs application.
1 Evaluation Report of ROP Thessaly 1994-1999, July 1999, by YPODOMI.
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Improvement is also noted in unemployment rates which in 1997 was 7,5% of
the working force, a percentage that is lower than national and European rates.
There are considerable differences in welfare levels and growth rates in
the Region. The largest gap exists between the eastern part of the Region on the
one hand, comprising the Prefectures of Larissa (where the capital of the
Region) and Magnesia, the latter being on the developmental axis Thessalonica
- Volos (capital city of Magnesia) - Athens - Patra, which crosses the country
from north east to south west, and which concentrates a substantial bulk of
heavy industrial activity, and the west part on the other, which includes the
Prefectures of Karditsa and Trikala, with a traditionally agricultural profile. 2
Regarding demographic developments, there is an increase of the
population, although there is also a tendency of internal migration towards the
more developed areas with subsequent population shrinkage of backward
areas such as the mountainous ones. These developments contribute largely to
the aggravation of the intra-regional and intra-prefectoral inequalities as
described above.
Structure ofROP Thessaly 1989 - 1993
ROP Thessaly 1989-1993 comprised five sub programmes, on the basis of
the five Funds, while sub programme ERDF was subdivided in four Measures
(Sub-sub programmes). Sub programme Implementation was agreed upon
between the Greek government and the Commission after the CSF had been
signed. Accordingly the 1st ROP Thessaly was structured as follows:
2 For a more detailed profile of the Region of Thessaly, see the a) Commission of the European
Community (1993), "Portrait of the Regions" b) Several Evaluation Reports of the two ROPs
Thessaly, commissioned by the Ministry of National Economy and carried out by "HYPODOMI
Economists Consultants".
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1. -ERDF:
1.1 Upgrading of basic infrastructure
1.2 Improvement of social infrastructure
1.3 Development of tourist and cultural resources
1.4 Industrial and handicraft development
2. -EAGGF
3. -ESF
4. -EAPTA (Special Development Programme for Local Self
Government)
5. -Implementation
The preponderance of the infrastructure projects is evident, a feature
which has been common in all ROPs in Greece. The tendency towards basic
infrastructure works and projects increased during the application of the ROP,
with considerable shifts of resources from other innovative actions to this
sector which, as discussed below is connected among others to the traditional
networks of public works production.
TheMonitoring Committee(MC)
The ROP Thessaly Monitoring Committee, seating in the Region of
Thessaly was set up with a Ministerial Decision of the Ministry of National
Economy (YPETHO).3 It consisted of:
3 Document: Decision of the Deputy Minister for National Economy, Ref. No:
56562/3402/15.11.1990.
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- The Secretary General of the Region and President of the Monitoring
Committee
- The Head of the Directorate for Planning and Development of the
Region
the four (political appointees) Prefects
A representative of the Local Association of Local Government
Authorities
Five members staff of the Region, Responsibles for the five sub
programmes of the ROP
- Three representatives of the Commission
one from DG V
one from DG VI
one from DG XVI
Representatives of various Ministries involved in the application of
the ROP
The same Ministerial Decision provided for the establishment of the
Secretariat of the ROP MC also seating in the Region of Thessaly and consisting
of the five Responsibles of the respective sub programmes.
In the context of its general competence for the effective application of
the ROP, the MC's capacities included ensuring the eligibility of the projects. In
the case of larger projects, the MC should notify the Commission sending the
necessary information according to Art. 5 of the EC Reg. 4254/1988. Before
revision of the programme the MC should notify the national government and
the Commission. As stipulated in the Ministerial Decision the MC should meet
twice a year in the Region unless otherwise decided.
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The main tasks of the Secretariat included drawing up the financial
tables and progress reports twice a year as well as at the end of each year. It
was also responsible for locating delays in project implementation and re
activating the respective implementation agencies. Furthermore, the Secretariat
was responsible for monitoring synergy between the projects on the one hand
and the goals of the Programme on the other, as well as eligibility of the
expenditures.
ROP formulation
The process of drafting Thessaly Regional Development Plan (RDP) for
the 1st CSF has been similar to those of the other RDPs. The relevant ministerial
circulars giving instructions as to how the RDP should be drafted reached the
recipients either a few days before the deadline expired, or, in some cases even
after that. Most of the interviewees attributed this to the traditional
improvisation of the Greek public administration, while others interpreted it as
an intention to prevent Local Authorities from participating in the planning
procedure.4
The amount of resources to be allocated to the Prefectures was decided
at the central level. The first ROP set no developmental goals, and apart from
the classical criterion of population, the principal aim in drafting the plan has
been to achieve a balance between local conflicting interests, in light of electoral
considerations. All actors at Local Self-government (LSG) level have stressed
the very low degree of LSG participation in the process.
There was also lack of interest or what has been referred to as "non
rational indifference" of the various social and economic actors of the Region
for the development plan. The main labour unions of the Region for instance,
4 Interviews with Thessaly LSG actors, July 2000-June 2001.
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were involved only to a negligible degree in the planning process, and so did
the employers' unions. This attitude of the organised interests, has been
attributed among others to lack of trained staff, know how, and technical
infrastructure.5 Lack of political personnel with a vision and the determination
to transform the existing patterns of behaviour has also been emphasised.6
The case of Thessaly confirms maintenance of the Prefecture's
supremacy in planning and programming. The prefectoral development plans
were submitted to the Regional Council, which incorporated these
programmes unchanged into its RDP proposal to the YPETHO. The role of the
Region in this process consisted simply in helping to achieve a political balance
in resource distribution.7
Project selection, system weaknesses and clientelist practices.
The technical fiche (TF) which had been introduced in IMPs in a very
simple form and was also applied in the 1st ROP did not contribute
substantially to improvement of project selection. In reality, the value added of
the TF should be understood not so much in practical terms as in terms of
initiation to new practices. The "project technical fiche", which was filled in by
the implementing agency, contained information on the basis of which the
project would be approved or rejected. Eligibility criteria though described in
the TF were far from homogeneous when they existed at all, a fact that a)
allowed discretion as to what type of TF could be preferred, and b) rendered
project selection even more arbitrary.8 As a result, each implementation agency
5 Interviews with Valavanis, President of the Pan Thessalic Accociation of Industries,
Goudopoulos, President of the Chamber of Commerce of Thessaly. July 2000.
6 Ibid
7 Interviews with H. Karakostas, and Ch. Lytrokatis, Prefectoral Self-government of Larissa.
8 Interview with D. Economou, Evaluator, July 2000.
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would choose the TF most suitable to them, a practice which however did not
address the issue of their organisational paucity: most often than not,
implementation agencies, especially Local Self-government Organisations
(LSGOs) were not capable of even filling in these originally simple forms in a
satisfactory way.9 These weaknesses allowed project selection in such a way
that served and promoted clientelist politics and the interests of the traditional
public works production networks mentioned above.10 Project selection has not
proven a challenge only for the LGOs. It has brought into relief the whole
range of flaws in public works production, at all levels. For example, a very
frequent remark concerned the impact of the absence of strategic framework
studies at the national level, but also at the regional and local levels, defining
the developmental needs, setting goals, locating the technical problems and
suggesting solutions. As a result, instead of trying to select projects to fit into
an existing developmental framework, there were in the first place lists of
projects and a framework was drawn a posteriori to include them.11
A number of other parameters illustrate the organisational deficiencies
of the LSGOs and the centralisation of competencies at the Ministries, all of
them complementing the lack of strategic framework studies. More specifically,
a crucial factor in project selection has been the low degree of maturity of basic
infrastructure projects of the ROP. Maturity consists in a number of factors at
the moment of project selection, such as detailed description of the objective,
and the timetable of its completion. Moreover, it is important that certain
conditions are met such as expropriation of land where necessary, and drafting
of environmental impact studies approved by the competent authorities when
9 Interview with G. Demolios, ROP Programme Manager, July 2000.
10 Interview with D. Economou, Evaluator, June 2001.
11 Interviews with G. Demolios, D. Economou, Ch. Karakostas, P. Skoteiniotes Prefect of
Magnesia, and LG actors. July 2000-June 2001.
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so demanded by law. 50% of the projects selected for the 1st ROP Thessaly did
not meet these criteria.12
This was due not only to weaknesses of Sub-national tiers. Time
consuming legal procedures concerning expropriation of land caused
considerable delays, while approval of environmental impact studies was held
jealously at the central level by the Ministry of Environment, Planning and
Public Works (YPEHODE). As a result 99% of the projects were not
accompanied by an environmental impact study as required by law.13
The predominance of basic infrastructure works, project fragmentation
and under-estimation of budget.
The prevalence of the ERDF in the ROP is evident in its structure as
given above. Moreover, as shown from the Evaluation Reports of the ROP, the
vast majority of the projects selected were traditional basic infrastructure
works of a small scale, revealing concern not so much for efficiency, but mainly
for absorption, a feature shared with the other ROPs. Indicatively, Measure
1.1.1. of the Sub-programme ERDF which concerned road improvement works,
covered 21% of the total public expenditure of the ROP.14
Directly related to the preference for this type of projects is over-
fragmentation. A large number of works were not planned as integrated
interventions, but were instead mere lists of similar though not interrelated
works.15 The average length of road construction works is 4,6 KLM, which
12 Economou, D. (1995), "Developmental programmes and social interests" in Spanou, K. "Collective
claims and governmental policies", Athens-Komotini, A.N. Sakkoulas, p. 213.
13 Ibid. Also interview with G. Demolios, Programme Manager, July 2000.
14 1993 Annual Evaluation of the ROP Thessaly 1989-1993. p. 46.
15 Ibid. p. 40.
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shows again preference for a large number of small-scale works corresponding
more or less to fragments of roads, at the expense of integrated projects.16
Preponderance of infrastructure works is evident also in drainage and
water supply systems projects. Despite the fact that they did not have a
developmental impact and therefore lacked the main eligibility criterion, they
were finally selected, accounting for 24,6% of the overall public financial
commitments of the ROP. Considering that part of these commitments went to
Smokovos dam which is a project of considerable size, the real percentage of
this type of projects reaches finally 13-14% of the ROP, still rather high.
Moreover, judging from the rest of the works of this category, it is clear that
there has been extreme fragmentation with average cost of the works, 24,7
million dr.,17
Lack of maturity of the projects as described above has been a pre¬
condition for another traditional practice, that brings into relief the sub-
interrelation between public on the one hand and private actors on the other,
namely deliberate underestimation of the real cost of projects appearing in the
tenders.18 Overall, the traditional practices in public works production were
not replaced by rational ways of action. As expected, the organisational flaws
conducive to traditional patterns were far more difficult to remedy.
The organisational weakness of the Region, the Programme Manager
and the Evaluator.
As implementation proceeded, the problems arising from organisational
deficiencies and defective planning came into full relief. The Secretariat of the
16 2nd Evaluation Report of ROP Thessaly. (1994) Part 1: "Results and unpad of ROP 1989-1993".
p.48.
17 Ibid, pp. 51-53.
18 Interviews with d. Economou, H. Karakostas, G. Demolios, July 2000 - October 2001.
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Monitoring Committee inadequately staffed and equipped could not respond
successfully to the responsibilities arising from the administration of an
operational programme of such scale. While in other Regions the personnel
supporting the Secretariat were civil servants transferred from other public
services, in Thessaly even this has not been possible. In light of the inadequacy
of the system, some of the tasks such as following the implementation progress,
and locating the problems, as well as co-ordinating the activities of the actors at
the various levels, rendered the Secretariat's work extremely difficult while
efficient monitoring of the programme was hampered.19
The Programme Manager was established after a lot of pressure from
the Commission to address precisely this issue. A company of economic
consultants was hired by the Ministry of National Economy (YPETHO), to
assist the management of the ROP. It substituted for the Secretariat of the
Monitoring Committee, with the exception of the five Responsibles of the sub
programmes. There have been no incidents of conflict between the civil
servants and the Programme Manager as has been the case in other Regions.20
The Programme Manager assumed extensive responsibilities, and their
contribution to the management of the system has been of great value. Judging
from statements of the Programme Manager and the Region's staff it could be
argued that the Region's heavy dependence on external actors has resulted in
good co-operation, because the degree of resistance was rather low. Moreover,
the Region's dependence on the Programme Manager was at the same time a
reinforcement of the control of the Ministry of National Economy over the
Region, since the new agent had signed a contract with the Ministry and
reported directly to it.21
19 Interview with member staff of the Region July 2000.
20 Interview with Demolios, June 2001.
21 See Christopholopoulou, P. (1996), "Prefectoral Administration and SelfGovernment in the Greek
Political System", (in Greek), In GREEK REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VOL. 7, pp. 124-
152.
Chapter Six p. 220
In 1992, the Evaluator was established in the Region. The relations with
the Region's staff have also been reported as excellent.22 The Evaluator's
contribution to better practices and improvement of the system in general has
been multifaceted. A member staff of the Evaluator settled down in the Region,
to help with elaboration of the data. Of significant importance has been the
Evaluator's contribution in re programming resulting from the change of the
Greek/Community funding ratio from 50/50 to 25/75.23 The resulting exit of a
substantial number of projects from the ROP required a careful selection so that
the developmental goals could be reached. The Evaluator tried to establish the
correct criteria for the works to be excluded, these being not only the
absorption rates, but also the strategic importance of the projects under
question.24
Elaboration of environmental studies lacking from a large number of
projects has been part of the Evaluator's input in the system as well as
proposals for the preparation of a new information system as a priority, with
view to remedying the serious flaws of the existing system. According to the
proposal, the new system should be established at the central level by
YPETHO, so that homogeneity, coherence and co-ordination be guaranteed.
More over, the problem of information flow and co ordination among the
agencies involved but mainly between the Region and the Prefectures, was
pointed out and it was suggested that ad hoc joint committees be set up to
tackle the problem.
While there has been reluctance on the part of the Administration to
proceed to materialisation of the Evaluator's proposals, certain measures were
22 Interviews with the Evaluator, and members of the staff of the Region, July 2000. Moreover,
the good communication has been stressed in all Evaluation Reports.
23 See Chapter Four.
24 Annual Evaluation Report ROP Thessaly, 1993.
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adopted although not very successfully.25 A point needs to be made in relation
to that: the initiatives taken by the Region following the suggestions of the
Evaluator, did not materialise in cases where their endorsement depended on
action taken by the central state.26 The case of the environmental studies is
illustrative in that sense: On 16.9.1992, following the Evaluator's suggestions,
the Region asked the Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works, to
speed up the elaboration of environmental studies regarding a number of
projects.27 However, the Ministry did not respond, nor did the Ministry of
National Economy regarding the information system. The highly centralised
nature of the Greek State, and the tendency to retain this feature, expressed in
the obstructive actions and practices of the political and to a very large degree
of the administrative personnel has been associated with the traditional
opportunity structures.28
Overall, it can be argued that the contribution of the Programme
Manager and the Evaluator has been significant, and indeed it would have
been impossible for the Region to face its responsibilities in the context of the
ROP application without these external actors. However, and this does not
diminish to the least the value added of the two actors, when seen from the
point of view of empowerment of the Region, it seems that its dependence on
the central state in terms of resources as well as in terms of competencies was
retained throughout the 1st ROP. The fact that both the Programme Manager
and the Evaluator were hired by and reported to the Ministry of National
Economy is an indication of this, and so is the reluctance of the Ministry of
Public Works City Planning and Environment to devolve the competency of
25 Interview with D. Economou, July 2000.
26 Ibid
27 Document: Region of Thessaly, ref. no: 2607/16.9.1992
28 Interviews a) with G. Demolios, b) Local Government authorities and c) actors at the
Prefectoral level, July 2000 - October 2001.
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approval of environmental studies to the Region or to even approve them,
which hindered smooth and efficient implementation of Projects.
Monitoring Committee and partnership: persistence of old practices
and further concentration ofpower
Before an official meeting of the ROP Monitoring Committee, the so
called "technical groups" composed of representatives of the Region, Ministry
of National Economy and the Commission would meet in advance to discuss
the issues before these were brought in the Monitoring Committee. As widely
stated, there has always been a very good level of communication among the
three partners. Lobbying by the various agents would also take place during
this phase.29 "Lobbying" in this context, however, should be understood as
traditional clientelist practices. The result has been that the agreements reached
in this context were not based on rational developmental criteria, but on re-
distributive, political considerations.30 The Monitoring Committee tended to
endorse what had already been decided upon. Thus, this forum, the expression
par excellence of the principle of partnership, was reduced to a body of
endorsement of already taken decisions.
Confirming the general rule observed in Chapter Pour, partnership in
Thessaly seems also to have been impinged owing to the 'written procedure'.
This replaced extensively the formal decision making process for the sake of
speeding up the operation of the ROP. It seems that the 'written procedure' has
worked very effectively in Thessaly. As pointed out, there has scarcely ever
been a refusal on the part of either the Ministry or the Commission, to adopt
the proposals of the Region submitted in the context of the 'written procedure'.
29 Interviews with a) A. Pappis, Co ordinator of the 1st ROP Thessahf. b) A. Heliopoulou,
responsible of the Sub-programme Technical Assistance during 1 and 2 ROPs.
30 Interviews with Local Government Authorities and Demolios, Programme Manager, July
2000 - October 2001.
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This was attributed again, to the very good level of communication among the
three tiers.31
Given that both in the "technical committees" and the "written
procedure", lobbying on the part of Local Government almost never reached
the Commission32, it has been convenient for the central level of Government
(mostly YPETHO) to use the presumed veto of the Commission as a pretext in
order to turn down proposals of Local Self-government Authorities(LSGA) and
other implementation agents. If the dialogue had taken place in the context of
formal transparent procedures with all partners involved present it would
have been difficult and politically costly, whereas in this case the Commission
was used as a scapegoat.33 The argument goes that the proposals rejected in
this context did not meet the criteria and the proposing agents were using
political pressure in order to bypass them. However, even if this applied in all
cases, which would mean that at least efficiency was served at the expense of
transparency and partnership, still, this practice allowed ample margins for
misuse. It is furthermore, a clear evidence of concentration of power towards
the upper levels of government. Furthermore, the inadequacies of the State at
the central level made the Commission's role far more important and
interventionist.34
31 Interviews with a) A. Heliopoulou, b) A. Pappis, July 2000.
32 This has been confirmed by Bruce Millan.
33 Interview with A. Pappis.
34 The Commission's heavy contribution in planning process has been confirmed by all
interviewees.
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SECOND ROP THESSALLY
The structure of the ROP Thessaly 1994-1999 was different in that it




3. Local infrastructure networks
4. Environmental protection
5. Human resources
6. Special Local Self-government Developmental programme
(EAPTA)
7. Implementation
8. Completion of ROP 1983-1989 projects
Planning in the second programming period was to a great extend along
the same lines as in the 1st ROP. The response of the social and economic
partners was not substantially altered. A slow change was perceived in the
planning process with regards the role of the Region which was enhanced. As
stated by actors involved in the process, the Region set the financial
framework, and the goals as provided for in the CSF for Greece and had a
slightly more active role mainly in ensuring that the Prefectures complied with
the rules. It was argued that this came as a result of the Commission's
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persistence in changing the rules of the game, after what had happened in the
application of the 1st ROP.35
Regarding broader participation though, it was widely reported that the
RDP submitted at the Ministry for National Economy (YPETHO), was in reality
the result of consultation between the Prefectures on the one hand and the
Region on the other, and that LSG Authorities(LSGA) did not have a chance to
influence its formulation.36 The pathology of the political system as a
framework for the elaboration of the ROP has been identified as a major cause
for the defective process of project selection. More specifically, clientelist
practices have been held responsible a) for lack of transparency in the process
of planning and b) for the transfer of concern for effectiveness to the
particularist pursue of interests in absence of a developmental logic.37 The
Commission's determination to alter the traditional process was reflected in its
refusing in 1995 to approve a number of projects which had been selected for
the ROP, and for which the process of procurement was already concluded
before final approval by the Monitoring Committee. After being rejected by the
Commission they had to be financed exclusively with national funds.38
To the extend that a change occurred regarding a rather higher degree
of maturity of the ROP, this was due to the fact that the already implemented
public works had improved basic infrastructure in the Region, which allowed
for a more relaxed developmentally oriented logic. Consequently there was an
increased emphasis on the quality of the interventions as opposed to the
35 Interviews with Demolios, Heliopoulou, and Karakostas.
36 Interviews with LSGO actors.
37 Reported by D. Economou, Evaluator, who participated in the group of the Region which
examined the application and the lists of works submitted for approval.
38 Interview with high ranking official of the Region of Thessaly, July 2000 and V. Kontorizos
Mayor of Portaria, June 2001.
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quantity.39 Overall however, there has been a very slight improvement in
comparison with the 1st ROP.
The role of the Region was enhanced after 1995 as has been the case in
the other Regions too. After the introduction of the Prefectoral Self-
government, this tier lost its influential role to the Region The Prefectoral
Council does not enjoy anymore the prestige of the period before 1995, as it has
lost its role in the process of final formulation of the local programmes. It was
bitterly argued that the prefectoral tier had acquired over time a storage of
knowledge and experience in the developmental planning, which the Region
lacks and tries in vain to remedy with external bodies like the Management
Organisation Unit (MOU). As moreover noted, the levels of programming are
not clear anymore, and there has been further centralisation of power in the
Region which is controlled by the Central State.40
TheManagement Organisation Unit
The MOU subdivision of the Region of Thessaly41 was established in the
Region in 1997, after pressure by the Commission as discussed in Chapter V,
with view to enhancing the Region's managerial capacity. The issue of
overlapping competencies with the existing Programme Manager was soon
raised. An instance of this has been an information system introduced to cover
the large projects all over the country. The purpose of this system was to keep
the Prime Minister and his team of experts informed on the progress of the
large projects at a national level. The system known as PRIMAVERA, was
established in the Region of Thessaly in 1997, (before the introduction of
MOU), in the premises of the Programme Manager of the ROP, considered by
39 Interviews with Karakostas and Demolios, July 2000-June 2001.
40 Interview with Ch. Karakostas, PSG of Larissa, October 2001.
41 For a detailed discussion of the MOU see Chapter V.
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the Prime Minister's team to be the most appropriate operator. When later
during the same year MOU took over the Secretariat of the Monitoring
Committee, they claimed access to the system. However, there was a key to the
system for security reasons, which guaranteed access only to the Programme
Manager, and at the same time established their responsibility for the reliability
of the data entered to the system. This was one of the first points of friction
between the new institution on the one hand and the Programme Manager on
the other.42 While the claim of the MOU unit seems legitimate since they
should be able to have access to the data and thus initiate the process of
problem solving, the Programme Manager saw in this claim a threat to their
own status fearing they would lose completely control of the management of
the ROP 43
At any rate, what is important here is the fact that there has been power
conflict over the management of the Funds, urithin the Region, which is
institutionally the competent agent, but somehow in the Region's absentia, since
both the MOU and the Programme Manager were answerable to and
depended on YPETHO rather than the Secretary General of the Region. Again,
this development is due to the fact that the Region did not have resources of its
own to cope with its demanding managerial role, a traditional feature of all
sub-national units in Greece as shown in a Chapter Two. The establishment of
the MOU has not empowered the Region, nor has this been the intention of
YPETHO, quite the opposite. In short, the Region's managerial capacity
continued to depend on external actors answerable to the Central State.
42 Inteview with G. Demolios, July 2000.
43 Ibid.
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Public works production and the new tools.
• The new Technical Fiche, Ministerial Circular No 2 and the Technical
Consultants,
There have been contradictory statements regarding the new,
sophisticated Technical Fiche(TF). On the one hand it has contributed to
rationalisation and has made project selection more transparent. On the other
hand it has placed additional pressure on the LSGOs, already unable to deal
with the existing far simpler form of TF. As argued, there is no doubt that this
has been an important step towards rationalisation of project selection with
significant impact on clientelist practices, however, the issue of LSGOs
incapacity should have been addressed before its introduction. The LSGOs
mergers which at any rate occurred much later after the introduction of the TF,
in most cases have not produced new strong entities, while national resources
for LSGOs organisational needs continue to be insufficient.44
Similarly, the Ministerial Circular No 2 has been another instance of
challenge for both the clientelist system as well as the LSGOs capacity. Its
sudden introduction, while project implementation had already begun under
the previous regime (Law 1418/86) caused strong reaction and great confusion.
Indicative of the turmoil it created in the network of public works production,
and presumably of the 'solutions' adopted by the interested actors to cope with
the new measure, is the fact that it has not been possible to access data
regarding the percentage of compliance with the circular.45 However, the
following example which has been the only relevant piece of information
44 Interviews with Ch. Lytrokatis Larissa PSG, Ch. Bessas Volos Municipality, and Region of
Thessaly officials, July 2000 - October 2001.
45 It is characteristic that at all levels actors refused outright or found subtle excuses for not
providing data, treating the issue as "classified". It has been stated though that "wherever it has
been possible to avoid application of the circular, it was not applied after all." Interview with H.
Lytrokatis.
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accessible, is indicative of the nature of the problems created from application
of the circular:
The project of a school that had started under the old regime included a
swimming pool, the cost of which was not estimated in the initial budget
of the project. The intention was to revise the budget in the course of the
implementation and thus cover the cost of the swimming pool.
However, the introduction of the ministerial circular prevented the
implementation agency from completing this scheme.46
Again, as argued by actors at LSG and Prefectoral levels, there are
several dimensions in the issue:
1. Compliance with the circular involves the necessary
infrastructure to prepare the studies required with detailed description
of the physical object. The issue of LSGOs weakness has not been
addressed satisfactorily despite the launch of the project
'KAPODISTRIAS' on LSGOs mergers while LSGOs resource dependence
on the Central persists.47 On the other hand, it has been argued that the
reason behind LSG weakness to prepare studies has not always been
lack of resources but often their waste in small scale 'fancy' projects by
the Mayors with view to securing votes, instead of investing in studies
for larger projects of a developmental nature.48
2. The other dimension of the issue of under-estimation and revision
of budgets is connected to the effort to accommodate as many electoral
interests as possible achieving a balance. It was argued that project
46 No further details were provided.
47 Interview with K. Agorastos, Deputy Mayor of Larissa. C. Lytrokatis, Directorate of Technical
Services, and H. Karakostas, Directorate of Developmental Programmes, Prefecture of Larissa,
October 2001.
48 Interview with M. Antoniou, YPETHO official and member of the ROP Thessaly MC, October
2001.
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selection was decided within a certain financial limit, and under¬
estimation of budget allowed inclusion of a larger number of projects,
thus satisfying more local actors. It was understood that later there
would be budget revisions.49
3. Related to the political dimension of the problem are the interests
of the contractors who were also threatened by the introduction of the
circular, as they could not anymore ensure contracts by offering heavy
budget discounts.50 As characteristically pointed out, "the circular
challenged directly the traditional patterns of interaction between public actors
on the one hand and the contractors on the other, a pattern well established and
consolidated over time"51
The Technical Consultants were established to make sure that the new
forms of the TF and later circular No 2 were applied. They were seen in the
beginning as intruders by the Secretary General and a threat by the
implementing agents, but more particularly by the contractors. As
characteristically noted, they "stirred up calm waters", meaning that they
challenged directly the interests of the of public works production network as a
whole which caused real turmoil.52
It was argued in Chapter Five that Technical Consultants were
answerable to YPETFJO, and as such their loyalties did not lie with the Region.
Indeed, as illustrated in the case of Thessaly, there have been problems
resulting from their refusing to abide by the organisational rules of the Region,
as directly answerable to YPETHO.53 Moreover, there have been tensions
49 Interview with C. Lytrokatis, October 2001.
50 Inteview with H. Karakostas, October 2001.
51 Interview with M. Antoniou YPETHO official, responsible for ROP Thessaly, October 2001.
52 This has been widely reported. Among others, interviews with A. Michalis, G. Demolios, H.
Karakostas, D. Economou, Ch. Bessas., July 2000 - October 2001.
53 Interview with N. Michalis, Technical Consultant Region of Thessaly, July 2000.
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between Technical Consultants and MOU staff due to overlapping
competencies. An incident of this has been the antagonism over control of the
new Management Information System, established in the Region in 1999. Just
like in the case of friction between the Programme Manager and MOU, external
actors competed for power and influence within the Region.
Apart from the fact that all these bodies did not really enhance the
Region's organisational and managerial capacity as a developmental entity,
there has been a negative impact of this external matrix on programme
efficiency. The fact that the various actors did not acknowledge the Secretary
General of the Region as their sole superior, made their co-ordination by the
latter difficult, with consequences
Project Fragmentation and Opportunity structures
As discussed in Chapter V, the provisions of Directive 93/37/EEC as
amended by Directive 97/52/EEC, prohibit fragmentation of works.54 This has
far reaching implications on public works production especially in the case of
Greece. It involves transparency with view to assuring healthy competition and
restricts considerably the cases in which public agents can avoid open
competition by splitting a work into several lots and thus directly awarding a
contract.
However, fragmentation of projects with view to direct award of
contracts, constitutes as described in Chapter II, a cardinal feature of public
works production networks in Greece, deeply rooted in the political and
administrative culture of the country. More specifically, the issue is related to
54 See Chapter One. :"No work or contract may be split up with the intention of avoiding the
application of the Directive" Art 6 (b) of Directive 93/37/EEC as amended by Directive
97/52/EEC.
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a) The organisational incapacity of the LSGOs to handle large scale
projects and public works. This feature, which is often the reason
and/or the pretext for fragmentation, is connected to the over centralised
nature of the State, that has kept the LSGOs weak and dependent.
b) The opportunity structures built precisely on LSGOs weakness and
dependence, and involving a wide spectrum of actors both public and
private with the contractors holding a central position.
c) Electoral considerations underlying resource distribution process.
More specifically, the funds available for X ROP, were split into smaller
sums in order to satisfy a larger number of mayors, who in turn are
linked with a clientelist bondage to the Central State and the actors as
discussed before. (Also related to budget under estimation discussed
above).
All these factors are closely interrelated, underlined by clientelist
practices and therefore non-transparent, and constitute a vicious circle
consolidated and cemented over time. This circle was challenged by
Community Directives and the reaction of the system has been analogous. The
limit of 100 m DR set by the provisions was not respected. Not only was there
most often outright fragmentation, but in order to bypass the Directive without
causing reactions, the grouping of works was invented and applied. This means
that under the title of an apparently single project there are several fragmented
works of similar nature that could be dealt with as one project. The following
examples from the 2nd ROP Thessaly are illustrative of this argument.
a) Measure 3.2 Small-scale road constructions. Average cost of projects:
73.4 m DR
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b) Measure 4.2 Sewage and irrigation: Average cost of projects: 73, 4 m
DR. Grouping: many projects are groups of similar smaller works
e.g.
• project No 105 includes 14 different irrigation works and a large
number of contracts,
• project No 303 consists in 7 different small-scale works.
c) Measure 4.5 : Tourism - Culture. Average cost: 78 m DR. Grouping:
Most projects consist in groups of smaller scale works as in the
case of:
• project No 302 which includes 4 works and 7 contracts.
d) Measure 6.1 Basic infrastructure. Average cost of projects: 38 m DR,
Grouping: a large number of projects are in fact groups of smaller
works, e.g.
• project No 208 includes construction of 17 roads of total length
3.2 klm!
e) Measure 6.2 Quality of life: Average cost of project: 25 m DR, plus
grouping of projects55
The reasons for persistence of these practices have been located to the
resistance of groups that profit most from the application of the European
55 Evaluation Report, ROP Thessaly 1994-1995. July 1999.
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Funds.56 More over, cultural embeddedness of institutions has been identified
as a determining factor in the persistence of traditional practices. It has been
maintained that it is not easy to eradicate long established patterns and self
understandings, and that devices like the grouping of works serve as a 'security
valve' to the pressures placed upon the traditional system by the rules
introduced in the context of European integration.57
Social and economic partners, social capital, and empowerment of the
Region.
The importance attributed by the Commission to the social and
economic partners as playing a significant role in the empowerment of the
Regions is revealed in the special provision included in the CSF 1989-1993.
More specifically, it is provided that "a priority objective should be to improve the
efficiency of the productive sector and semi-public regional bodies (chambers of
commerce, trade organisations, local authorities etc) by providing high-level training
and attracting, recruiting and promoting exchanges between highly-qualified and
experienced managers".58 In application of the above provisions, there were two
Measures included in the 1st ROP Thessaly, aiming at the creation of agencies
that would provide technical support, promote financial engineering and
prepare studies e.g. regarding new markets, with view to supporting the SME
of the Region. The financial commitment of these Measures did not exceed 4-
5% of the overall financial commitment of the ROP, yet, absorption was next to
56 See above Chapter Four, the discussion of the analysis by D. Economou. These arguments
have been confirmed in the case of Thessaly by a large number of interviewees, at all levels,
both political and administrative personnel. Among others, D. Economou, G. Demolios, H.
Karakostas, V. Kondorizos, Ch. Bessas, July 2000 - June 2001.
57 Interview with V. Kondorizos, Mayor of Portaria, June 2001.
58 Commission of the European Communities (1990), "Community Support Framework 1989-1993
- Greece", p. 21.
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zero, with repeated transfers of resources to other traditional type measures.59
The success of the Measures depended largely on the response of the SME,
which, however, showed indifference despite the fact that the Measure was
aiming at upgrading their capacity. As a result it was not activated.60.
As argued by the Evaluator, this is due to their lack of the necessary
means not only in terms of finance but also infrastructure and trained staff.61
The same has been confirmed by the Presidents of the Commercial Chamber of
Thessaly and the Association of the Industries of Thessaly regarding
participation in the planning process of the ROP. It was argued that "owing to
lack offinancial and human resources as well as technical infrastructure, the social and
economic partners are not in a position to submit mature proposals".62 In addition, it
was admitted that the regional Chambers rely to a great extend on the central
Associations for the proposals they make in the context of development
plans,63 an indication of centralisation of power, in connection to the role of the
leaders of the unions as described in Chapter II, and their political ambitions.64
More over, the importance of personalities and personal interaction was
stressed in relation to the positive climate created and inspiration provided for
by political personnel with a vision, and the determination to transform
traditional patterns of interaction.65 Popular distrust towards the obsolete State,
59 Economou, D. "Problems of Planning and Implementation of the First CSF for Greece". (1994),
TOPOS, REVIEW OF URBAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES, No 7, (In Greek), pp. 57-91.
60 Annual Evaluation Report of ROP Thessaly, (1993) YPODOMI. Interview with D. Economou,
June 2000.
61 Interview with Economou, July 2000.
62 Interview with Valavanis, President of the Pan - Thessalic Association of Industies. July 2000.
63 Interview with Goudopoulos, July 2000.
64 See Chapter Two, the section on the intermediary bodies.
65 Interview with Valavanis and Goudopoulos, July 2000.
Chapter Six p. 236
as discussed in Chapter Four in relation to the non-implemented five year
plans, was also acknowledged as a factor contributing to the unresponsiveness
of the social and economic groups of Thessaly to regional development
process.
It is argued, that social capital aspects such as the organisational paucity
of the social and economic partners, the poor interaction between the latter on
the one hand and public sector actors on the other, the indifference of social
and economic actors, resulting from distrust to an obsolete and unreliable
State, dependence of the regional chambers on their central associations
regarding the proposals in developmental planning, account for ROP
inefficiency directly related to the perpetuated incapacity and dependence of
the Region on the Central State. Regarding in particular dependence of the
regional chambers on their central associations, it reveals when analysed other
traditional features of social and political organisation. More specifically, the
entanglement of the intermediate bodies by the State and their control through
the union leaders who have a personal interest in retaining this mode of
interest aggregation and articulation, in connection to the reliance of the
regional chambers on the central associations suggests absence of social control
on regional development policy process by social actors of the Region in the
interest of the Region. On the contrary, it confirms the existence of patterns so
often identified before in this dissertation, namely, the centralised clientelist
State sustained by the traditional opportunity structures.
These factors restrict considerably the prospect of empowerment of the
Region, hence the increasing emphasis on the part of the Commission on the
social capital as revealed also in the Sixth Report on Social and Economic
Cohesion, discussed above in Chapter One.
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• The Regional Development Fund(RDF)
It is ironic that while it was a member-staff and the Secretary General of
the Region of Thessaly that had worked with enthusiasm for the introduction
of the RDF, it was in Thessaly that its operation ended up to be a repetition of
old patterns. The Director of the RDF of Thessaly owing to the classical
"security dilemma" resorted to the old rigid bureaucratic procedures of
approving payments. The truth is that the additional controls introduced after
the General Accounts Authority's interference had striped the RDF of its initial
flexibility.66 However, according to reports, the Director of Thessaly RDF
fearing the responsibility has made the system even more perplex and rigid.
Additional documents are required in order to approve a payment which is
refused even when the lacking documents are of very minor importance. As a
result, project implementation is being delayed, and RDF operation is held
responsible for the slow implementing process of the ROP, along with other
factors.67
Moreover, a spill-over effect was produced as the RDF of Thessaly was
the first one to be established and it has served as an example for the other
Regions. As the RDF is increasingly processing payments of additional
numbers of projects, the bulk of required documents, the staff needed, and the
subsequent entanglement of the whole process are only beginning to be
identified and assessed. Thus, the rather improvised introduction of the RDF,
on the one hand, and the role of the personalities involved in its operation at
the regional level, have had a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of the new
measure with repercussion on the Region's empowerment.
66 See the relevant section above, in Chapter Five.
67 Interviews with P. Skoteiniotes Prefect of Magnesia, Ch. Bessas Municipality of Volos, G.
Demolios, June - October 2001.
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The Preparation of the 3rd ROP Thessaly
Although the 3rd ROP Thessaly is not part of this project, it is deemed
that discussion of the preparatory phase is illustrative of several arguments
deployed in the analysis so far, allowing for a more accurate appraisal of the
impact that Community programmes can have on domestic policy process.
There have been signs of a culture of co-operation and an integrated logic in
tackling problems common to several municipalities, prefectures and social
and economic partners, as opposed to the old practice of fragmented,
individualistic pursue of interests. More specifically, in the beginning of 1999
and in light of the 3rd CSF, the Region of Thessaly initiated an innovative
twofold action: a) contacts with bordering Regions (Epirous, Western
Macedonia) with view to discussing common developmental problems, b)
instructions to the four prefectures of the Region to submit integrated
proposals for the CSF.68 More analytically, this process evolved as follows:
a) There were meetings held at the seats of the two bordering Regions
respectively, (one more sign of departure from the logic of localism on
the part of the Region of Thessaly), and the issues discussed concerned
mainly transport and tourism. The participants included not only
officials of the Region and elected Local Self-government and Prefectoral
Self-government Authorities, but also representatives of the social and
economic partners of the three Regions. Apart from the practical results
of the meetings, i.e. the positive impact on ROP planning of the three
Regions, the importance of the innovative action lies also in i) the rise of
a 'regional consciousness"69, which is very encouraging as the Region has
not yet been established in the popular consciousness as an
administrative entity, and ii) a potential spill-over of the new logic in the
68 Interview with M. Exarhos, Special Consultant to the Secretary General of the Region of
Thessaly, July 2000.
69 Ibid.
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bordering Regions. Evidence of this was brought in by participants of
the meetings. It was argued, that actors of the other two Regions have
showed great interest in the new way of interaction between the
Regional level of administration in Thessaly on the one hand, and the
Local, Prefectoral Authorities, and the economic and social partners of
the Region on the other. They have expressed the wish to see this
approach adopted in their Regions as well, and seem willing to push
towards this direction.70
b) The instructions to the Prefectures for submission of integrated
proposals suggested transfer of the responsibility for co-ordination of
the LSG development plans to the PSG. It is noted that, the Prefects, as
directly elected do not all belong to the ruling party, something that in
other regions and in the past in Thessaly posed considerable problems in
the co-operation with the Secretary General of the Region, a political
appointee of the Central State. In this specific case they responded
positively to the initiative of the Region. Following the instructions, they
asked the Municipalities and the Communes to organise informal
meetings in order to discuss common issues in the case of bordering
entities, before submitting their proposals to the Prefectures. The
purpose of this was to avoid fragmentary proposals in practice so far,
with the development of an integrated logic in programming. Not all the
Local Authorities responded positively to the call, in which cases, the
result was obvious in the rather poor quality of the proposals
submitted.71 Regarding the transfer of responsibility for co-ordination of
the planning process from the Region to the Prefectoral Auhtorities, i.e.
to a lower and more over elected tier of government, it can be
interpreted as a sign of decentralising tendency, acquiring additional
70 Interviews with a) G. Goudopoulos, President of the Commercial Chamber of Thessaly, b) E.
Valavanis, President of the Association of Industries of Thessaly. July 2000.
71 Interview M. Exarhos, July 2000.
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significance if moreover it is considered that it occurred not at the
implementation but at the planning phase of the Programme. It could
moreover be seen as an effort to activate the role of the prefectoral level
in the process of the Democratic Planning/2 which signifies departure
from the extra-institutional formulation of developmental plans.
The background to these developments highlights important elements
in the process of reform. In this particular case, it was the Commission's
initiative to which YPETHO responded positively. Following the Commission's
suggestions YPETHO's political leadership, instructed the Secretaries General
of the Regions to adopt a new logic in planning. The operation was undertaken
in person by the Deputy Minister and the Secretary General of YPETHO, who
held meetings with the Secretaries General of the Regions and gave the
guidelines.73 Following this the Secretary General of the Region of Thessaly
organized several meetings between the staff of the Region and public and
private actors involved in ROP planning in all tiers. During these meetings the
staff of the Region tried to imbue the actors with the new planning logic. Main
elements of this dialectic were: a) the need to draw up technical studies before
projects are submitted for approval, b) the need to take into consideration the
developmental problems of the wider area of their own entity since the
development of the wider area involves gains for all entities included in it.
However, not all the Regions, -and as noted above not all localities within the
Region of Thessaly- responded positively, which means that the Commission's
ideas materialised in Thessaly as a result of a coincidence of actors with a
reforming logic. This highlights the validity of the actor-centred argument
according to which actors are important in the empowerment of subnational
tiers.
72 See Chapter Five above, on the introduction of the Prefectoral Self-government and its
ensuing disarming in developmental planning.
73 Interview with D. Economou, July 2000.
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Summary
The case study has shown that there has been a slow though not
substantial improvement in the regional policy process during the two
programming periods. As far as empowerment of the regional tier is
concerned, the Region of Thessaly confirms the pattern observed in the other
regions of the country, i.e. the perpetuation of organisational and managerial
incapacity, and even further dependence on and control by the Central State.
Similarly, there has been centralisation of power at the regional level as a result
of the introduction of the PSG, while the weaknesses of the lower tiers, as
revealed in their inability to carry out successfully their tasks as implementing
agents of projects remains a major problem.
All the pathological features of the public works production process,
despite the application of the new tools, persisted as well.
On the other hand, the operation of the Regional Development Fund
and the preparatory phase of the 3rd ROP, have unveiled the significance of the
role of personalities in the reforming effort.
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Conclusions
The institutional reforms provided for in the 1988 revision of the
Structural Funds viewed empowerment of subnational tiers in terms of
administrative and developmental capacity. The uniform rules to be applied by
all Member-States aimed at producing administrative convergence with view
to achieving social and economic cohesion.
The research goal of this project has been to find out whether and to
what extent the application of the two CSFs induced changes in the domestic
regional policy process in terms of structures and practices. The research has
shown that several new institutions were introduced to meet the needs arising
from the application of the Community Support Frameworks. The adaptability
of the domestic system to these reforms has been rather low. According to the
main argument of this thesis, the reason why traditional patterns persisted
throughout the two programming periods, despite the introduction of
significant reforms especially after 1994, is due to the fact that these reforms
challenged core elements of the existing opportunity structures. More
specifically, they challenged the centralised clientelist State, and the networks
of public and private actors built around the system of resource allocation for
local development programmes, that sustain and are sustained precisely by the
centralised clientelist State. To a much lesser degree, the classical "security
dilemma" has influenced the reforming process, while the role of individual
actors has also been important.
More analytically the research has revealed the following:
Some reforms were introduced in compliance with Community
statutory obligations. Some were urged by the pressing needs of the Funds'
management. Others had been part of the domestic reform agenda and were
accelerated by the process of European integration. The origins differed as to
whether they were directly or indirectly related to European integration.
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However, the outcome of the reforms has been rather uniform in terms of
adaptability of the existing system.
The introduction of the regional tier in Greece did not summon
devolution of power. This argument is supported by the fact that despite the
continuous transfer of new competencies to the Region, there has been no
analogous transfer of resources in terms of staff and technical infrastructure.
The Region has been from the beginning an abortive formation and remains so
to a very large extent to date.
The creation of a parallel matrix of bodies to assist the Regions'
managerial function in the context of the CSFs clearly suggests that the only
preoccupation of the State when introducing the new institutions has been the
management of the ROPs -centrally controlled- not the empowerment of the
Regions. In reality, the external matrix reinforced the Region's bondage to the
Central State, since employment of all the new agents remained the latter's
responsibility. The Programme Managers and the Evaluators, despite their
valuable contribution to the management of the ROPs have been YPETHO's
employees.
Even more illustrative of the above argument has been the introduction
of the Management Organisation Units (MOU) and the Technical Consultants
of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), both under YPETHO's direct control.
The Commission's role in introducing the above innovations, especially the
MOU and JMC, the pressure it exerted towards this direction similarly
illustrates preoccupation with the managerial capacity of the Regions not their
political empowerment vis-a-vis the State, which at any rate has never been the
Commission's intention. To the Commission, adoption of the external matrix
has been the appropriate means to address the managerial deficiencies of the
Greek administrative system, as it was believed that the public administration
was far too "sick" to cure. Therefore, private actors should be used to address
the existing deficiencies. This is the reason why Commission officials have
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embraced enthusiastically the idea of private economic consultants when first
suggested in 1991 by the Deputy Minister or National Economy. This is also the
reason why it threatened to discontinue funding unless MOU was introduced.
Against this background, YPETHO sought to ensure control of the new
institution fearing that its authority would be bypassed in case MOU was
controlled instead by the Commission. Likewise, the Technical Consultants
were external actors, limiting the authority of the Secretary General of the
Region, as directly answerable to YPETHO.
Similarly, the establishment of the Regional Development Funds (RDF)
should not be interpreted as an effort to empower the regional tier. There are
two dimensions in this development: a) The need on the part of the Central
State to achieve decongestion of administrative functions retaining a
supervisory role, which is also reflected in the continuous devolution other
competencies to the Regions, b) The expectations on the part of the Ministry for
the Interior (YPESDDA) that the creation of the RDF would somehow restore
the balance of power over the Regions -which it considers its own offspring-,
vis-a-vis the Ministry for National Economy (YPETHO), which due to its
central role in European Funds management acquired additional powers and
influence. A reflection of the competition on this issue is the fact that
YPESDDA supported the introduction of RDF while YPETHO hindered it.
However, even the establishment of the RDF should not be expected to -and
indeed it did not finally- challenge YPETHO's supremacy.
As a result of the application of the CSFs there has been not only further
centralisation of power towards the central level of governance, but also
concentration of power at YPETHO at the expense of the influence of other
Ministries. Apart form the competition with YPESDDA, the case of the
Ministry for the Environment, City Planning and Public Works (YPEHODE), is
also illustrative of YPETHO's tendency to increase its power and influence.
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The prefectoral tier has been weakening and lost completely its
predominance in local development planning process, as it was replace in its
role of resource dispenser by the Region. This development is directly related
to the management of the Community Funds by the regional tier. The
establishment of self-government at the Prefectures risked to deprive the
Central State of the control it exerted on resource allocation for local
development through clientelist networks preserving electoral balances. The
transfer of power to the Region, headed by the Secretary General, a political
appointee, secured the firm grip of the Central State on the Community funds
which constitute the only serious source for development in Greece and
consequently, the perpetuation of the existing opportunity structures.
This development suggests that it was awareness that the Region's
significance was growing as a result of the management of Community
programmes, while the Prefecture's importance was moving in reverse order
on exactly the same account. This allowed for the long delayed introduction of
the PSG. In other words, the application of the Community Regional Policy
(CRP) raised the profile of the Regions paving at the same time the way for the
introduction of the PSG. However, in no way did these developments summon
empowerment of either tier, quite the contrary. The PSGs have been constantly
withering away in every possible term to the point of raising doubts as to the
purpose of their existence, while the Regions continue to suffer from extreme
organisational weakness, to such a degree that their operation often becomes
problematic.
Moreover, the Local Self-government Organisations, despite the fact that
more competencies were transferred to them, remain in their majority weak
and unable to carry out their tasks as implementing agents of projects in the
context of the Regional Operational Programmes. The mergers introduced
towards the end of the 2nd CSF have not produced in most cases, strong local
developmental entities.
Conclusions p. 246
As a result of the above, the old pattern of regional development
process, in which the Prefecture headed by the appointed Prefect played a
dominant role in resource allocation, has been replaced by a new one in which
the Region substituted for the Prefecture in this role. The clientelist networks of
public and private actors involved in the process of public works production
have moved to the Regional level.
These factors indicate that changes in structures may have been
inevitable due to European integration, but they occurred in such a way as to
ensure maintenance of the traditional opportunity structures. In reality, there
has been further centralisation of power as to the level of aggregation and
articulation of interests, since this moved to the Region, i.e. closer to the Central
State, while there has not been a change in practices i.e. clientelism remains the
dominant modus operandi of regional policy process, although slightly
restricted.
These points are further illuminated by the features of the particular
phases of regional policy process in the European context. Over-fragmentation
of resources and budget underestimation of projects, key features of the
traditional policy process persisted throughout the two programming periods,
again slightly restricted by the reform of the public works production system.
On the other hand, the reforming process has brought into relief the all-
important role of the Commission in the implementation of the Community
policies. Facilitated by the soft law aspect of the CSFs, and fostered by the
endemic weakness of the Greek administration, Commission intervention has
been often rigorous, as shown in the case of the reform of the public works
production system, involving further centralisation of power.
Overall, the centralised clientelist State has been preserved despite the
imposition of new operational tools. This suggests that existing institutions are
deeply rooted in culture and the dynamics they released when defending their
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maintenance and reproduction has proven far too powerful for the reforms
introduced. It is stressed once again that this does not mean that traditional
institutions have been left completely untouched. It means that their
persistence has been very strong and as a result the change has been slow and
of a limited scope. The self-reforming capacity of the Greek society, impaired
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